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The urgency to reduce current greenhouse gases emissions from both developing and 
developed country parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change to stabilise the global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius or well below at 
the end of the present century has led the international climate change diplomacy to adopt 
the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change in replacement to the Kyoto Protocol after 
it expires in 2020. Although substantially nuanced in its approach, the Paris Agreement 
represents as a new climate change treaty, a significant regime shift for developing 
countries, because it puts them under a legally binding obligation to undertake emission 
mitigation activities, conversely to the Kyoto Protocol which left them free from any 
obligation. This is because the objective of stabilising the global temperature increase at 
2 degrees Celsius as said above requires considerable mitigation efforts from all 
countries, urged to undertake a transition towards fully decarbonised economies by the 
half of this century.  
 
In order to determine to what extent the greenhouse gases emission reduction regime has 
for developing country shifted from what it was under the Kyoto Protocol to what it has 
become under the Paris Agreement, the study focuses on two following questions:  (i) 
What are the differences and the similarities between the greenhouse gases emissions 
mitigation regime under both treaties, and, (ii) what are the implications of those probable 
differences or similarities for the developing countries?  Whereas at a first glance the 
analysis shows that there are not much substantial elements of comparison between the 
two regimes instituted by the two climate change treaties, a closer consideration of the 
characteristics of the new universal regime under the Paris Agreement has offered 
pathways for an intensive regime comparison between Kyoto and Paris. Analysis further 
allowed us throw lights on the implications of the differences and similarities of both 
regimes for the group of developing countries. The study at last makes valuable 
recommendations for a successful implementation of the Paris Agreement by Developing 
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1.1. Background to the study  
 
In the nineties, global concerns arose from the discovery that the earth’s climate was 
changing due to increasing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases;1 this was 
mainly attributed to human or anthropogenic activities, such as energy production and 
consumption, industrial development, mining, agriculture, land use patterns and 
forestry.2 The industrialisation movement which started around 1850, has been 
particularly finger pointed for emitting large amounts of greenhouse gases to the extent 
of reaching levels of concentrations that has exacerbated the natural greenhouse gas 
effect, causing the current climate change.3 Many adverse phenomena such as violent 
storms and cyclones, increase of sea levels, floods of low coastal areas, loss of 
biodiversity, degeneration of natural ecosystems, heats, etc. are consequences of climate 
change.4 Climate scientists predict that those events will occur with more severity in 
future if the current trend of greenhouse gas emissions is not improved.5 
  
Under the aegis of the United Nations (UN),6 member states adopted the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, with the ultimate 
objective of ensuring the stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that will not be harmful to humankind.7 In other words, the 
                                                          
1 Greenhouse gases refer to the gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, 
that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation. See section 2.1.1 below for more details on Greenhouse gases.  
2 IPCC ‘Climate Change 1990 and 1992 Synthesis Report’ (1992) 63. Available at: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/1992%20IPCC%20Supplement/IPCC_1990_and_1992_Assessments/En
glish/ipcc_90_92_assessments_far_full_report.pdf (Accessed: 10 April 2016). 
3 See chapter two below for definition and more details on ‘Climate change’; see Article 1 of the 
UNFCCC; See IPCC ‘Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report’ (2014), 39 – 54.  
4 P. Huybrechts & J. De Wolde ‘The dynamic response of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets to 
multiple-century climatic warming’ (1999) 12 J. Clim 2169 at 2170; IPCC (b) ‘Climate Change 2014 
Synthesis Report’ (2014) at 40 – 54. 
5 See ‘Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report’ (2014) at 40 – 54. 
6 The United Nations Organisation [Herein after referred to as UN] is an international organization 
founded in 1945 to unite the nations of the world. It is currently made up of 193 Member States. Its mission 
and work are guided by the purposes and principles contained in its founding Charter. See more details 
at: http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/overview/index.html (Accessed: 10 April 2016). 
7 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [hereinafter referred to as “the 
UNFCCC”, or “the Convention”] was adopted on the 19th of May 1992 in New York, and entered into 
force on 21 March 1994. It has currently 197 Parties, 196 of which are States and 1 is the European Union. 




framework convention came up with the international response to the climate change 
threat. The unanimity upon the adoption of the UNFCCC proved a high level of 
engagement by country members of the UN to the climate change issue.8 Inspired by the 
regime9 that was instituted under the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer10 and the 1987 Montreal Protocol,11 the Convention adopted a regime of 
differential treatment as it allocated commitments to country parties (Annex I and Annex 
II, or developed countries, and Non-Annex I, or developing countries),12 in 
acknowledgement of their unequal historical responsibilities towards climate change.13 
The UNFCCC so acted on the basis of the principle of Equity and Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective capabilities, in accordance with parties’ 
respective capabilities.14 The Convention instituted the two key strategies that represent 
the international response to the climate change threat, which are the mitigation and the 
adaptation. It further urged developed country parties to take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.15  
 
As also acknowledged under the UNFCCC preamble, developed countries are the 
primary contributors to the aggravation of the concentrations of greenhouse gas in the 
atmosphere, owing to two centuries of industrialisation.16 That was the reason why it 
was agreed under the Convention not to put on the two groups of countries the same 
burden with respect to emissions reduction obligations.17  
                                                          
8 Moncel et al "Building the climate change regime: Survey and analysis of approaches." WRI/UNEP 
(2011) at 2. Available at: http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/building_the_climate_change_regime.pdf 
(Accessed: 10 April 2016). 
9 See section 2.1.1 below for the definition of a “Regime”. 
10 The 1985 Vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer [herein after referred to as “the 1985 
Vienna Convention”] See Section 3.1.1.2 below for more details. 
11 ‘The Montreal Protocol to the 1985 Vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer was 
originally adopted on 16 September 1987, and entered into force on 1 January 1989. See Section 3.1.1.2 
below for details. 
12 Article 4 of the UNFCCC. 
 13 See Preamble of the UNFCCC; W. Obergassel et al ‘Phoenix from the ashes–An analysis of the Paris 
Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ (March 2016) at 8. 
Available at: http://wupperinst.org/fa/redaktion/downloads/publications/Paris_Results.pdf. (Accessed: 
August 18, 2016); See also D. Bodansky (a) ‘The history of the global climate change regime’ (2001) 
IRGCC 23 at 40; D. Sher & A. Sauer ‘The Montreal Protocol and Its Implications for Climate Change’ 
(2009) Issue Brief EESI. Available at: http://www.eesi.org/files/100609_montreal_brief.pdf, (accessed: 
20 Avril 2016). 
14Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. 
15 Ibid. see for more details: http://unfccc.int/focus/adaptation/items/6999.php. Accessed on 10 May 2016. 
See also http://unfccc.int/focus/Mitigation/items/6999.php. Accessed on 10 May 2016. 
16 Preamble of the UNFCCC. 




In 1997, almost five years after the adoption of the UNFCCC, in pursuit of the ultimate 
objective of the Convention, country parties agreed to adopt a legally binding 
instrument, the Kyoto Protocol18 which introduced binding emission reduction targets 
only for developed countries, urging them to reduce their anthropogenic emissions by at 
least 5.2 percent in average, below the 1990 levels.19 The protocol refrained from 
providing for any emissions limitations to developing countries, arguing that they played 
no significant role in the current aggravation of GHG atmospheric concentration.20 
However, the Protocol ran for a first commitment period, from 2005 to 2012, without 
yielding the expected outcome.21  The second commitment period has been running 
since 2013 to end in 2020, with comparatively lesser country parties and hence lesser 
emissions covered.22  
 
In 2005, scholars such as Philibert,23 drew attention to the fact that the absence of 
binding emissions limitations to developing countries had the potential to increase their 
emission over time, and therefore defeat the very purpose of the Convention. Similarly, 
scholars such as Den Elzen,24 and Dellink25 noticed the increasing change in the global 
                                                          
18 The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC [Hereinafter referred to as “the Protocol”, or “Kyoto”] See chapter 
four below for more details; See also Glemarec et al ‘Catalysing Climate Finance: A Guidebook on Policy 
and Financing Options to Support Green, Low-Emission and Climate-Resilient Development.’ (2011) 
UNDP at 9; Available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (Accessed: 10 May 2016). 
19 The Kyoto emissions targets varied in three ways, between (i) -10 degrees Celsius from 1990 emission 
levels, (ii) the stabilization of 2005 levels, and (iii) allowable increases from 1990 levels. But in average, 
it came to 5.2 percent of reduction. See Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, and Annex B of the UNFCCC for 
details; See also chapter four below for more details; See also K.L. Mbeva & P. Pauw ‘Self-Differentiation 
of Countries' Responsibilities Addressing Climate Change through Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions’ (April 2016) Discussion Paper Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, at 9-10. 
Available at: https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_4.2016.pdf. (Accessed: 10 August 2016). 
20 Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration proclaims that ‘in the view of different contributions to the 
global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities’. See United 
Nations (1992) 
 ‘Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development’ at 2. Available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/education/nfsunesco/pdf/RIO_E.PDF. (Accessed: 7 May 2016); See also 
preamble and Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. 
21 E.R. Korhola The rise and the fall of the Kyoto Protocol (Unpublished LLM thesis, University of 
Helsinki, 2014) 19-20. Available at: 
https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/136507/Therisea.pdf; (Accessed: 02 February 2016). 
22 Ibid Korhola at 21. 
23 C. Philibert et al ‘Considering the options: climate targets for all countries’ (2001) 1 (2) Clim Policy 
211 at 212. 
24 Den Elzen, M. et al ‘Differentiating future commitments on the basis of countries’ relative historical 
responsibility for climate change: uncertainties in the ‘Brazilian Proposal’ in the context of a policy 
implementation’ (2008) 71 (3) Climatic Change 277 at 277. 





distribution of contributions to greenhouse gas emission. This was due to a rapid 
industrialisation of developing countries.26 They concluded that there was increasing 
probability for a new regime that will split responsibilities in the future, between those 
that were already identified as historically responsible for climate change, and the 
current and future new responsible for climate change that are being identified, which 
are the developing countries with fast developing economies.27 Along with Den Elzen,28 
other scholars also noticed the continuing rise in global emissions and concentrations of 
greenhouse gases throughout the 21st century, a contradiction to the objective of the 
UNFCCC.29 Dellink30 for example, criticised countries for being responsible for the rise 
of emissions in contradiction to the commitments they themselves made for emission 
reduction under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol.31  
 
As discussed by Dubois32 and other scholars,33 the UNFCCC differential treatment 
approach lost its broader support over the years. This arguably for three reasons. First, 
as supported by Dubois,34 in comparison to 1992, the world’s situation has rapidly 
changed. Developing countries are today a more heterogeneous group that is at diverse 
stages of development, and they differ in vulnerability towards climate change, and 
hence the need of differentiating among them as well.35 Secondly, it became noticeable 
that emissions from developing countries rapidly grew into alarming proportions, as put 
by Winkler.36 Therefore, there came up a need for mitigation actions on the side of 
developing countries in contribution to the objective of the Convention, although for the 
majority of them, much more emphasis had to be put rather on adaptation to climate 
change, considering the insignificance of their GHG emissions. Thirdly, the pressure put 
by the significant emission gap between countries’ mitigation pledges and the required 
                                                          
26 Ibid.  
27 Elzen (note 24 above; 277); W.J.W. Botzen et al ‘Cumulative CO2 emissions: shifting international 
responsibilities for climate debt’ (2008) 8 Climate Policy 569 at 570. 
28 Ibid Elzen. 
29 Moncel (note 8 above; 2); Dellink (note 25 above; 411). 
30 Ibid Dellink at 415. 
31 Korhola (note 21 above; 19-20) 
32 S.M. Dubois ‘the Paris Agreement: A New Step in the Gradual Evolution of Differential Treatment in 
the Climate Regime?’ (2016) 25 2 RECIEL 151 at 151. 
33 J. Lee ‘Rooting the Concept of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in Established Principles 
of International Environmental Law’ (2015) 17 VJofEnvt law 28 at 29. 
34 Dubois (note 32 above; 152). 
35 Ibid Dubois; H. Winkler et al (a) ‘Future mitigation commitments: differentiating among non-Annex I 
countries’ (2006) 5 (5) Climate Policy 469 at 473.  




volume of emissions that was needed for a reduction in order to maintain the increase of 
the terrestrial temperature within harmless levels.37 Therefore, there grew among 
country parties to the UNFCCC a need to develop a more global instrument whose 
regime will solve the above concerns.  
 
Adopted within the above context, the 2015 Paris Agreement aimed at strengthening the 
global response to the threat of climate change by holding the increase in the global 
average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius, or at best 1.5 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels.38 Based on the principle of Equity and Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities, in the light of different 
national circumstances, the Paris Agreement is applicable to all the parties to the 
UNFCCC, thus putting an end to the differential treatment that existed under the Kyoto 
protocol.39  
 
1.2. Problem statement  
 
Although nuanced in substance, the Paris Agreement represents a significant regime 
shift for developing countries, as it puts them under legally binding obligation to 
undertake greenhouse gases emission mitigation activities.40 This is because the urgency 
to reach the ambitious goal of stabilising the global temperature increase at 1.5 degrees 
Celsius requires considerable efforts from all countries to achieve full decarbonisation 
of their economies by 2050.41 Such a shift will require a broad and deep transition within 
the legal and financial sectors.42 However, it is well documented that the capacity of 
                                                          
37 ‘The emissions gap between what the full implementation of the unconditional INDCs contribute and 
the least-cost emission level for a pathway to stay below 2°C, is estimated to be 7 GtCO2e in 2025 and 14 
GtCO2e in 2030. See UNEP The Emissions Gap Report 2015 (2015) at 18. Available at: 
http://uneplive.unep.org/media/docs/theme/13/EGR_2015_301115_lores.pdf (Accessed: 10 April 2016). 
38 Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. 
39 Ibid Article 2 and Article 3. 
40 Article 3 of the Paris Agreement provides: ‘As Nationally Determined Contributions to the global 
response to climate change, all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined in 
Articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 with the view of achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in 
Article 2. The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time, while recognizing the need to 
support developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement.’ 
41 Article 4.1 of Paris Agreement; M. Ivanova ‘Good COP, bad COP: Climate Change after Paris’ 
(2016) Briefing note at 415. Available at: 
http://www.futureun.org/media/archive1/briefings/FUNDS_Brief40_Paris_Climate_April2016.pdf. 





developing countries to adapt to climate changes and to minimise their own 
contributions to it through mitigation actions is constrained by their limited 
resources.43Although the regime under the Paris Agreement acknowledges the need for 
a support to developing countries to effectively implement the treaty, no legal obligation 
has been put on developed parties to provide that support.44  
 
Meanwhile, after the entry into force of the Agreement in 2020, developing countries 
will be under legal obligation to submit their Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDC) to UNFCCC Secretariat as a contribution to the global response to climate 
change that reflects a progression of national ambitions over a period of time,45 which 
will be reviewable every five years.46 This amounts to considerable mitigation efforts to 
be undertaken at the expense of their nationally scarce resources,47 while the reality of 
parties’ differing capabilities to address the various climate change issues poses 
problem, and remain one of the two prongs of the CBDR principle, along with the 
varying historical responsibilities parties have towards climate change.48 
 
This study, therefore, is centred on the shift that occurred between the regime of the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC and the regime of the 2015 Paris Agreement on 
climate change for the group of developing countries, with respect to greenhouse gases 
emissions mitigation. The study will follow the pathway of the universal regime as it 
was progressively taking place under the aegis of the Conference of the Parties to the 
United Nations Convention on Climate Change. The study will further identify and 
discuss the key features of the new regime under the Paris Agreement, which represents 
a major transition for developing countries, in comparison to their situation under the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
                                                          
43 IPCC ‘Climate Change 1990 and 1992 Synthesis Report’ (1992) at 113; M. Betsill et al ‘Building 
Productive Links between the UNFCCC and the Broader Global Climate Governance Landscape’ (2015) 
15 (2) G EP 1 1. 
44 See Article 3 of the Paris Agreement at note 40 above. 
45 Ibid.   
46 Article 14.2 of the Paris Agreement.  
47 See for more details W. Chandler et al ‘Climate change mitigation in developing countries’ (2002) 
PCGCC at ii. Available at: http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/dev_mitigation.pdf, (Accessed: 14 
September 2016). 
48 L. Rajamani (a) Differential treatment in international environmental law 175 (2006) at 1-2; this (and 






1.3. Objective of the study 
 
Against this background, the study sets out to draw a comparative analysis between the 
two legal regimes that govern greenhouse gases emission abatement by developing 
countries. The first regime is the one under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (the first and the 
second commitment periods) and the second regime is the one under the 2015 Paris 
Agreement on climate change. To that end, the study will be limited and focused only 
on the core provisions of both instruments that are concerned about the issue of the 
greenhouse gases emissions reduction by developing countries.  
 
1.4. Reason for choosing the subject and limitations to the study 
 
Many analyses have been conducted on the Kyoto Protocol’s legal regime for 
developing countries, regarding the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC. They are 
standing witnesses of the contribution of scholars to the legal debate on the issue of 
climate change. Doubtlessly, it is thanks to them that further steps have been taken in 
the international climate change governance. This was also stated in the Paris Climate 
Agreement, called to supersede the repudiated Kyoto Protocol, which is awaiting the 
expiration of its second commitment period in 2020, to flow into the ocean of history. 
The present research, however, finds its justification in the fact that it is relevant to 
consider well in advance the entry into force of the Paris Agreement the bulk of the 
greenhouse mitigation legal obligation that lies on the shoulders of the developing 
country parties. Although the study will not constitute a normative assessment of the 
Paris Agreement and its new universal climate change regime, but rather a tracking of 
the transition of the emission mitigation regime for developing countries from Kyoto to 
Paris, the study will nevertheless explore some of the probable weaknesses of the 
Agreement that are linked with developing countries mitigation regime. Such insights 
will doubtlessly help the reader have a broader view on the legal and institutional issues 
with respect to the new emission mitigation obligations for developing countries. 
Conclusions will be drawn from the analysis which we hope will have the honour of 
putting some few matters on the ever-busy table of scholars for further insightful 









1.5. Key question to be answered 
 
The key question to be investigated in the study is, “To what extent has the greenhouse 
gases emission reduction regime of developing country parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on climate change shifted from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 
2015 Paris Agreement on climate change?” To do so, the study will be focused on the 
following broad questions:  
 
i. What are the differences and the similarities between the greenhouse gases 
emissions mitigation regime under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC 
and the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change for developing countries? 
 
ii. If there are any differences or similarities in the greenhouse gases emissions 
reduction obligations under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris 
Agreement, what are the implications of those differences or similarities for 
the developing countries?  
 
1.6. Research methodology 
 
This is a desktop study and it will include a content analysis, comparison of regimes 
under the two different treaties, analysis of official reports and statistics from some 
national and international authoritative institutions, as well as applicable scholarly 
literature. 
 
1.7. Structure of the dissertation 
 
The dissertation starts with a first chapter that proposes an overview of the study, 
followed by a second chapter that focuses on the key concepts of the study, with, in its 
heart, the CBDR Principle, the spearhead of the differential treatment under the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and heart of the Paris Agreement as well. Its third 
chapter will bring in the consideration of the historical developments of the developing 
countries’ international climate change regime as it evolved over the years. The fourth 




developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol, while the fifth chapter will lean on the 
emissions’ reduction legal regime by developing countries under the Paris Agreement. 
A sixth chapter will briefly undertake a comparative analysis between the two regimes 
established by the two treaties, before handing over to a seventh chapter that will be a 











‘There is no question that climate change is happening; the only arguable point is what part 
humans are playing in it.’49  
 
Through the recent decades, climate change has become one of the highly discussed 
topics in the public domain, and will probably continue in the future to be one of the 
most important subjects that are discussed internationally.50 From a legal perspective, 
the issue of climate change has become one of the central spots of the international 
environmental law diplomacy.51 In this regard, the feeling of the interest for the current 
study is to first ensure that the notion of climate change, along with its related major 
topics are properly introduced, defined and discussed because this study will refer to 
them throughout. This will also be the case for notions such as “greenhouse gas”, 
“developing and developed countries”, and the CBDR which are linked to climate 
change, and will be referred to throughout this study abundantly. These general key 
notions are explored before engaging into the proper legal analysis in order to avoid 
basing this present study on biased information. Therefore, this chapter starts with the 
notions of climate change, greenhouse gases emission and mitigation, then it discusses 
the concepts of developing and developed countries before focusing on the principle of 
CBDR as conceptually defined and understood by some of the key emitting countries, 
and also how the principle applies under the ozone layer regime and under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), two regimes that share some similarities 
with the climate change regime.52  
                                                          
49 Quote from David Attenborough. Available at: 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/climate_change.html. (Accessed: 28 October 2016). 
50 S. Barrett et al ‘Towards a workable and effective climate regime’ (2015) Re3 Forthcoming at 23.  
51 Baker & Mckenzie The Paris Agreement: Putting the first universal climate change treaty in context 
(2015) at 25. Report available at: http://www.bakermckenzie.com/-
/media/files/insight/publications/2016/01/the-paris-
agreement/ar_global_climatechangetreaty_apr16.pdf?la=en. (Accessed: 14 October 2016). 
52 G.J. Velders et al ‘The importance of the Montreal Protocol in protecting climate’ (2007) 104 (12) 





2.2. The climate change phenomenon: Discovery, description and reasons for 
concern53 
 
A newly observed atmospheric phenomenon that was previously unknown to both 
scientists and the general public, the “greenhouse effect” caught the attention of the 
Swedish chemist S. Arrhenius at the turn of the 20th century.54 While pursuing his 
researches, Arrhenius55 later found out that the observed greenhouse effect was even 
related to a more complex phenomenon that was also occurring, which signalled itself 
through observed changes in the climate of the planet earth. Climate is defined as the 
‘average weather’,56 while the observed changes in the climate are referred to as “climate 
change”.57  
 
Two globally accepted definitions of climate change serve as references: the IPCC 
definition,58 also qualified as the “scientific definition”,59 and the UNFCCC definition, 
also tagged as the “political definition”,60 Pielke61 noticed the existence of serious 
                                                          
53 See section 3.1.1 below for details on the history of the discovery of climate change. 
54 Bodansky (a) (note 13 above; 32). 
55 ‘In 1895, S. Arrhenius presented an answer to the Stockholm physical society in a work entitled ‘on the 
influence of carbonic acid in the air on the temperature of the ground’ formulating a scientific model for 
the planet in which, changes in the atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide are matched by changes in surface 
temperatures. He further published a book ‘Worlds in the making (1908)’ in which he described the 
greenhouse effect (referred to as the hot-house theory) confirming that the earth’s surface temperature 
would be about 30 degrees Celsius cooler than it presently is without the effect of atmospheric gases’; See 
Bodansky (a) (note 13 above; 24).  
56 Climate is described in terms of the mean and variability of temperature, precipitation and wind over a 
period of time, ranging from months to millions of years (the classical period being 30 years); See for 
details: IPCC 2014 (a) Climate Change: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group 
III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) at 96. 
Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_full.pdf. (Accessed: 12 
August 2016). 
57  IPCC 2014 (note 56 above; 1255).  
58 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPCC”. It is a 
cosponsored independent scientific body consisting of over 2000 scientific and technical experts from 
around the world, who collect scientific information about the causes of climate change, its potential 
effects and possible ways to mitigate these effects. It was established in 1988. It issued its First Assessment 
Report in 1990 under the title “Climate Change, the IPCC scientific assessment”, confirming the threat of 
climate change, however with no scientific certainties with respect to its causes, effects on ecosystems, 
humans, etc. The IPCC’s subsequent reports have progressively brought in more lights on Climate change 
related issues and consequently dispersed many previous uncertainties. Information available at: 
https://www.ipcc.ch/organization.shtml; (Accessed: 9 May 2016).  
59 Legates et al ‘Climate consensus and ‘misinformation’: a rejoinder to agnotology, scientific consensus, 
and the teaching and learning of climate change’ (2015) 24 3 Sc. & Ed. 299 at 309. 
60 Ibid. 
61 AR. Pielke ‘Misdefining “climate change”: consequences for science and action’ (2005) 8 (6) ES & P 




inconsistencies between what the scientific community under the IPCC regard as 
‘‘climate change’’ and what constitutes ‘‘climate change’’ in the language of the climate 
change convention. 
 
Article 2.1 of the UNFCCC defines climate change as a change of climate which is 
attributed directly or indirectly to human activities that alter the composition of the 
global atmosphere,62 and which is in addition to natural climate variability,63 observed 
over comparable time periods”.64 The IPCC proposed a more inclusive definition, in 
contrast to the restrictive one in the UNFCCC. Climate change for the IPCC refers to a 
change in the state of the climate that can be identified by changes in the mean and / or 
the variability of its properties and which persist for an extended period, typically 
decades or longer”.65 Changes in the state of climate are identified through the use of 
statistical tests.66 Hardy67 noticed that scientists tend to use the UNFCCC’s definition of 
climate change while referring to the post-industrial era, whereas they use the IPCC one 
for the pre-industrial times.  
 
The interpretation of ‘the climate change definition’ has evolved according to Gupta,68 
who noticed that it earlier took into account environmental issues, and later on started 
broadening progressively to include developmental considerations. Not only that but the 
UNFCCC attributed climate change exclusively to human activities, not taking into 
consideration any other probable causative factors, whereas, for the IPCC, climate 
                                                          
62 ‘The earth's atmosphere consists of about 78% nitrogen (N2), 20% oxygen (O2), and a mixture of small 
amounts of numerous other ingredients such as carbon dioxide (CO2), water vapour (H2O), methane 
(CH4), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and carbon monoxide (CO). Some of these minor constituents do, however, 
have big impacts.’ Information available at: 
http://www.windows2universe.org/earth/Atmosphere/chemical_composition.html&edu=high. 
(Accessed: 14 October 2016). 
63 ‘Climate variability refers to variations in the mean state and other statistics of the climate on all spatial 
and temporal scales beyond that of individual weather events. Variability may be due to natural internal 
processes within the climate system (internal variability), or to variations in natural or anthropogenic 
external forcing (external variability).’ See for details IPCC 2014 (note 56 above; 1257).   
64 Article 1. 2 of the UNFCCC. 
65 IPCC 2014 (note 56 above; 1255); It is important to notice that the definition of Climate Change 
proposed by the IPCC in 2014 is the result of some adjustments since the first IPCC Assessment Report 
in 1992, that were made as more scientific evidences were brought forward. The definition of Climate 
Change by the UNFCCC has on the contrary enjoyed a certain stability, undoubtedly thanks to its statutory 
nature, even though it has suffered strokes of critics and calls for adjustments ever since; See JT. Hardy 
‘Climate change: Causes, Effects, and Solutions’ (2003) John Wiley & Sons at 4. 
66 IPCC 2014 (note 56 above; 1257).  
67 Hardy (note 63 above; 4); JT. Houghton Global Warming: The Complete Briefing 4 Ed (2009) at 11.   




change was the result of many factors, not only those of anthropogenic origin. To that 
end, the IPCC mentions for instance, the natural internal processes and the external 
forces such as the modulations of solar cycles and the volcanic eruptions.69    
  
By adopting such a restraining approach in defining climate change, the Framework 
Convention made it clear from the start that it was of the view that all the efforts to be 
deployed in the sense of healing the climate were to be done with focus on anthropogenic 
activities alone.70 Kiss explains that the UNFCCC did so, because its purpose was to 
prevent any harm to the climate system by way of regulating state actions that are 
influential to the global climate,71 whilst a legal instrument was not the proper tool to 
regulate or have any effect on any of the natural causes of climate change. Therefore, 
the UNFCCC being a treaty, had to focus on the anthropogenic causes, because they are 
the only ones that are subject to human re-adjustment and manipulation.72  
  
In the present research, both definitions will be referred to as we consider them both to 
be credible. However, no special mention attached to the definition will always be 
suggested to the reader as a reference to the UNFCCC definition, whereas a special 
mention will signal whenever the researcher expects climate change to be momentarily 
envisaged from the IPCC perspective.  
 
Many adverse phenomena such as the warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, violent 
storms and cyclones, an increase of sea levels, floods of low coastal areas, loss of 
                                                          
69 For details about “internal processes”, and the “external forcing” see IPCC 2014 (note 56 above; 1255). 
70 From the beginning, the UNFCCC sowed but not purposely seeds of future conflicts around a suitable 
approach of combating climate change. By way of fearful discourses, nations were put under pressure and 
pushed to quick climate change actions, whilst there was yet not enough certainty on the human origins 
of climate change. Nations therefore were urged to act, however, states later abandoned that initial 
monolithic anthropogenic conception of the human’s origins of climate change, to embrace a more 
questionable conception of the matter, which henceforth accompanied the climate change discussions 
under the aegis of the UNFCCC. See Pielke (note 61 above; 548).  
71 ‘The climate system is the highly complex system consisting of five major components: the atmosphere, 
the hydrosphere, the cryosphere, the lithosphere and the biosphere, and the interactions between them. It 
evolves in time under the influence of its own internal dynamics and because of external forces such as 
volcanic eruptions, solar variations and anthropogenic forces such as the changing composition of the 
atmosphere and land use change (LUC).’ See for more details: IPCC 2014 (c) Climate Change 2014: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) at 1761; see 
Article 2 of the UNFCCC; see A. Kiss & D. Shelton International Environmental Law 2 Ed (2000) at 512. 




biodiversity, degeneration of natural ecosystems, heats, etc. are listed among the 
consequences of climate change.73 Climate scientists predict that those events will occur 
with more severity in future if the current trend of greenhouse gas emissions is not 
improved.74 In its 2014 IPCC Synthesis Report, the IPCC identified five reasons of 
concern about additional temperature increases due to climate change.75 These include 
the concern regarding the following:  
 
o Unique and threatened ecosystems and species.  
o The increase in the frequency and damage from extreme weather events.  
o The greater climate change vulnerability of homes of poorer communities.  
o The growing economic costs caused by the impacts acquired over time by increased 
atmospheric concentrations GHG.  
o The growing possibility of the occurrence of large scale singular events.  
 
Whereas, there are some unique and threatened ecosystems, cultures or species that are 
already at risk because of climate change, an additional warming of 1°C will as well 
represent for them additional risks, whereas a 2°C rise will mean a very high risk and 
increased vulnerability for many systems, especially those characterised by limited 
adaptive capacity.76 Although climate change related risks from extreme events such as 
heat waves, heavy precipitations, and coastal flooding, are moderate at present, a 1°C 
additional warming will represent a risk of increasing them.77 
 
In addition, the risks and consequences associated with climate change are unevenly 
distributed between groups of people and regions of the planet.78 With increasing 
warming, some physical and ecological systems are at risk of abrupt and/or irreversible 
changes.79 It was noticed that climate change risks and consequences were generally 
greater for disadvantaged people and communities everywhere.80 For instance the 
                                                          
73 Huybrechts (note 4 above; 2170); IPCC 2014 (b) Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report at 40 – 54. 
Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf. 
(Accessed: 12 August 2016). 
74 IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 40 - 54). 
75 IPCC 2014 (b) (Note 73 above; 151). 
76 Ibid IPCC 2014 (b) at 70. 







negative impact of climate change on crop production which is already serious in 
developing countries than in the developed ones will worsen with an additional warming 
of above 2 degrees Celsius.81 Although moderate with a one to two degrees Celsius 
temperature raise, there are further concerns about global aggregate impacts such as the 
loss of biodiversity and other impacts on the global economy. 82 
 
2.2.1. The rationale for a legal response to the climate change phenomenon 
 
The law is the discipline that regulates behaviours of all community members, binding 
them to the observance of its recognised values and standards.83 That is why, after the 
discovery of the climate change phenomenon, and the understanding of its drivers, the 
law had to be called upon by country parties to the United Nations Organisation in order 
to help drive a global climate change regime which would be an effective response to 
the climate threat. A regime is broadly defined as a system of principles and rules that 
are governing something and which is created by the law.84  
 
As discussed in the previous sections, GHG are emitted from natural or anthropogenic 
sources which are generally located within sovereign states’ jurisdictions. Despite the 
fact that the GHG emissions originate from local jurisdictions, their consequences are 
spread over and beyond the boundaries of national territories from where they are 
emitted, and thus are shared with remote foreign jurisdictions.85 Shaw86 even talks about 
the consequences of greenhouse emissions being “imposed” to remote victimised 
communities, because of the fact that the Earth’s climate functions as a whole 
coordinated and interrelated system. This, among the other things is what justified the 
adoption of the 1992 United Nations Climate Change Convention and its 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol. The first climate change regime began in 1992 and will be issued in 2020. 
However, from 2020 onwards, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol will be replaced by the 2015 
                                                          
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 M.N. Shaw International Law 6 Ed (2008) at 1.   
84 More detail about the definition of ‘regime’ available at: http://definitions.uslegal.com/l/legal-regime/, 
(Accessed: 02 April 2016). 
85 Shaw (note 83 above; 1).    




Paris Agreement, which will be the key climate change treaty, in co-existence with the 
UNFCCC whose objective the Paris Agreement has the ambition to enhance.87 
 
To effectively and proactively deal with the climate change threat, the UNFCCC regime 
established an institutional mechanism, a supreme body of the treaty, which is the 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP).88  The COPs have the mandate to take 
any decision that they find necessary to promote the effective implementation of the 
Convention. The COPs are identified by adding a number at the end, so that the first 
COP is denominated COP1, the second is COP2, and so on. 
 
Articles 2 and 16.1 of the UNFCCC entitle the COPs to adopt protocols or any other 
legal instrument under the Convention.89 On this basis, country parties adopted the 2015 
Paris Agreement as a universally legally binding treaty to enhance the climate change 
global action.  
 
The Paris Agreement does not merely constitute an addition or a clarification to its 
mother treaty the UNFCCC, as it was the case for the Kyoto Protocol. Viewed from 
several angles, the Paris Agreement constitutes an innovation compared to either the 
UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. It has for instance, dropped the Kyoto Protocol’s top 
down approach of sharing emissions obligations from targets that are defined inside the 
treaty, in favour of a more bottom up approach,90 that have the merit of leaving up to 
country parties the initiative of fixing themselves their national emissions limitation 
targets.91  
 
                                                          
87 See section 5.3.2 for details about the objective of the Paris Agreement. 
88 See Article 7 of the UNFCCC for more details about the Conference of the Parties institutional 
mechanism.  
89 Article 2, of the UNFCCC provides as follows: ‘the ultimate objective of this Convention and any 
related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at levels that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ 
The COP therefore acknowledged having legal right to adopt “any legal instruments” related to the 
UNFCCC. 
90 D. Bodansky (b) ‘A tale of two architectures: the once and future UN climate change regime’ In Brill 
Climate Change and Environmental Hazards Related to Shipping: An International Legal Framework 
(2012) 35 at 35. 




2.2.2. The Greenhouse Gases: Description, link with climate change, and the 
reasons for concern92 
 
In 2010, mankind injected approximately 49-54 billion tonnes of Greenhouse Gases 
(GHG) to the atmosphere.93 At the release of the 2014 IPCC’s 5th Assessment report in 
2014, the 2010’s record was the highest level that the anthropogenic GHG emissions 
ever reached in the climate change history.94 The same IPCC report established that the 
global anthropogenic GHG emissions had risen more rapidly during the period from 
2000 to 2010 in comparison to the previous three decades, with an average annual 
growth of 1.0 billion of tonnes (2.2 percent) in comparison to 0.4 billion of tonnes (1.3 
percent) per year from 1970 to 2000.95 What raises concerns is the fact that such 
emissions growth have occurred despite the presence of the UNFCCC, and its Kyoto 
Protocol, and besides an additional wider array of national and multilateral institutions 
and policies that all aimed at mitigating national or regional GHG emissions.96  
 
Article 1.5 of the UNFCCC defines the GHG as those gaseous constituents of the 
atmosphere, either natural or anthropogenic, whose properties are the absorbance and 
emission of radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of terrestrial radiation, 
emitted either by the Earth’s surface, or the atmosphere itself, or even by the clouds.97  
Any greenhouse gas is a causal agent of the ‘greenhouse effect’. The ‘greenhouse effect’ 
is the infrared radiative effect of all infrared absorbing constituents in the atmosphere.98 
The greenhouse effect is not in itself a harmful phenomenon, because it occurs naturally 
in order to keep the Earth’s temperature liveable and stable.99 What is harmful is its 
exacerbation.100 In fact, the magnitude of the greenhouse effect can increase due to the 
exacerbation of its atmospheric concentration,101 which generally originates from 
anthropogenic activities, and eventually results in the rise of the atmospheric 
                                                          
92 Herein after referred to either as GHG, or as greenhouse gases. 
93 IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 1257); further details about the IPCC measurement units are available 
at: https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/sroc/sroc_a4.pdf. (Accessed: 20 October 2016). 
94 IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 42). 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid.  
97 IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 1263); See also Article 1.5 of the UNFCCC. 
98 Ibid IPCC 2014 (a). 






temperature in order to gradually restore the radiative balance at the top of the 
atmosphere.102 This phenomenon is referred to as the ‘Global warming’.103 The Global 
warming in turn is responsible for the changes that occur in the climate, known as the 
climate change phenomenon.104  
 
The currently identified major GHG are: 105 Carbon dioxide (CO2)
 106 which is the most 
important contributor to climate change, accounting for approximately 76 percent of the 
phenomenon, while methane (CH4), the second one accounts for about 16 percent; the 
nitrous oxide (N2O) follows with approximately 6 percent and the combination of Per 
fluorocarbons (PFCs) and Hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs) accounting for 2 percent.107 The 
predominance of the carbon dioxide’s influence on the green house phenomenon 
justifies the use of the Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Emission (CO2-eq) as the 
measurement unit of GHG emissions.108 
 
Several factors are directly or indirectly contributing to GHG emissions,109 even though 
the literature is not unanimous as to how they should be classified, or identified.110 
Factors that are directly or indirectly contributing to the emission of greenhouse gases 
are referred to as “GHG emission drivers”, although the term, ‘driver’ may not represent 
an exact causality, and rather indicates an association which provides insights on the 
overall changes in global GHG emissions.111  
                                                          
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 See section 2.1 above. 
105 IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 125).  
106 Carbon dioxide is the largest component of anthropogenic GHG emissions. It is released during the 
combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and gas as well as the production of cement. See R. Houghton 
et al ‘Carbon emissions from land use and land-cover change.’ (2012) 9 Biogeosciences 5125 at 5126. 
107 IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 125). 
108 ‘The CO2 Equivalent (GtCO2eq) per year is the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emission that would 
cause the same integrated radiative forcing, over a given time horizon, as an emitted amount of a 
greenhouse gas (GHG) or a mixture of GHGs’. See IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 1257).   
109  Immediate Drivers are: Population, GDP per Capita, GHG intensity and energy intensity. Underlying 
Drivers are: behaviour, trade, infrastructure, resource availability, governance, technology, urbanisation 
and industrialisation. Policies and measures concern: economic incentive, research and development, 
information provision, direct regulation, non-climatic policies, and awareness creation. See details in PCC 
2014 (note 56 above; 357). 
110 ‘Some authors distinguish proximate versus underlying or ultimate drivers, whereas others propose 
different approaches. Proximate drivers are in general the activities directly or closely related to the 
generation of GHGs and underlying or ultimate drivers are those activities that motivate the proximate 
drivers.’ See IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 364); whereas others propose different approaches. 




Scholars also do not share the same view on the issue of what constitutes a key GHG 
emission driver. For instance, Hertwich and Peters112 think that it is the consumption 
patterns, whereas O’Neill113 concludes in favour of the population growth, and Bolla 
and Pendolovska114 draw attention rather to the energy consumption patterns. Blodgett 
and Parker115 find the population and economic growth to be the main GHG emission 
explanatory factors, while Jakob116 points out the international trade. On summarising 
the debate, the IPCC recognises that more often, it seems difficult to isolate a clear or 
unique cause-and-effect relation for a certain phenomenon through the lens of scientific 
observation. Not only that but the reality is that most of the drivers of GHG emissions 
are interlinked with each other, and besides they each can be deconstructed into various 
sub-components.117 
 
Despite these opposing ideas, many scholars however agree on the fact that the GHG 
emission drivers can be either immediate, or underlying, or even of a policy and 
measures order.118 Immediate drivers touch to issues such as the size of the population, 
the GDP per capita, the energy intensity pattern as well as the GHG intensity.119  
Underlying drivers refer to factors such as behaviours, trade, resources availability, 
governance, technology, urbanisation, industrialisation, as well as matters regarding 
infrastructure development.120 Policies and measures that affect GHG emissions are 
those that address climate change awareness, economic incentives, local and national 
                                                          
112 E.G. Hertwich & G.P. Peters ‘Carbon footprint of nations: A global, trade-linked analysis’ (2009) 43 
(16) Environ. Sci. technol. 6414 at 6414. Available at: http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es803496a 
(Accessed: 05 September 2016). 
113 B. C. O’Neill et al ‘Global demographic trends and future carbon emissions’ (2010) 107 Nat. Acad. Of 
Sc. of the USA 17521 at 17521. Available at: http://www.pnas.org/content/107/41/17521.short. 
(Accessed: 05 September 2016). 
114 V. Bolla & V. Pendolovska ‘Driving forces behind EU-27 greenhouse gas emissions over the decade 
1999–2008’ (2011) 10 SinF 1 at 1. Available at: http://temis.documentation.developpement-
durable.gouv.fr/documents/Temis/0068/Temis-0068967/Eurostat_2011_10.pdf. (Accessed: 05 July 
2016). 
115 J. Blodgett & L. Parker ‘Greenhouse Gas Emission Drivers: Population, Economic Development and 
Growth, and Energy Use’ Congressional Report Service (2010) 1-7 Washington, D. C. Available at: 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL33970.pdf. (Accessed: 05 September 
2016). 
116 M. Jakob et al ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Trade-Theory Analysis of Leakage under 
Production- and Consumption-Based Policies’ (2013) 56 Envi. & Res. Econ. 47 at 50. Available at: 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10640-013-9638-y. (Accessed: 05 September 2016). 
117 IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 365).  
118 IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 357). 
119 Ibid.  




planning, research and development, information provision, direct regulation, and GHG 
related non-climate policies.121  
 
Since its establishment in 1988, the IPCC has released five global assessment reports on 
climate change in which it provides estimations on the level of certainty of 
anthropogenic interferences in the climate system.122 Despite divergent reasoning from 
few scholars, the overwhelming majority of studies are unanimous regarding the 
character of the current human induced climate change.123 To date there is a stronger 
scientific consensus around the 95 percent of certainty established by the IPCC that the 
climate change is a human induced phenomenon, due to the build-up of GHGs. There is 
also consensus on the fact that stronger and firmer actions to curb the phenomenon 
should be taken without delay.124 That is why the global climate change diplomacy lifted 
the issue of GHG emission reduction to the top of the world’s agenda.125 
 
However, as for the developing countries (being the focus of the present research), their 
industrialisation process has been energy-intensive, with enormous ejection of GHG to 
the atmosphere,126 as it was the case with the current OECD countries before 1970.127  
The OECD countries were the ones that mostly contributed to the pre-1970 emissions, 
whereas since 2010 onwards, developing countries and Asia in particular increasingly 
became the main emitters.128 This is because of the fast growing and urbanisation of 
developing countries experiencing important increases in energy demand, and 
consequentially in CO2 emissions as far as fossil fuel is concerned for energy supply.
129 
                                                          
121 See IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 351-397) for more details on the drivers of the GHG. 
122  IPCC Assessment Reports available at: 
https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml. (Accessed: 23 
August 2016).  
123 IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 359). 
124 Moncel (note 8 above; 2); IPCC 2014 (b) (Note 73 above; 151). 
125 Ibid IPCC 2014 (b). 
126 IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 359). 
127 ‘The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established in 1948 to run the 
US-financed Marshall Plan for reconstruction of the European continent ravaged by the Second World 
War. Canada and the US joined OEEC members in signing the new OECD Convention on 14 December 
1960. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was officially born on 30 
September 1961, when the Convention entered into force. Japan joined it in 1964. Today, it has 35 OECD 
member countries worldwide regularly turn to one another to identify problems, discuss and analyse them, 
and promote policies to solve them.’ Information available at: http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ 
(Accessed: 09 August 2016); See IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 357). 
128 IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 359).  




That energy demand from developing countries is even expected to become bigger in 
future, due to their economic growth which is of an emissions-nature, in comparison to 
the technologically leading developed countries, whose growth will take a rather low 
emission pathway, thanks to technological innovations.130  
 
2.3. The concepts of developing countries and developed countries regarding 
the international climate change diplomacy  
 
For one reason or the other, the international climate change law and governance process 
often faced dramatic challenges in the last two decades.131 Among those reasons, 
Gupta132  identifies the uneven and unpredictable character of the issue of costs and the 
benefits distribution associated with climate change at a global level, and also the 
question regarding to how the climate change responsibilities between countries are 
being shared, compared to how they should be.133 The above reasons evoked by Gupta 
are both linked with another bigger question concerning the inequalities that characterise 
the developing and the developed countries, in terms of their levels of socio-economic 
development, although the literature hardly agrees on the criteria used for such a 
differentiation. According to Nielsen,134 there is no differential criterion which is 
currently generally accepted.  
 
The UNFCCC does not provide a definition of what constitutes developed or developing 
countries, but rather adopts and applies the ambient concept of developed and 
developing countries.135 Nevertheless, in the present study, it is presumed that any 
reference to “developing country” or “developed country” by the Paris Agreement is to 
be envisaged in the sense of countries that are either “Non-Annex I” or “Annex I” and 
“Annex II” under the UNFCCC. The fact is that the Paris Agreement avoided to 
                                                          
130  M. Jakob et al ‘Will history repeat itself? Economic convergence and convergence in energy use 
patterns’ (2012) 34 Energy Economics 95 99. 
131 J. GUPTA ‘International law and climate change: The challenges facing developing 
countries’ (2006) 16 1 Yearbook of Inter. Env. Law 119 119. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 L. Nielsen ‘Classifications of countries based on their level of development: How it is done and how 
it could be done’ IMF Working Papers (2011) at 4. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1755448. 
(Accessed: 01 June 2016). 
135 Ambient definition of developing and developed countries Refers either to the WB, MIF or the 




undertake at present a pre-classification of countries parties as was done by the 
UNFCCC.136 
 
At the international level, the distinction that is commonly made between “developing” 
and “developed” countries follows three major schools of classifications which are:  
 
o The International Monetary Fund Classification (IMF);  
o The United Nations Development Programme Classification (UNDP); 
o The World Bank Classification (WB).  
 
These three schools of classification do not use a similar criteria to differentiate between 
developing and developed countries.137 The World Bank and the IMF utilise either an 
operational country classification system or an analytical classification system, which 
draw to the operational system.138 The operational country classification of the Word 
bank initially established an income threshold in 1964 which was upgraded later, as a 
test for eligibility to access IDA resources.139  Whereas the operational country 
classification of the IMF operates as a concessional facility expanded, refocused, and 
renamed over the years, with currently a new framework for the determination of the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust based on criteria relating to per capita income, 
market access, and vulnerability. Since 2010, 71 countries were recognised by the Fund 
to be “low income developing countries on the basis of the above framework.140 
  
Under its analytical classification system, the World Bank introduced the first economic 
classification of countries which divided them into three categories: (i) developing 
countries, (ii) industrialised countries, and (iii) capital-surplus oil-exporting countries. 
On the other hand, in the World Bank report, developing countries were categorised as 
low income (with GNI/n of US$250 or less) and middle income (with GNI/n above 
                                                          
136 The UNFCCC also did plan for countries evolution over time, but the system did not work, and 
countries ended up being stuck in one or the other annex. See Article 4.2 (f) of the UNFCCC. 
137 Nielsen (note 134 above; 8). 
138 Nielsen (note 134 above; 14). 
139 ‘The threshold was initially set at an annual per capita income level of US$250, but throughout the 
1960s the threshold was not rigidly adhered to as several countries with income levels of up to US$300 
accessed IDA resources.’ See Nielsen (note 134 above; 10). 




US$250). For the World Bank, the threshold between developed and developing 
countries is a per capita income level of US 6,000 according to the 1987 prices.141 
 
The IMF analytical classification system introduced in 1980 a significantly simplified 
two category classification system consisting of (i) industrial countries and (ii) 
developing countries.142 The system was adopted from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS),143 although the IFS never motivated the choice of the classification 
systems it used.  
  
The UNDP’s country classification system as noticed by Nielsen, 144 
 
“is built around the Human Development Index (HDI), 145 which was launched for the 
first time together with the Human Development Report (HDR) in 1990.”  
 
However, Nielsen 146 concluded on the fact that the three above classification systems 
failed to offer enough clarity regarding how they did categorise the different countries.  
The World Bank for instance, failed to explain why the threshold between developing 
and developed countries is a per capita income level of US$6,000 in 1987-prices, 
whereas the threshold used for the IMF’s classification remained unclear, and the UNDP 
on its side gave no rationale to explain why the ratio of developing and developed 
countries is one to three.146a 
 
                                                          
141 Ibid. GNI/n refers to Gross National Income per capita. It was used for purpose of income measure in 
the 2010 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme. See Nielsen (note 
134 above; 8).  
142 The IMF published for the first time its World Economic Outlook (WEO). In support of the analysis, 
the WEO utilized the country classification system used in the IFS. See Nielsen (note 134 above; 16). 
143 Information available at: http://stats.ukdataservice.ac.uk/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ifs. (Accessed: 10 
October 2016). 
144 Ibid. 
145 “The HDI is a composite index of three indices measuring countries’ achievements in longevity, 
education, and income. Other aspects of development such as political freedom and personal security were 
also recognised as important, but the lack of data prevented their inclusion into the HDI.” See note 147 
below, see also Nielsen (note 134 above; 8). 





Table 1 below illustrates how the above three different classifications are influential to 
positioning a country as a developed or a developing country, depending on the 
institution which applies its criteria.  
 
Table 1: Synoptic presentation of the IMF, UNDP and the World Bank development 
criteria  
CRITERIA IMF UNDP WORLD BANK 

















75 percentile in the 
HDI147 distribution 
US$ 6000 GNI148 
per capita in 1987 
prices 
% of developed  
Countries in 1990 
13% 25% 16% 
% of developed 
Countries in 2010 
17% 25% 26% 
Source: Our own synthesis based on data provided by Nielsen (see note 134 above).   
 
In the above table, there seems to be more developed countries in 2010 comparatively 
to 1990, based on the approaches of the IMF and the World Bank, whilst the UNDP 
approach shows that the situation of developing countries has not significantly evolved 
since 1990 levels, and that consequently, their number is still the same in 2010 
comparatively to 1990.149 This ambiguity is arguably going to upset the newly adopted 
climate change regime because of the lack of any definition of what constitutes 
developing and developed countries, although the regime has granted developing 
                                                          
147 ‘HDI stands for Human Development Index. ‘The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary 
measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being 
knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices 
for each of the three dimensions. The HDI was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities 
should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone.’ 
Information available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi. (Accessed: 20 
October 2016). 
148 ‘GNI stands for Gross National Income. GNI per capita - Gross national income (GNI) is the sum of 
value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation 
of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from 
abroad. GNI per capita is gross national income divided by mid-year population. GNI per capita in US 
dollars is converted using the World Bank Atlas method. Information available at: 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/stats_popup7.html (Accessed: 20 October 2016). 




countries some few preferential treatments owing to their particular vulnerability 
towards climate change.  
 
However, as also postulated by Pauwelyn,150 the issue in today’s context is minus that 
of insuring whether China or Russia are developing countries, but rather finding out 
relevant criteria to differentiate between the two countries in the sense of defining their 
individual and respective responsibilities towards climate change. The same also applies 
in differentiating between other individual countries within both groups of developed 
and developing countries.  
 
However, being a global threat, the climate change problem needed to be approached in 
a global manner, every country bringing in its contribution towards solving the problem. 
The 1992 UNFCCC was adopted as a multilateral legal instrument whose objective was 
to frame the fight against climate change.151 The result was that the UNFCCC instituted 
a two-speed climate change regime, with developing countries committed differently 
than developed countries.152    
 
2.4. The Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective 
Capabilities Principle and the climate change regime 
 
2.4.1. Enunciation of the principle 
 
The notion of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities 
(CBDR-RC) is a key notion in the international negotiations under the UNFCCC.153  The 
Preamble of the UNFCCC acknowledges that the global nature of climate change calls 
                                                          
150 J. Pauwelyn ‘The end of differential treatment for developing countries? Lessons from the trade and 
climate change regimes’ (2013) 22 1 Review of European, Comp. & Intern. Environ. Law 29 at 29. 
151 Gupta (note 130 above; 1).  
152 See section 3.1.2 for more details on the regime under the UNFCCC. 
153 P. Pauw et al ‘Different perspectives on differentiated responsibilities: a state-of-the-art review of the 
notion of common but differentiated responsibilities in international negotiations’ (2014) at 1. Available 
at : https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_6.2014..pdf  (Accessed: 18 September 2016); A. Shawkat 
et al Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (2013) at 55; E. Louka International 
Environmental Law: Fairness, Effectiveness, and World Order (2006) at 54; H. Winkler & L. Rajamani 
(b) ‘CBRD in a regime applicable to all’ (2014) 14 (1) Climate Policy 102 at 102; J. Brunnée & C. Streck 
(a) ‘The UNFCCC as a negotiation forum: Towards Common But more Differentiated Responsibilities’ 




for the widest possible co-operation by all countries, and also their participation in an 
effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic 
conditions,154 whereas its Article 3.1 exhorts country parties to protect the climate 
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. 
 
The CBDR-RC is a concept in the international climate regime that is derived from the 
principle of CBDR.155 The “CBDR-RC” formulation of the principle Annexes to its 
“CBDR” initial formulation one more element which is the “Respective Capabilities” of 
countries (RC).156 CBDR can be understood as a way of outlining the proportional 
environmental obligations that countries have, compared to others, in all justness.157 The 
notion of CBDR is underpinned by the two meta-principles of equity and fairness, which 
are often used interchangeably.158 Fairness refers to, the ability to decide on what is just 
and what is not, while Equity is a mode of interpretation of the legal norms, as well as a 
palliative principle in a context of shortcomings of positive law.159 As argued by 
Hallding,160 countries perceptions of fairness and equity are based on their respective 
backgrounds, and on their particular economic and social circumstances. 
   
Deconstructing the CBDR principle into its two main sub-concepts can assist in 
understanding its application in the international climate change regime.161 First, the 
sub-concept of “common responsibilities”, which requires all states to participate in the 
                                                          
154 Preamble of the UNFCCC. 
155 Mbeva (note 19 above; 5). 
156 The concept of countries’ Respective Capability was already present in Article 7.2 (C), Article 3.1 and 
the preamble of the UNFCCC. It was further reaffirmed as a criteria for any new climate change 
international treaty by the USA and China’s joint statement on climate change, released at Beijing, China 
on the 12th November 2014. Statement available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change. (Accessed: 15 September 2016). 
157 Pauw (note 153 above; 1). 
158 Ibid at 5. 
159 D. Carreau & F. Marrella ‘Chapitre XIV ‘l’Equité’ en Droit international’ 11 Ed. (2012) at 1. Available 
at: http://www.pedone.info/di/Carreau-Marrella_Chap14.pdf. (Accessed: 15 August 2016). 
160 K. Hallding et al ‘Together alone: BASIC countries and the climate change conundrum’ (2011). 
Available at: 
http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publikationer/2011-530 (Accessed: 12 September 2016). 
161 T. Honkonen ‘The Common But Differentiated Responsibility Principle in multilateral environmental 




global effort of addressing climate change, given the fact that climate change is a global 
problem that equally requires a global solution.162 Second, the sub-concept of 
“differentiated responsibilities” which relates to the idea that states should have 
differential obligations while addressing climate change depending on their respective 
national capacities, and their specific development needs, as well as their historical 
contribution towards the climate change problem.163 
 
2.4.2. Origins of the principle 
 
The CBDR principle originally emerged from the application of equity in international 
environmental law.164  Even though the concept of differential treatment of states existed 
for long in international instruments,165 some of the conceptual elements that are directly 
behind the CBDR principle were traced back only in the 1970s, at the time of the call 
for a “new international economic order”.166 They are also found at the UN Conference 
on the Human Environment in 1972 held in Stockholm,167 and in the enabling clause of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1979.168 Within the environment field, 
the 1989 Montreal Protocol, under the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
                                                          
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Mbeva (note 19 above; 5).  
165 See for instance the Constitution of the International Labour Organization (ILO) (“Differences of 
climate, habits and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial tradition, make strict uniformity in 
the conditions of labour difficult for immediate attainment.”) Cited by J. Lee (note 33 above; 30). 
166 Resolution A/Res/S-6/ 3201 stating a Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order under the United Nations Organisation, available at: http://www.un-
documents.net/s6r3201.htm.  
(Accessed: 25 October 2016). 
167 Information on the 1972 Stockholm Human Environment Conference available at: 
http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503. (Accessed: 
25 October 2016). 
168 ‘The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the 
rules of trade between nations. Its goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers 
conduct their business. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the 
world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments.’ More details on the WTO available at:  
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm. (Accessed: 10 October 2016); ‘Decision 
L/4903 of 28 November 1979 by signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
allows derogations to the most-favoured nation (non-discrimination) treatment in favour of developing 
countries. Its paragraph 2(c) permits preferential arrangements among developing countries in goods 
trade. This provision has continued to apply as part of GATT 1994 under the WTO. Information available 
at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm. (Accessed: 23 October 2016); See 




Ozone Layer, offered one of the first early and outstanding illustrations regarding the 
implementation of CBDR in an international context.169   
 
It was not until 1992 that the principle was finally recognised as an international 
principle, due to its adoption as principle 7 in the Rio Declaration at the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).170 The UNFCCC 
adopted the CBDR principle as one of the key principles to govern the implementation 
of the climate change regime it had instituted. Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC states that the 
parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations 
of humankind, based on equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, adding that the developed country parties 
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof because 
of the aforementioned.171  
 
The application of the CBDR in the UNFCCC climate change regime led to a 
dichotomous approach for the share of the climate change responsibilities between the 
developed countries parties and the developing countries parties. Under the UNFCCC, 
developed countries are identified as “Annex I countries” and developing countries are 
identified as “Non-Annex I countries”.172 Annex I countries were in 1992 member states 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), along with 
some few additional states undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.173 
On the view of Pauw,174  the UNFCCC bilateral differentiation was a reflection of the 
economic welfare of countries in the context of 1992, based on the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita.  
                                                          
169 The 1985 Vienna Convention does not refer to CBDR as such. However, it addresses the issue of 
different responsibilities that different countries need to take on them in accordance with their capabilities 
to regulate the emission of ozone-depleting substances. For instance, countries had different base years 
regarding the commitment to phase-out their ozone depleting substances; to developing countries it was 
accorded delayed compliances if their per capita consumption of certain controlled substances was below 
a certain threshold; See section 3.1.1.2 for more details on the 1985 Vienna Convention and its 1987 
Montreal Protocol; See also Pauw (note 153 above; 1). 
170 Conference held from 3 – 14 June 1992 under the aegis of the UN. Report on the conference (entitled: 
“Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment”) available at: 
http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html (Accessed: 16 July 2016). 
171 Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. 
172 Ibid Article 4. 
173 See section 2.1.2 note 126 above for more details on the OECD organisation.  




It was without surprise that subsequent decisions under the UNFCCC adopted the 
Convention’s approach of differentiating among member states.175 This was the case for 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol which was the first protocol to be adopted under the UNFCCC. 
The Kyoto Protocol prescribed the legally binding emission reductions for developed 
countries (Annex I parties), while developing countries (Non-Annex I parties) were not 
assigned any reduction obligation.176  
 
The interpretation that countries had on the CBDR in 1992 made it easy for them to 
agree on the UNFCCC climate change regime. Yet, thereafter the same CBDR 
interpretation by countries became a source of considerable obstacles for countries to 
keep their commitments.177 Negotiating countries had recurring discussions regarding a 
new approach for the application of the CBDR principle for the period post Kyoto.178 
Pauw179 argued that the differential approach applied by the UNFCCC became very 
controversial because it left massive emissions increasingly unregulated from major 
emitting developing countries such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa, which are 
now all among the world’s largest GHG polluters. 
 
However, the difficulty in addressing climate change under the UNFCCC interpretation 
of the CBDR principle became clear in this way: any efforts that were deployed by 
developed countries under their Kyoto legally binding obligation to reduce GHG 
emissions were felt to have a great chance of being offset by the quickly increasing GHG 
emissions of unregulated major developing countries emitters.180 This undisputable 
failure led to the question about the utility and legitimacy of the CBDR principle as 
interpreted and applied under the UNFCCC to be the international climate regime 
guiding principle in an attempt to address the challenge of climate change by way of 
mitigating the global GHG emissions.181 However, scholars such as Bortscheller182 
                                                          
175 See Articles 2 and 4 of the UNFCCC. 
176 See Articles 3 and 4 of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol for more details. 
177 Pauw (note 153 above; 23-24). 
178 Ibid.  
179 Ibid.  
180 Ibid Pauw; Lee (note 33 above; 30). 
181 C.D. Stone ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law’ (2004) 98 AJINTL 
276 at 280  
182 MJ. Bortscheller ‘Equitable but Ineffective: How the Principle of Common But Differentiated 





argued that the CBDR was a sound principle that the international environment 
community has failed to apply correctly in the climate change field. 
 
The thing is, from a conceptual perspective, the CBDR principle was not conceived to 
be a static principle, but rather as a dynamic one. Its vocation was to accommodate 
countries respective circumstances in any issue of common or global interest as it was 
the case for environmental concerns in the seventies.183 That is why, depending on the 
issue that is the focus of a treaty, and on the objective of a treaty, the CBDR principle 
has been applied diversely by different multilateral environmental agreements over the 
years.  
 
2.4.3. Application of the CBDR principle by neighbor Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements 
 
In the international environmental law, there are many treaties other than the climate 
change ones that apply a regime of differential treatment between country parties.184 In 
this section, the researcher will discuss the application of the CBDR principle under two 
major multilateral environmental agreements. The first is the 1987 Montreal Protocol to 
the Vienna Convention on ozone depleting substances, and the second is the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD). The Montreal Protocol is considered because of its 
influential role in the UNFCCC/Kyoto protocol regime.185 Whereas the CBD is 
envisaged from an historical view point, because it was negotiated and adopted almost 
simultaneously with the UNFCCC.186 The Montreal Protocol has made a huge 
contribution to limit the climate change threat by accelerating the phase out of 
chlorofluorocarbon and other ozone depleting substances.187 As also argued by 
Depledge and Yamin,188 the acknowledgement of the global problem of ozone layer 
                                                          
183 See principle 7 of the Rio declaration which relates to the CBDR Principle. 
184 The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer.  
185 The Montreal Protocol is referred to as much as eleven times in the UNFCCC. 
186 The CBD and the UNFCCC were both adopted in 1992. 
187 Velders (note 52 above; 4814).  
188 J. Depledge & F. Yamin ‘The global climate change regime: a defence’ in: D. Helm & C. Hepburn 




depletion through the Vienna Convention and its 1987 Montreal Protocol did strongly 
influence the regime design of climate change.  
 
2.4.3.1. The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
 
The CBD is the key Convention regarding the terrestrial biological diversity, despite the 
adoption of many other biodiversity-related conventions and agreements worldwide.189 
The CBD got 196 country parties, among which 168 signatories.190 The main objective 
of the CBD is the conservation of biological diversity.191 Apart from the climate change 
phenomenon, the loss of biodiversity is arguably the most pressing global environmental 
problem of an anthropogenic origin, with land use change being its main driver.192 The 
CBD is further complemented by two protocols which are the Nagoya Protocol on 
Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
                                                          
189 ‘The UNEP convened the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity in November 
1988 to explore the need for an international convention on biological diversity. In May 1989, it 
established the Ad Hoc Working Group (AWG) of Technical and Legal Experts to prepare an international 
legal instrument for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. The experts were to take 
into account "the need to share costs and benefits between developed and developing countries" as well 
as "ways and means to support innovation by local people". By February 1991, the AWG had become 
known as the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee. Its work culminated on 22 May 1992 with the 
Nairobi Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the CBD, opened for signatures on 5 June 
1992 at the Rio "Earth Summit" until 4 June 1993, and received 168 signatures. It entered into force on 
29 December 1993, the 90th day after the 30th ratification.’ Information available at: 
https://www.cbd.int/history/ (Accessed: 15 September 2016); see also Pauw (note 153 above; 31). 
190  List of CBD parties available at: https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml. (Accessed: 1 May 
2016). 
191 Article 1 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) provides: ‘The objectives of this 
Convention, to be pursued in accordance with its relevant provisions, are the conservation of biological 
diversity. the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by 
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to 
technologies, and by appropriate funding.’  




from their Utilisation,193 and the Cartagena Protocol on biosafety.194 Both protocols 
‘institutionalise’ the Convention’s approach to equity and differentiation.195  
 
Even though the Convention on Biological Diversity does not explicitly mention the 
CBDR principle in its body text, it is nevertheless implicitly acknowledged and 
manifested throughout the Convention and its protocols.196 The CBD’s preamble 
stipulates that the conservation of biodiversity is a common concern for humankind, but 
it also reaffirms states’ sovereign rights over their own biological resources, its Article 
3 stipulates that states have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies. Therefore, Article 3 implicitly refers to 
the CBDR principle if it is assumed that the CBDR is one of the principles under 
international law.   
 
The CBD stipulates that the, ‘Conservation of biological diversity is a common concern 
for humankind’.197 Under the CBD, country parties have symmetrical legal obligations 
that have automatically different effects.198 While the conservation of biological 
diversity and the sustainable use of its components apply to all parties, the obligation to 
facilitate access to genetic resources is in charge of the host states, in which most of the 
cases are developing states with a rich genetic potential and biological diversity.199  
 
                                                          
193 ‘At the tenth Conference of the Parties, held in Nagoya, Japan, in October 2010, the Nagoya Protocol 
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization was adopted.’ Information available at: https://www.cbd.int/undb/media/factsheets/undb-
factsheet-nagoya-en.pdf. (Accessed: 20 September 2016); text of the Nagoya Protocol available at: 
https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf. (Accessed: 20 September 2016). 
194 ‘The Cartagena Protocol on Bio safety to the Convention on Biological Diversity is an international 
agreement which aims at ensuring the safe handling, transport and use of Living Modified Organisms 
(LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on biological diversity, 
taking also into account risks to human health. It was adopted on 29 January 2000 and entered into force 
on 11 September 2003.’ Text of the Cartagena Protocol available at: 
https://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf. (Accessed: 12 September 2016). 
195 C. Voigt ‘Equity in the 2015 Climate Agreement: Lessons from Differential Treatment in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2014) 4 Climate Law 50 at 61; Available at 
SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2637840 (Accessed: 10 August 2016). 
196 Pauw (note 153 above; 31). 
197 See the preamble of the CBD. 





As for the issue of differentiated responsibilities, the CBD has built a simple structure: 
Developing countries have to protect biodiversity, but developed countries have to pay 
for it.200 
 
According to Article 20 which provides for the financial resources, the developed 
country parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to enable developing 
country parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs for them to implement measures 
which fulfil the obligations of this Convention, and also to benefit from its provisions.201 
The implementation by developing country parties of their commitments is conditioned 
(the CBD uses the formula ‘will depend on’) on the effective fulfilment by developed 
countries of their financial and technology transfer commitments.202 
 
Obligations regarding conservation and sustainable use of biological resources by 
country parties are qualified by terms such as ‘in accordance with its particular 
conditions and capabilities’203 or ‘as far as possible and as appropriate’.204 These 
provisions are examples of contextual differentiation between country parties to the 
treaty. Only that the differentiation applied leaves it up to the discretion of each party to 
adopt its own level of obligations in accordance with its particular circumstances. 
Furthermore, the specific needs of developing countries are explicitly recognised under 
Article 12 of the CBD regarding scientific and technical education, research, and 
training.205  
 
2.4.3.2. Application of the CBDR principle under the 1987 Montreal Protocol  
 
Neither the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, nor the 1987 
Montreal Protocol use the wording of CBDR as known in the climate change regime.206 
The reason arguably is because they were adopted before the emergence of the CBDR 
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as an explicit concept in the international law, in 1992.207 However, country parties to 
the ozone regime opted for a temporal differentiation regime,208 and from 1992 onwards, 
after the adoption of the CBDR principle in the Rio Declaration, meetings of the parties 
to the Montreal Protocol started referring to the CBDR principle as a way to express the 
differentiation approach that was already put in place in the treaty.209 
 
Article 2 of the 1985 Vienna Convention provides that country parties shall take 
appropriate measures in order to protect human health and the environment against 
adverse effects resulting or likely to result from the ozone depletion phenomenon in 
accordance with the means at their disposal and their capabilities.210  Article 5 of the 
Montreal Protocol on “special situation of developing countries” does include special 
rights for developing countries whose annual calculated level of consumption of listed 
controlled substances by the protocol is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita, on the date 
of the entry into force of the protocol.211 Those countries are allowed to postpone their 
statutory compliance to phase out the consumption and production of ozone depleting 
substances for up to ten years.212 During that period countries that benefited from the 
exemption of Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol were allowed to make use or even 
increase their national use of the ozone depleting substance.213   
 
The purpose of granting to that special category of developing countries a whole grace 
period for the implementation of the Protocol was to allow them as well to meet their 
basic domestic needs and prepare themselves before a total phase out of the ozone 
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depleting substances.214 In addition to Article 5 which provides for a differential 
treatment which is in favour of developing countries, Article 10 contains the obligation 
for industrialised parties to provide ‘financial and technical co-operation, including 
transfer of chlorofluorocarbon-free technology to developing countries in order to 
enable them comply with the statutory control measures.215 Article 10 further creates a 
financial mechanism, including a Multilateral Fund from developed countries, whose 
financial obligations are the condition for developing countries’ actions towards an 
effective implementation of the Convention.216   
 
The CBDR principle under the Montreal Protocol suffered a reproach as only 24 
countries and the European Commission signed the Montreal Protocol in 1987. This 
number included virtually all developed countries,217 which accounted for the bulk of 
CFCs production, but they included few of the major developing countries with rapidly 
emerging economies, such as India and China.218 These two countries refused to 
participate in the Protocol until the establishment of the fund to help developing 
countries find and implement alternatives to CFCs. 219 As early as at that time, the 
differences between the developed and the developing countries were perceived as the 
main obstacle to the effective implementation of the Differentiated responsibilities 
approach under the Montreal Protocol.220 The Montreal Protocol is currently considered 
as a reference in the global environmental negotiations because it has successfully 
reduced the global production, consumption and emissions of ozone depleting 
substances.221  The reason why on the view of Ladly222 the Montreal Protocol constituted 
an early and significant example of how the principle of CBDR could be operationalised. 
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2.4.4. The interpretation of the CBDR principle by the UNFCCC Key 
negotiating parties 
 
On the view of Hallding,223 countries differently perceive and interpret the notions of 
equity and fairness, which are the core concepts that form the CBDR principle. They do 
so on the basis of their own specific backgrounds and their particular economic and 
social circumstances.224 This section provides an overview of the positions that were 
adopted and defended by some key country parties and some negotiation groups under 
the UNFCCC regarding the CBDR principle before the adoption of the 2015 Paris 
Agreement. The exercise has the merit of helping us understand some of the stances of 
the key countries during the climate change negotiation rounds under subsequent COPs. 
In one hand, parties such as the United States of America and the European Union are 
considered, giving us an idea about the view point of developed country parties, while 
on the other hand, we envisage the positions of emerging developing countries such as 
China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, in order to get an idea about the perception of 
developing countries on the matter under analysis.225  
 
2.4.4.1. The Republic of China 
 
In the 1990s, China, through its Premier Minister Li Peng indicated that for any country, 
economic development had precedence over environmental protection, and that 
developed countries had the responsibility to provide financial resources and technology 
to compensate developing countries for climate change.226 China considered emission 
mitigation the responsibility of developed countries and has repeatedly insisted for 
fairness and equity whilst abstaining from making any commitment to reduce its 
emissions.227 China strategically employed the principle of CBDR to crystallise climate 
change as a “North-South issue”.228 
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2.4.4.2. The Republic of India  
 
Advocating for the CBDR principle, the country resisted pressure from developed 
countries that developing countries should accept incorporating mitigation actions.229 
The country is known as a long “glued to a do-nothing position”230 in the climate change 
diplomacy. However, a change in the country’s position was first noticed in 2008, at the 
release of its National Action Plan on Climate Change,231 before it announced in 2009 
in Copenhagen its adoption of voluntary targets to reduce the country’s emissions for 
20–25 per cent by 2020 from the 2005 levels, showing by that a considerable move in 
its interpretation of the CBDR principle.232 
 
2.4.4.3. South Africa  
 
Despite its BASIC group membership,233 South Africa has a more flexible approach in 
interpreting the CBDR principle and its own specific climate change position, because 
of its distinct national background.234 During the UNFCCC negotiations, the country 
often acts like a “bridge builder” among parties of the G77, and between developing and 
industrialised states.235 At the COP 17 in Durban, the country showed itself favourable 
to a new universal legally binding agreement with differentiated commitments for 
parties.236 Prior to Copenhagen in 2009, the country announced to commit itself to a 
voluntary emission reduction target scheme of 34 percent below the Business As Usual 
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(BAU) pathway by 2020,237 but suffered the opposition from some developing countries, 
arguing that such unilateral commitment was a breach of the CBDR-RC principle.238  
 
2.4.4.4. The United States 
   
The country is known to be the major critic of the Kyoto Protocol.239 In 1997, the US 
Senate adopted the Byrd-Hagel Resolution,240 which stated that the country would not 
participate in a climate change agreement which does not comprise binding emission 
reduction targets for developing countries.241 The main argument was that the Kyoto 
protocol was built on the CBDR principle, meaning that developing countries were 
exempted from binding targets, which would lead to unfair economic disadvantages 
towards developed countries, in favour of developing countries, especially those that are 
regarded as the new emerging economies.242 The USA further argued that the lion’s 
share of future emissions growth would be taken by developing countries, whereas their 
emissions were not controlled under the UNFCCC/Kyoto climate change regime.243 The 
position of the USA opened a fault line in-between the country and the group of 
developing countries, especially China, due to what the USA government perceived to 
be an unfair agreement because of an erroneous application of the CBDR principle.244 
 
During the climate change negotiations, the United States constantly argued that 
developing countries should take on more emissions mitigation responsibilities as they 
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economically evolved over time.245 The country called for a more nuanced interpretation 
of the CBDR and respective capabilities.246 In the draft decision of the Durban Platform, 
no reference was made to the Equity and CBDR-RC principles, partly because of the 
opposition of the United States to see the principle mentioned.247 In its submission to the 
UNFCCC regarding the 2015 climate change agreement, the USA suggested that 
commitments should be defined in a transparent way, on the basis of countries’ national 
circumstances. The United States also opposed the incorporation of the UNFCCC 
Annexes into the 2015 climate change agreement, arguing that the approach of Annexes 
would not reflect the 2015 realities of countries.248 
 
2.4.4.5. The European Union (EU) 
 
The European Union has been very influential in making other states ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol and its extension, even though in application to the CBDR principle, the Kyoto 
protocol had mitigation obligations only for Annex I countries.249 The EU position 
confirmed its support to the UNFCCC interpretation of the CBDR principle. At 
Copenhagen in 2009, developing countries rejected a proposition from the EU to move 
the functioning parts of the Kyoto Protocol into a new global agreement. They argued 
that the union was trying to repeal the Kyoto Protocol and abolish the CBDR principle 
form the climate change regime.250 Since then, the EU has advocated for a post-2020 
climate regime based on a more differentiated interpretation of the CBDR,251 expecting 
that large emitting developing countries would take on as well. 
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Climate change is happening, there is no doubt, especially now that various parts of the 
planet are increasingly experiencing its adverse effects.  To minimise the climate change 
adverse effects, and further create conditions for the healing of the planet, every country, 
either developed or developing has to participate in the global effort to reduce the GHG 
whose exacerbation in the atmosphere causes the global warming and hence the climate 
change. In allocating GHG mitigation responsibilities to its countries parties, the 
UNFCCC, separated developed from developing countries, based on the CBDR-RC 
Principle. The overview of the key concepts of the study have shown that there is more 
than one way that country parties envisage some of the climate change related issues, 
such as the climate change definition, the differentiation of countries on the basis of their 
level of development, the way to understand and apply the Common But differentiated 
Responsibility and Respective Capabilities principle in the climate change regime. The 
next chapter will focus on the key steps undertaken during the negotiations towards the 
new 2015 universal climate change regime, which has updated the UNFCCC’s 
interpretation of the CBDR principle to better reflect the global context of 2015, which 
is radically different from the context of 1992, whose CBDR interpretation led to the 






CHAPTER III: THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE 






From the discovery of the climate change phenomenon in the sixties followed by the 
adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992 and the Paris Agreement in 2015, considerable 
changes have occurred in the overall context of climate change, especially in countries’ 
national circumstances.252 For instance, the participation of developing countries in the 
global share of GHG emission has significantly increased in 2015, compared to 1992 
when they played no significant role in that regard.253 The situation progressively and 
abundantly changed since 1992, to the extent that developing countries were among the 
main emitters in 2015. The majority of the COP forums which were organised before 
COP 21 in Paris discussed the issue of how to obtain emissions mitigation from 
developing countries as well, especially the new major emitters.254 It seems relevant to 
track discussions in order to understand country parties’ stances, before engaging into 
the material and legal considerations regarding the regime shift that occurred under the 
2015 Paris Agreement. With a special focus on the COP process, this chapter will 
analyse the progressive formation of the new emission mitigation regime for developing 
countries as adopted in the Paris Agreement in 2015. The chapter will start by briefly 
giving an historical overview of the climate change legal regime, before it reviews the 
positions of the parties and the outcomes of the key negotiation forums from the period 
pre and post UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol.  
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3.2. Key steps of the development of the international climate change regime 
for developing countries 
 
Finding an adequate and equitable formula to regulate GHG emissions originating from 
developing countries has been one of the most crucial issues for the UNFCCC states 
negotiators.255 As argued by Winkler, 256 and supported by a number of other scholars,257 
discussion has for long revolved around the question as to whether or not developing 
countries (especially major emitters from developing countries) should be included in a 
universal legally binding emission reduction scheme and how to settle such a binding 
scheme legally and practically. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Bodansky,258 the history 
of international environmental law does not fall short of relevant examples on how legal 
regimes have been set up and applied to address common environmental matters, and of 
which some are considered referential for emissions reduction regimes.259  
 
In the field of international development, three major systems exist, as advanced by 
Nielsen Lynge,260 which are the World Bank system, the UNDP system and the IMF 
system, under which countries are classified into two groups, with regard to their levels 
of development, the developed countries and the developing countries. The former 
comprises financially richer and materially more equipped countries, while the later 
comprises poorer and under-equipped countries. The difference finds its explanation in 
some two centuries of industrialisation and equipment that has made the former richer. 
Also their two centuries of industrialisation makes them historically responsible for the 
current global warming and climatic change, by way of aggravating atmospheric 
concentration of GHG.261 Developing countries on their side have not played a 
significant role in global warming and climatic change.262 That is the reason why it was 
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agreed from the beginning of climate change talks that the two groups of countries would 
not be asked to bear the same burden of emissions reduction efforts.263  
 
Parties hence had to endeavour so as to find the most appropriate and equitable formula 
that takes into account developing countries’ national circumstances, which by the way 
are not static, but rather dynamic and changing over time. In fact, the global context that 
prevailed in the 1990s and before the adoption of an international treaty regulating 
climate change was no longer the same at the time of the negotiations of the 2015 Paris 
Climate Agreement.264 As asserted by Brunnée,265  the context having changed, it 
becomes normal that the law follows so as to correspond with the new context.  
 
3.2.1. The era preceding the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change  
 
Three dominant reflexes emerged among developing countries during the negotiations 
of the first climate change treaty that is the UNFCCC. The first was the fear that 
developing countries could be hampered from any economic development because of 
the climate change related restrictive measures to be imposed on their weaker economies 
and products.266 This was expressed by major industrialising countries such as China, 
Brazil and India. The second comprises the string of environmental damages on 
geographically disadvantaged countries,267 brought forward by developing countries 
islands (that later established the Alliance of Small Island States “AOSIS” negotiating 
group to support their climatic claims).268 The last was in liaison with developing 
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countries’ lack of financial and technological means for mitigation and adaptation 
actions,269 put up by the Least Developed Countries (LDC).270 Those reflexes, made by 
countries with different developmental profiles, varying economic situations, and 
uneven geographical vulnerability,271 later became formal claims of developing 
countries, and played a role in inspiring the climate change regime in general. The next 
section describes the few steps back into the days when the current climate change 
regime was in gestation.   
 
3.2.1.1.  Initial climate change awareness  
 
Previously unknown, the climate change awareness arose at the turn of the 20th 
century.272 The Swedish chemist S. Arrhenius, is regarded as one of the scientific 
pioneers to have discovered the greenhouse effect, which he found to be in relation with 
climate change.273 For a short time, his work triggered a great interest for both 
phenomenon (greenhouse effect and climate change) but especially for the greenhouse 
effect.274 However, it took almost a century before the awareness expanded worldwide, 
and concrete political engagements followed, owing to insufficiency of information and 
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to rudimentary means of research at that time.275 Even though more information came 
up, and knowledge improved, there were still doubts and hesitations for climate change 
actions due to persistent uncertainties around its nature, origins and drivers.276 As a 
result, further efforts had to be deployed to dispel these uncertainties. 
 
3.2.1.2. Early climate change initiatives  
 
In 1960, the research of a group of scientists from the Mauna Loa observatory277 
established the rise of the atmospheric CO2 and hence confirmed the occurrence of 
climate change, putting an end to the climate change controversy that until then 
existed.278 As a result, scientists and political actors started undertaking actions to deal 
with the new challenge.279  
 
However, despite numerous earlier international environmental moves that eventually 
led to the 26 principled 1972 Stockholm Conference,280 firmer initiatives towards the 
current climate change regime started only late 1980s and early 1990s.281 Contributions 
such as the discovery of the stratospheric “ozone hole” in 1987 followed by the 
publication of the Brundtland Commission report, Our Common Future282 were 
noticeable, as they led to the 1992 UNCED in Rio de Janeiro.283 The 1985 Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
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Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer284 are also worthy to be mentioned owing to 
the referential role they played towards the shaping of a climate change regime. 285 The 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 43/53 recognising climate change as a 
“common concern for mankind” was determined to put the subject on a high profile 
agenda.286 In addition, both the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) in 1988,287 and the proclamation of the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Principles 
added value to the scientific contributions and to the ongoing judicial steps, as both were 
proven to be particularly enabling to the negotiation and adoption of the UNFCCC in 
1992 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.  
 
As also was the view of Velders,288 among all the aforementioned influential factors, 
was the prominent and referral legal role played by the 1987 Montreal Protocol towards 
the shaping of the climate change regime. The next sections review the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol contribution. 
                                                          
284 “Since its initial adoption in 1987, the Montreal Protocol has been adjusted six times. Its specificity is 
that it includes a unique adjustment provision that enables its parties to respond quickly to new scientific 
information and agree to accelerate the reductions required on chemicals already covered by the Protocol. 
These adjustments are then automatically applicable to all its country parties.” Available at:  
http://ozone.unep.org/en/handbook-montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-ozone-layer/6 (Accessed: 11 
April 2016). 
285 “The 1985 Vienna Convention was adopted in 1985. It entered into force on the 22nd September 1988. 
In 2009, it became the first Convention to achieve universal ratification, with 197 countries parties. Its 
objectives were for Parties to promote cooperation by means of systematic observations, research and 
information exchange on the effects of human activities on the ozone layer and to adopt legislative or 
administrative measures against activities likely to have adverse effects on the ozone layer. Its specificity 
is that it includes a unique adjustment provision that enables its parties to respond quickly to new scientific 
information and agree to accelerate the reductions required on chemicals already covered by the Protocol. 
It required not to countries to take concrete actions to control ozone depleting substances. It provides that 
countries had to adopt a Protocol which sets up actions to phase out substances that deplete the ozone 
layer.” Information available at: http://ozone.unep.org/en/treaties-and-decisions/vienna-convention-
protection-ozone-layer. (Accessed: 11 April 2016). 
286 ‘The 70th plenary meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, of the 6th December 1988, 
entitled “Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind” declares: ‘… 
Recalling also the conclusions of the meeting held at Villach, Austria, in 1985, which, inter alia, 
recommended a programme on climate change to be promoted by governments and the scientific 
community with the collaboration of the World Meteorological Organization, the United Nations 
Environment Programme and the International Council of Scientific Unions, Convinced that climate 
change affects humanity as a whole and should be confronted within a global framework so as to take into 
account the vital interests of all mankind, 1. Recognizes that climate change is a common concern for 
mankind, since climate is an essential condition which sustains life on earth’.  
See UNGA Resolution 43/53 A/RES/43/53, 6 December 1988, United Nations Organisation. Available 
at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/43/53; (Accessed: 10 February 2016). 
287 See section 2.1 note 58 for details on the IPCC.  




At the adoption of the 1987 Montreal Protocol, whose mandate was the phasing out of 
listed ozone depleting substances,289 there was probably no idea of the future role this 
text was going to play for the climate change regime.290 The fact that both the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol refer to the Montreal Protocol as much as 11 times each is a 
confirmation of the inspirational role it has played in the adoption of both texts.291  
 
One of the features of the climate change regime that the Montreal Protocol has 
contributed to influence the most is the share of GHG emissions reduction burden 
between countries parties to the Kyoto Protocol, based on the CBDR and Equity 
Principle. Despite the fact that neither the 1985 Vienna Convention, nor the 1987 
Montreal Protocol do explicitly mention the CBDR in their text bodies, the principle 
however is clearly referred to by both treaties,292 while differently affecting to parties 
the burden of phasing out the ozone depleting substances. Tripp293 for instance sees the 
principle not only present, but overused under the Montreal Protocol, declaring that 
during the first ten years of its implementation, the Protocol tended to favour the “equity 
element” more than the protection of the ozone as such.  
 
Once placed back into its 1987 context, Tripp’s remark although striking today, appears 
more justifiable as at that time, differential treatments towards countries was a relatively 
new international environmental law concept, as also noticed by Philippe Cullet in his 
analysis of differential treatments in international law:  
 
“International law has traditionally been based on the principle of sovereign equality 
among states. As a consequence, treaties have normally provided for similar obligations 
for all states. In recent decades, the expansion of the international community and the 
globalisation of environmental and economic issues have led to the search for new legal 
                                                          
289 The chemical substances referred to here are used in solvents, foam, aerosols, mobile air conditioning, 
refrigeration and fire, of which chlorofluorocarbons are the most prominent. They accounted for 85% of 
the ozone layer depletion. See Kurukulasuriya (note 280 above; 111); Ibid Velders. 
290 Ibid Velders.   
291 See chapter 4 on the Kyoto Protocol below. 
292 See section 2.3.3.2 above for details about the CBDR principle under the 1985 Vienna Convention and 
the 1987 Montreal Protocol.  
293 Tripp & T.B. James ‘UNEP Montreal Protocol: Industrialized and Developing Countries Sharing the 





tools to take into account existing disparities and inequalities among states and to foster 
a better implementation of international agreements”294  
 
It should also be noted in passing that the 1987 Montreal Protocol is one of the pioneer 
treaties on the issue of differential treatment among countries parties.295 In fact, as put 
forward by Cullet,296 differential treatment among countries parties to an international 
treaty erupted due to recent global environmental concerns (such as accidental 
discharges of oil tankers in the high seas) owing to which the UNFCCC also got adopted 
as the international legal framework to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at levels that would prevent the world from experiencing any dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.297 
 
3.2.2. The advent of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
 
After all the above mentioned scientific progress, and political openings towards finding 
a solution to the climate change challenge, in May 1992, countries adopted the UNFCCC 
in order to cooperatively negotiate and engage into actions to tame the increasing global 
temperature, and its already felt negative impacts on the geo and biosphere.298 The 
UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994. To date, the Convention enjoys a 
universal support as reflected by its 197 ratifications, which has given a good signal 
about the trust country parties put in its goal.299 
 
3.2.2.1. Objective of the UNFCCC 
 
The Objective of the UNFCCC is to protect the humankind from the consequences of 
increasing concentrations of unrestricted anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gas in 
                                                          
294 P. Cullet ‘Differential treatment in international law: towards a new paradigm of inter-state relations’ 
(1999) 10 (3) EJInt'l L 549 at 549. 
295 Ibid.  
296 Ibid. 
297 Article 2 of the UNFCCC. 
298 The biosphere is the part of the earth's environment where life exists. Definition available at: 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/biosphere. (Accessed: 20 September 2016). 
299 Information available at: 





the atmosphere from interfering with the climate system. To that extent, Article 2 of the 
UNFCCC provides: 
  
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
conference of the Parties (COP) may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, stabilisation of greenhouse gas (GHGs) concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame that is sufficient 
to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production 
is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner”300  
 
This objective also applies to any related legal instruments that the Conference of the 
Parties may adopt.301 
 
3.2.2.2. Principles of the Convention 
 
Article 3 of the UNFCCC sets up the following guiding principles that parties should 
observe in their actions: 
 
o The inter-generational equity principle (Article 3.1.) 
o The common but differentiated responsibilities principle (Article 3.1.) 
o The full consideration to be taken on the special circumstances of developing 
country parties. (Article 3.2.) 
o The precautionary principle (Article 3.3.) 
o The principle of sustainable development (Article 3.4.) 
o The principle of international co-operation for climate action (Article 3.5.) 
 
Article 38.1. (C) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice confers the status of 
the source of international law to the principles of law that are recognised by civilised 
                                                          
300 Article 2 of the UNFCCC.   




societies.302 In the views of Beyerlin,303 principles may also be the source of emerging 
legal rules. Dworkin’s explanations helps to better understand the concept “principle of 
law”, as he first contrasts and further links it from the notion of “legal rule”: 
 
“A legal rule point to particular decisions about legal obligation in particular 
circumstances, but they differ in the character of the direction they give. Rules are 
applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion, whereas a principle states a reason that argues 
in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision. All that is meant, when 
we say that a particular principle is a principle of our law, is that the principle is one 
which officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a consideration inclining in 
one way or another. Because of the open-ended character of principles, a government 
cannot be certain of where they will eventually lead.”304  
 
Principles that are applied under the UNFCCC are all general principles of international 
law. However, some of them equally apply to sectors other than climate change, while 
others mostly apply to one sector at a time. Principles such as the international co-
operation, and the principle of full consideration to be taken on the special circumstances 
of developing country parties to a treaty, or even the CBDR, are also found in sectors 
other than the climate change sector or the environment sector, one find them for 
instance in commercial agreements.305 Whereas, principles such as the precautionary 
principle and the polluter pays principle are most specifically applied in the environment 
field.306 Therefore, from a sector view point, principles that apply to more than a sector 
at once are transversal principles, whereas those that apply to only a sector at once are 
vertical principles, as also explained by Kidd307 while discussing on the issue of 
                                                          
302 General principles of law are the third source of international law, as included in article 38 (1) (c) of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See the Statute of International Court of Justice; available 
at: http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/sicj/icj_statute_e.pdf (Accessed: 10 April 2016). 
303 The Kyoto Protocol for instance illustrates the manner in which the CBDR principle have given birth 
to concrete rules. See U. Beyerlin 'Different types of norms in international environmental law: policies, 
principles and rules' in D. Bodansky et al The Oxford handbook of international environmental law (2007) 
at 442. 
304 R. Drowkin ‘Taking rights seriously’ (1978) 136 HPU 24 at 26. 
305 For instance, the principle of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment under the World Trade 
Organisation. Information available at: 
https://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm. (Accessed: 28 May 2016). 
306 M. Kidd Environmental Law 2nd Ed (2011) at 7. 
307 “Although different sources indicate that there are a number of distinctive environmental law 
principles, there appears to be general agreement on only two of these: the polluter pays principle and the 




environmental laws principles being distinctive principles in the field of international 
law.  
  
Even if it is not the focus of the present study, the researcher esteems it necessary to 
summarily explain the meaning of each one of those principles played under the 
UNFCCC, in order to understand their probable implication in the formation of the new 
climate change regime.  
 
The inter-generational equity principle, which is the first to be referred to, promotes the 
protection of the climate for the benefit of present and future generations, as also noticed 
by Weiss.308 It echoes principle 3 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on environment and 
development: 
 
“The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and  
environmental needs of present and future generations”309 
 
Equity in a general sense refers to the quality of being fair or impartial.310 Werner311 sees 
through Equity, ‘The right of developing states to pursue development in the same 
manner as developed states did’. Moreover, the fact that the UNFCCC mentions 
“Equity” only once, whereas the Paris agreement mentions it as much as six times is a 
clue of its significance to the Paris climate change regime. Also, the Paris agreement 
chooses to associate it more often with the CBDR-RC principle, perhaps for better 
significance towards the principle itself? Or else it may be an insistence to put and keep 
both principles together, and thus avoid any future misinterpretation or misuse of the 
                                                          
308 “Intergenerational equity is a concept that says that humans 'hold the natural and cultural environment 
of the Earth in common both with other members of the present generation and with other generations, 
past and future. It suggests that we inherit the Earth from previous generations and that we have the 
obligation to pass it on to future generations in good condition. The idea behind is not reducing their 
ability to meet their needs. Economic progress that one generation might bequeath to the following one 
cannot be used as an excuse to justify environmental degradation by them to generate such a welfare.” 
See details on the intergenerational equity in section 5.3.3 below; See E.B. Weiss ‘Our Rights and 
Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment’ (1990) American Society of International Law 
198 200.  
309 Refer to note 20 above for the Rio Declaration. 
310 Its Synonyms are: disinterest, equitableness, impartiality, fair-mindedness, fairness, justness, even-
handedness, objectivity; justice, probity. Information available at: 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/equity (Accessed 13 January 2016). 




CBDR principle as it has arguably been decried in the case of the Kyoto Protocol?312 
Various scholars313 agree about the most significant role the CBDR principle has played 
in shaping the climate change regime for all parties to the Convention, and especially 
developing countries. The CBDR principle will be the focus of the next chapter of this 
study. 
 
The second alinea of Article 3 refers to the principle of full consideration to be applied 
on the special circumstances of developing country parties, especially parties that are 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Here, coalition such as the AOSIS 
surely finds their source of legitimacy, as well as a great support for action. 
 
The precautionary principle, evoked under alinea 3, then further developed in chapter 
four is a “pure” environmental law principle, compared to the others listed above.314 It 
reiterates the need to take action by parties even in a context of insufficiency of scientific 
certainty, as it was precisely the case in 1992, at the adoption of the UNFCCC.315 The 
AOSIS group was particularly supportive to the precautionary principle due to their own 
geographical vulnerability to adverse effects of climate change,316 giving a very good 
example of what the practical meaning of the precautionary principle could be. During 
the plenary session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee of the UNFCCC 
                                                          
312 See details in Chapter 5 on the Kyoto Protocol below; Pauw (note 153 above; 2). 
313 P.R. Muñoz ‘Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and its current interpretation 
problems in the context of the climate change international regulations’ (Unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of Chile, 2013) 5; available at: http://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/114523/de-
rivera_p.pdf?sequence=1; (Accessed: 5 August 2016). 
314 Article 3.3 of the UNFCCC: ‘The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and 
measures should take into account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all 
relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic 
sectors. Efforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties’; See also 
Kidd (note 306 above; 7).  
315 The first IPCC report released in 1990 was drafted in a time when there were many scientific 
uncertainties with regard to climate change. That is the reason why no certainty has been advanced with 
regard to the human induced factor. However, over time more certainty progressively came up. 
(Information Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climateconsensus97percent/2013/sep/27/global-warming-
ipcc-report-humans. (Accessed: 10 August 2016). 
316 D. Bodansky (c) ‘United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’ (1993) 




(INC/UNFCCC)317 in February 1991, a famous statement delivered by Robert Van 
Lierop, 318 former Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Chairman of the 
Delegation of Vanuatu, illustrates the fact:  
 
“For us, the precautionary principle is much more than a semantic or theoretical 
exercise. It is an ecological and moral imperative. We trust the world understands our 
concerns by now. We do not have the luxury of waiting for conclusive proof, as some 
have suggested in the past. The proof, we fear, will kill us.” 
 
The sustainable development principle more or less echoes principle 3 and 4 of the Rio 
Declaration,319 which reads respectively as follows: 
 
“The right to development must be fulfilled so as to meet equitably developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations.”  
 
“In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute 
an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from 
it.” 
 
During the drafting of the UNFCCC, a battle raged over suitable wordings for this 
principle, as it also occurred for other issues. With that regard, Bodansky320 explains that 
the presence of those principles left some developed countries uncomfortable, arguing 
that the original UNFCCC text that was brought to the negotiation table made no 
mention of principles. Bodansky further points out that it was a quest from China that 
insisted for the inclusion expressis verbis of an Article on principles in the Convention, 
despite the opposition of the USA on the grounds of lack of clarity of its legal status.321 
With China’s claim being taken into consideration, the USA insisted alternatively on the 
                                                          
317 The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee was established by the UN in 1991, with the mandate 
of negotiating an international convention on climate change. Information available at: 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php. (Accessed: 7 March 2016). 
318 Statement at the Plenary Session of the INC/FCCC, 5 February 1991. Information available at: 
http://www.unfccc.org (Accessed: 7 July 2016). 
319 See note 20 above on the Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development. 
320 Bodansky (c) (note 316 above; 501). 
321 The first country to propose an Article on general principles was China. See Bodansky (a) (note 13 




inclusion of the term “inter alia” in the introductive paragraph322 of the said Article, to 
specify that the list of principles under Article 3 was not to be envisaged as limitative, 
as there could be more other principles that parties might refer to while implementing 
the UNFCCC.323  
 
Still during negotiations, developing countries pushed for the recognition of "the right 
to development” as an “inalienable human right" and that "peoples have an equal right 
in matters relating to reasonable living standards".324 Developed countries, however, 
proposed instead the formula: “States have a duty to aim at sustainable development”. 
They were pushed by the United States which repulsed the phrase, "right to 
development", arguing that it was vague and that it could motivate developing countries 
to claim for financial assistance.325   
 
Besides this, developing countries expressed doubts about the concept of "sustainable 
development", fearing that the "sustainability" concept could end up being used as a new 
conditionality on financial assistance, in which case there could be inhibitions on their 
development goals.326 Fortunately the final provision of the Convention addressed 
concerns of both parties by saying: "Parties have a right to, and should promote 
sustainable development".327 The battle around which suitable words to be retained (for 
the provisions of the UNFCCC) was a more important presage with respect to country 
parties’ commitments. 
 
3.2.2.3. Parties Commitments under the UNFCCC 
 
Article 4 of the UNFCCC creates differentiated obligations for developing and 
developed countries. This is in order to achieve the objective of the Convention as 
                                                          
322 The introductive paragraph of article 3.1 states: “In their actions to achieve the objective of the 
Convention and to implement its provisions, the Parties shall be guided, inter alia, by the following”. 
323 Bodansky (c) (note 316 above; 501). 
324 Ibid at 504. 
325 In 1986, the United States voted against the U.N. Declaration on the Right to Development. See the 
UNGASS Resolution 128, 41st Session 97th plenary U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986). Doc available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/41/53. (Accessed: 18 September 2016). 
326 Bodansky (c) (note 316 above; 504). 




enshrined in its Article 2, although commitments are structured in a pretty complicated 
way:328  
 
o General commitments [Articles 4(1), 5, 6, and 12(1)]: mostly based on the CBDR 
principle they apply to both developed and developing countries;329 
o Specific commitments on sources and sinks of GHG [Articles 4(2) and 12(2)]: apply 
only to parties listed as Annex I (OECD330 member states and former Eastern bloc);  
o Specific commitments relating to financial resources and technology transfer 
(Article 4(3)), which apply to the parties listed in Annex II (OECD countries). Under 
those provisions, developing countries do not assume the same commitments as the 
developed ones; besides that, the general commitments are only qualitative, they 
relate to matters such as greenhouse gas inventories, reporting, national strategies, 
co-operation in scientific research, and information exchange. 
 
Under the UNFCCC, member countries of the OECD took on the strongest measures 
and further agreed to adopt policies and measures that demonstrate their good will in 
‘taking the lead’ in addressing climate change. Countries in transition to a market 
economy were granted ‘a certain degree of flexibility’, in the implementation of their 
commitments under Article 4.2. 
Similarly, to the scenario under the 1985 Vienna Convention and the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol for the phasing out of the ozone layer depleting substances, the UNFCCC 
adopted no “specific measures” to address climate change,331 but instead took on 
“framework measures” to organise the international response.332 Negotiations therefore 
had to continue towards more concrete measures and steps. 
 
Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that from the negotiation stages up to the adoption of 
the final text of the Convention, parties were unanimous on the fact that from an 
historical point of view, developed countries have played a greater role in the emission 
                                                          
328 Ibid at 505. 
329 PW. Birnie et al (a) International Law and the Environmental 3 Ed (2009) at 359.   
330 See section 2.1.2 note 126. 






of GHG, and that they should accordingly take the lead in combating climate change, 
with more commitments, compared to developing countries.  
 
Even the preamble of the UNFCCC states: 
 
“Noting that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of GHG has 
originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are 
still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing 
countries will grow to meet their social and development needs.” 333 
 
A proposition that developing countries should commit themselves to keep their future 
net growth of greenhouse gas emissions to the lowest levels possible was abandoned due 
to the lack of support.334 Countries such as India maintained that there should be no legal 
obligation for developing countries under the UNFCCC.335 Thus, the Convention 
included specific commitments for developed countries, with no specific timeframe and 
no target for emissions limitation.336 Here again, it is worth noticing that the main 
holdout against the adoption of targets and timeframes was the United States.337  
 
Meanwhile, for a quarter of a century after the adoption of the UNFCCC, the global 
context of GHG emissions has abundantly evolved, and more actions are needed from 
all countries.338 It is argued that more than two thirds of cuts in greenhouse gas emissions 
needed by 2030, will have to come from developing countries in order to stabilise long 
term greenhouse gas concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-eq or lower.
339 Developed countries 
as a group should by 2020 reduce emissions by 25–40 percent below 1990 levels, while 
developing countries’ emissions are expected to be reduced by around 15–30percent, 
                                                          
333 See Preamble of the UNFCCC. 
334 Consolidated Text Based on Proposals Regarding Principles and Commitments INC/FCCC 3rd Session 
(1991) Provisional Agenda Item 2(a) U.N. Doc. AIAC 237 I Misc.at 9. 
335 See the Statement of India Feb. 6 1991 at 4 (maintaining that "there can be no legal obligation for 
developing countries"). 
336 A. Kiss & D. Shelton International Environmental Law 2 Ed (2000) at 514.    
337 Ibid.    
338 Bodansky (a) (note 13 above, 11). 
339 D. Elzen et al ‘Sharing the reduction effort to limit global warming to 2⁰ C’ (2010) 10 (3) Climate 




relative to their baseline levels, even though they are not historically responsible for the 
current climate change.340  
 
Hence, slowly but firmly came up the question of whether or not there should be, binding 
emissions limitations upon developing countries as well. The question gained 
momentum to the extent of becoming one of the burning issues during climate change 
negotiations after the adoption of the Kyoto protocol.  
 
3.2.3. Overview of negotiations talks towards a new regime for developing 
countries  
 
The current climate change regime for developing countries is the fruit of trade-offs 
between stances of predominant forces.341 It is also the result of overall contextual 
factors that have had impact on negotiators’ decisions. Contextual factors relate to 
circumstances that were predominant at the time of negotiations, whereas predominant 
forces relate to countries (envisaged individually or in groups). Consequentially, it is 
important to identify those factors and understand how they work.  
 
3.2.3.1. Forces that are present during the climate change negotiations342 
 
There is an abundant literature from authors who recognise the following to be the most 
important forces that were present during the implementation of the current climate 
change regime, especially in its early days:343   
 
                                                          
340 Ibid Elzen; Werner (note 252 above; 166); IPCC 2014 (a) (note 56 above; 96). 
341 UNEP (2007), ‘Multilateral Environmental Agreement Negotiator’s Handbook 2nd Ed: Nairobi, Kenya, 
171; Keohane et al (note 11; 2).  
342 Many NGO and other civil society organizations have as well played a vital role. See L. Eastwood 
‘Climate Change Negotiations and Civil Society Participation: Shifting and Contested Terrain’ (2011) 4 
(1) Theory in Action 8; information about NGOs influential role in climate change talks. Information 
available at: http://www.climatenetwork.org/ (Accessed: 10 August 2016); See also:  
http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/climate/links/non-governmental-organisations-ngo. (Accessed: 9 July 
2016); see also: http://www.caneurope.org/ (Accessed: 9 July 2016); see: http://www.greenpeace.org; 
(Accessed: 9 July 2016).   




o The oil producing countries (OPEC),344 from the start, feared for the backwash 
of climate change measures on oil trade and questioned the science of climate 
change, arguing rather for a “go-slow” approach.345  
o The AOSIS group,346 their greatest fears are the environmental consequences of 
climate change on their territories and population, such as sea level rise and 
floods.347 Owing to that, they strongly supported the establishment of targets and 
timetables for developed countries.348 
o The coalition for rainforest nations, the first group of developing countries to 
have advocated for a staged approach that differentiates between developing 
countries, in contrast to the position of the G77 who does not accommodate with 
any type of differentiation among developing countries.349 
o The emerging developing countries, fearing that climate change measures would 
hamper their efforts to economic development, or infringe on their 
sovereignty.350   
o The group of 77 and China,351 were resistant to the simple idea of taking on any 
costly commitments, fearing negative impacts on their economies. Their strongly 
                                                          
344 ‘The ten members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have tried to slow 
the process of international negotiations by questioning the scientific case for mitigation and by attempting 
to postpone discussions of new commitments for all Parties for the future. Saudi Arabia, a very active and 
vocal member of the group initially supported the US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. OPEC countries 
call for a consideration and possibly compensation for the adverse effects of reduced emissions on their 
economic development due to reduced revenues from oil exports and/or funding from Annex II Parties 
for economic diversification as well as removal of subsidies by Annex I Parties for domestic coal and 
nuclear power. They also strongly support a comprehensive approach to the climate problem with all gases 
and all sectors being considered, particularly sinks’. Information on OPEC available at: www.opec.org 
(Accessed: 7 May 2016); See N. Höhne et al ‘History and Status of the International Climate Change 
Negotiations on a Future Climate Agreement’ (2006) 1 Background Paper at 25; Available at 
http://www.basic-project.net/ (Accessed: 7 May 2016).  
345 Bodansky (a) (note 13 above; 31).  
346 See section 3.1.1 and note 267 above on the AOSIS group.  
347 Höhne (note 344 above; 21).  
348 Bodansky (a) (note 13 above; 33). 
349 The coalition of rainforest nations was an initiative of Papua New Guinea. It sought recognition of the 
efforts of member countries to avoid deforestation. It comprises 14 countries with rainforests, formed over 
the course of 2005 – 2006 including Bolivia, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gabon, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu. Information available at: http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/ 
(Accessed: 20 May 2016); see Höhne (note 344 above; 22).  
350 Bodansky (a) (note 13 above; 33).  
351 The group of 77 and China represents interests of all developing countries plus China, for the sake of 
climate negotiations. Members have diverse national circumstances, with sometimes opposite interests. 
For instance, Small Island States members who call for stronger measures, fearing to be flooded due to 
sea level rise, while oil producing countries members call for a go slow approach, fearing loss of their 
income due to petrol use restrictions as a climate change measure. Information available at: 




held position was that the historical change of climate was the responsibility of 
developed countries, and that developed countries should have the main 
responsibility and take the lead in tackling climate change. They also support 
that no further commitments for developing countries would be acceptable, at 
least until the developed countries have demonstrated to have taken the lead in 
combating climate change.352  
o The LDCs, 353 the broad consensus relating to them is that they should not have 
any obligation to reduce emissions, and that future international actions should 
support their deployed efforts in terms of adaptation to climate change negative 
impacts and effects.354  
o The EU, whose standing position from the beginning of the negotiations up to 
date is that developed countries should take the lead in combating climate 
change. With regards to GHG emissions limitations, the EU has advocated that 
the Kyoto style targets may not be applied on developing countries, but has 
instead called for other types of approaches which are better suitable for the 
needs and circumstances of developing countries, arguing that emission 
reduction targets as they are under the Kyoto Protocol were appropriate for 
Annex I countries alone, and that there were other options suitable for Non-
Annex I countries.355  
o The USA, second largest GHG emitter worldwide after China, fearing for its 
economy to slow down as a consequence of climate change measures, kept its 
eyes on its greatest challenger, which is a developing country, China.356 From 
the start of climate change talks, the USA was opposed to the establishment of 
any target and for any time table/frame on the ground that they were too rigid, 
and took no account of differing national circumstances.357 From 1994 to 2001, 
the USA has firmly maintained its position of advocating for a greater 
involvement of developing countries (calling it a ‘meaningful participation’ of 
                                                          
352 Höhne (note 344; 23). 
353 Information available at: http://www.g77.org (Accessed: 20 May 2016). 
354 Höhne (note 344; 25).  
355 Pauw (note 153 above; 24-25). 
356 The world’s 10 largest emitters by 1 October 2015, in descending order of emission levels: China, the 
USA, the European Union, India, Russia, Indonesia, Brazil, Japan, Canada and Mexico; UNEP (note 37 
above; 14); see also Depledge (note 239 above; 11). 





developing countries), beyond the commitments defined under the UNFCCC.358 
It rejected the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, disappointed upon the apparent 
‘exclusion’ of developing countries, specifically China and India from any 
emission reduction schema, and owing to the high costs involved for the USA to 
reach its target. Since June 2002, Niklas draws attention on a determining shift 
in the US position, which no longer called for developing countries’ further 
commitments, but rather opposed henceforth any binding commitments for any 
party under the UNFCCC.359 
 
3.2.3.2. Contextual factors 
 
As Bodansky360 explains, negotiations towards the UNFCCC were happening within a 
context where prevailed factors such as:  
 
o Growing public awareness on climate change that led to broader calls for action, 
especially the public opinion in developed countries;  
o Progressively greater light on the origins and drivers of the climate change 
phenomenon, to the extent of leading developed countries to acknowledge their 
historical responsibility for climate change;  
o Financial pressures coming from developing countries so as to gather necessary 
means and address climate change.  
 
All these factors became the basic reflexes of developing countries during the early days 
of the UNFCCC negotiations.     
 
Similarly, Kurukulasuriya361 found prevailing factors during negotiations to the adoption 
of the Kyoto Protocol, that for him are comparable to those on the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol negotiation table:  
                                                          
358 Höhne (note 344 above; 26). 
359 Ibid Höhne; 
360 For Bodansky, the evolution of awareness about climate change was characterized by three stages:  
i. emergence of a broad scientific consensus,  
ii. growth in public and political interest,  
iii. formulation of an international policy response. See Bodansky (c) (note 316 above; 458);  




o Greater concerns about developing countries’ financial abilities, which were 
barriers to their adherence to the treaty’s commitments;  
o The necessity for a drafting style of the protocol that is flexible, in order to 
timely adjust to new scientific evidences and any probable significant change 
within the context of parties;  
o The determination of an economically feasible and detailed time schedule for 
the phasing out of the ozone depleting substances.362 
 
According to Birnie,363 the intention behind the adoption of the UNFCCC was to secure 
a universal participation of countries. However, such a universal inclusivity could not 
be achieved without any price to be paid.364 Therefore continued Birnie,365 even if the 
Convention had successfully gathered almost all the sheep in the sheepfold (considering 
its 196 ratifications to date), its provisions were the reflection of an unfinished 
compromise process, and its wordings recounting important differences of position 
among parties.366 That is why the inclusive characteristic of the UNFCCC has been 
generally viewed as both strength, and weakness.367 The UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, revealed their limitations during their implementation.368 Furthermore, the 
flow of climate change related scientific information followed established human 
behaviour for this phenomenon, and called for immediate and greater actions from all.369 
                                                          
362 Ibid. 
363 Birnie (note 329 above; 257).   
364 Ibid.  
365 Ibid.   
366 Ibid.   
367 V.P. Nanda & G. Pring International Environmental Law & Policy for the 21st Century (2003) at 247, 
290; See P.W. Birnie & A.E. Boyle ‘International Law and the Environment’ 2 Ed (2002) at 516.   
368 A. Manne & R. Richels ‘US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol: the impact on compliance costs and CO2 
emissions’ (2004) 32 (4) Energy Policy 447 at 451; Korhola (note 21 above, 197-208); E. Diringer 
‘Climate policy: Letting go of Kyoto’ (2011) 479 (7373) Nature 291 at 292.   
369 IPCC 2014 (a) Mitigation report confirms at 95% that climate change is a human induced phenomenon. 
Hereafter is a table of the degree of certainty that progressively came forward under each IPCC report. 
 
Years of publication of 
the IPCC Mitigation 
Assessment Report 
 
Degree of Certainty that 
the current climate change 
is a human induced 





1995 50.00 % 
2001 66.00 % 
2007  90.00 % 




This brought back the question of whether binding limitations should be extended as 
well for emissions resulting from developing countries. The question, although of great 
relevancy was still left formally unanswered, even after signs of a regime collapse that 
came up with the withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol scheme of a major emitter such 
as the United States.370 Subsequent rounds of negotiations showed lack of progress given 
the decreased confidence in the UNFCCC as the platform for mobilising a global 
response to climate change.371 
 
Bearing this in mind, it became easier to navigate through the UNFCCC negotiation 
forums which are the Conference of the Parties (COPs)372 as they progressively moved 
towards a new regime for developing countries in Paris in 2015. Considering the aim of 
the present research, the first COP to be envisaged under next sections of the current 
chapter will be the 13th, whereas the last will be the 20th. The focus will be put on the 
COP’s objectives and outcomes with respect to progressive formation of the developing 
countries’ new regime.  
 
3.2.4. COP 13: The Bali Road Map 
 
3.2.4.1. Objective  
 
The 13th edition of the COP at Bali, Indonesia was held from the 3rd –15th December 
2007 with the aim of creating a roadmap in order to chart the course for future global 
climate change negotiations on which basis a post Kyoto global agreement was to be 
                                                          
The IPCC Mitigation Assessment Reports are available at: 
https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml. (Accessed: 28 March 
2016). 
370 M. GRUBB et al ‘The economics of the Kyoto Protocol’ (2003) 4 (3) WEHT 143 at 164 - 165; Korhola 
(note 21 above; 199).  
371 Engel & H. Kirsten ‘Mitigating global climate change in the United States: a regional approach’ 
(2005) 14 NYU Envtl. LJ at 54. Available at: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/nyuev14&div=8&g_sent=1&collection=journal
s; (Accessed: 15 March 2016). 
372 Article 7 of the UNFCCC provides for the Conference of the Parties. See section 2.1.1 above for 




negotiated within the following two years.373 Parties were more willing to work together 
for a new global climate change treaty.374 Key issues at Bali concerned:  
 
i. the post-2012 emission reductions of the industrial countries;  
ii. the possible post-2012 participation of developing countries; 
iii. adaptation to climate change;  
iv. technology and financing of the developing countries, and  
v. curtailing forest depletion (in developing countries).375  
 
3.2.4.2. Outcome  
 
Several options were discussed in order to extend the limitations of GHG emissions to 
the group of developing countries, of which some were proposed by developing 
countries themselves.376 The Conference established two new subsidiary bodies: the first 
                                                          
373 Negotiations had to be completed by December 2009, at the COP15 in Copenhagen. 
374 R.L. Arcas ‘Is the Kyoto Protocol an adequate environmental Agreement to resolve the climate change 
Problem?’ (2001) EEnvLawRev. 282 at 284.   
375 ‘The initiative of Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Forest degradation (REDD+) came 
up with the Bali Action Plan. REDD + did not alter developing countries’ regime, but solved an 
economical, and socio-environmental problem by putting more attention on incentivising towards existing 
forests with the aim of avoiding having them cut down or degraded in the future. Emissions from 
deforestations and forest degradations which are covered by the REDD+ initiative represent 11% of global 
emissions.’ Information available at: http://www.unredd.net/documents/redd-papers-and-publications-
90/un-redd-publications-1191/fact-sheets/15279-fact-sheet-about-redd.html. (Accessed: 26 October 
2016). 
376 The following are alternative approaches proposed for the inclusion of developing countries under 
emission limitation scheme:  
1. Kyoto-Style fixed targets: A form of an agreed percentage reduction against annual emissions in a 
base year 1990, opening the way to the calculation of an absolute number of tons of CO2 to be reduced. 
2. Per Capita: it considers the equal right of each person to use the atmosphere as a global commodity. 
No reference to current emissions levels, but a global budget equally allocated to countries based on 
population. 
3. Brazilian Proposal: Bases its burden sharing approach on historical responsibility for change in 
temperature to individual countries. The original Brazilian proposal attributed responsibility among 
Annex I countries for an overall reduction of 30% below 1990 levels by 2020. 
4. Emission Intensity: requires reductions of emissions relative to economic output (GHG/GDP). It 
therefore allows growth in emissions if there is economic growth. To account for different national 
circumstances, commitments could be formulated as a percentage decrease from each country’s own 
emissions intensity. 
5. SD-PAMs Sustainable Development Policies and Measures: SD-PAMs suggest that developing 
countries themselves identify more sustainable development paths and commit to implementing these 
with financial support from the developed countries. 
6. Evolution of the Clean Development Mechanism: Extending the CDM already in place within 
developing countries will not be a commitment to reduce emissions domestically, but could instead be 




under the UNFCCC (the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long term Cooperative Action 
“AWG-LCA”)377 and the second under the Kyoto Protocol (Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Further Commitments for Annex I parties “AWG-KP”).378 The two subsidiary bodies 
were supposed to complete their works in two years, at COP 15, in Copenhagen in 2009. 
The following negotiations were held under the two subsidiary bodies within their 
respective statutory mandates and life spans. 
 
The attempt in Bali was to retain the Annex I/Non-Annex I balance of mitigation 
commitments, but also to increase the sense of urgency on both sides.379 However, the 
final document, the “Bali Action Plan” was neutral as it included no quantitative 
emissions reduction for any party.380 Dutt and Gaioli381 qualified it to be a simple echo 
of the position of the USA which opposed the idea of any emission limitation to be 
imposed on either party,382 although it launched an appeal towards large emitting 
developing countries such as China, India, Brazil and Mexico, for concrete actions on 
emissions limitations.383 Under the lead of China and India, the appeal made by the USA 
                                                          
7. Global Triptych: Focuses on three sectors – electricity generation, energy-intensive industries and 
“domestic sectors” (including residential and transportation). It also takes into account the 
technological opportunities available in various sectors. 
See UNDP “the Bali Road Map, Key issues under Negotiations” (2008) at 41 – 47. Available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Environment%20and%20Energy/Climate%20Change/B
ali_Road_Map_Key_Issues_Under_Negotiation.pdf. (Accessed:  July 16, 2016). 
377 ‘The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) 
was established as a subsidiary body under the Convention by decision 1/CP.13 (the Bali Action Plan) to 
conduct a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the 
Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012, in order to reach an agreed 
outcome to be presented to the COP for adoption’. Information available at: 
http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6431.php (Accessed: 02 June 2016).  
378 ‘In 2005, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP) at its first meeting in Montreal, by its decision 1/CMP.1, established the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). The AWG-KP was 
established to discuss future commitments for industrialized countries under the Kyoto Protocol. The 
AWG-KP reported to the CMP. In 2012, the CMP, at its eighth session, adopted decision 1/CMP.8 (the 
Doha Amendment). In doing so, the CMP decided that the AWG-KP had fulfilled the mandate set out in 
decision 1/CMP.1, and that its work was concluded.’ Information available at: 
http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6431.php (Accessed: 02 June 2016). 
379 UNDP (2008) “the Bali Road Map, Key issues under Negotiations” New York at 29. 
380 Ibid UNDP (2008); Bali Action Plan available at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf#page=3. (Accessed: 09 May 2016).  
381 G. Dutt & F. Gaioli ‘Negotiations and Agreements on Climate Change at Bali’ (2008) 43 (3) EPW 11 
at 12. 
382 ‘A historical change of the USA position towards the developing countries commitments first emerged 
at Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (5 June 2002), and became clear in COP 8 in 
November 2002. The USA was no longer calling for developing country commitments but was instead 
opposing the call for any UNFCCC process to discuss future commitments for any party.’ See Höhne 
(note 344 above; 26).   




was given a negative answer by the majority of developing countries, thus reinforcing 
their refusal to commit themselves to any quantitative emission reductions.384 In reply 
several industrial countries came up and made it clear too, that approving the Bali 
Roadmap will not mean committing themselves to any quantitative emission reduction 
after 2012.385 The EU’s legendary position with respect to developing countries’ regime 
was unmoved.386  
 
In summary, although parties showed clearly what their respective stances towards a 
new regime for developing countries were, there was nevertheless no significant move 
recorded. Great expectations for the adoption of a new climate change regime were 
henceforth put on the next significant COP, announced to be at Copenhagen in 2009. 
 
3.2.5. COP 15: The Copenhagen Accord  
 
3.2.5.1. Objective  
 
The 15th COP was organised from 7 – 19 December, 2009 in the Danish city of 
Copenhagen.387 It was labelled “the Conference to save the planet”388 due to its focus on 
the adoption of a new global Accord to cover the period after the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol.389 Under such a determination, parties came to 
Copenhagen to seal a deal,390 that would be a fair, ambitious and equitable agreement to 
                                                          
384 Korhola (note 21 above; 66). 
385 Ibid. 
386 See section 3.1.3.1 above for more details. 
387 ‘The Poznan conference in Poland was held in 2008, a year Before Copenhagen. With respect to the 
Bali Action Plan, the Poznan conference was regarded by some observers as a midpoint towards 
Copenhagen. Negotiations proceeded in two tracks: 1/ the post 2012 period for industrialized countries 
that ratified the Kyoto Protocol. It could generate unfortunately no emissions reduction from major 
emitters such as USA, China, India, and Brazil, being all outside the Protocol. 2/ the second track 
concerned all the countries parties to the UNFCCC, including USA, China, India, and Brazil the largest 
emitters worldwide. Discussions here never managed to focus on the global emissions reduction issue, 
due to the refusal of developing countries who instead chose to hold on to their position of not taking on 
themselves any emission limitation obligation. It is against this back ground that negotiations took place 
in Copenhagen the following year’. See Korhola (note 21 above; 69). 
388 Information on the conference available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/connie-hedegaard/time-is-
up-the-deadline-i_b_372691.html. (Accessed: 12 June 2016). 
389 IISD (a) ‘Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 December 2009’ (2009) 12 
(459) Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2 1. Available at: http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12459e.pdf. 
(Accessed: 10 July 2016).   
390 D. Bodansky (d) ‘The Copenhagen climate change conference: a post-mortem.’ (2010) 104 (2) AJIL 




put the world in paths of avoiding dangerous interference with the climate system.391 
For Yvo de Boer,392 former UNFCCC Executive Secretary, the key deliverables 
expected under at Copenhagen were, ambitious mid-term emission reductions by 
developed countries, clear mitigation actions by major developing countries, short and 
long term finance and climate change governance structures.393 Parties expected a 
legally binding agreement to all, in order to meet the goal of limiting the global 




Negotiations were conducted under the AWG-KP and the AWG-LCA. Little progress 
was made under AWG-KP, as developing countries were urging the developed ones to 
commit themselves to impressive emission reduction targets post 2012, sending them 
back to their historical accountability, while developed countries stressed that a 
meaningful response to climate change required the involvement of major emitters from 
developing countries.395  
 
Under the AWG-LCA, things did not improve. A negotiating text was proposed, taken, 
but it eventually took the form of a complex document in the history of the UNFCCC, 
comprising 200 pages which reflected various proposals by all parties and thousands of 
brackets indicating areas of disagreement between parties.396 
 
Ultimately, the COP 15 produced what came to be known as the “Copenhagen Accord”, 
signed between only 28 parties out of 167397 among which were the world’s major 
emitters, and some of the LDC.398 As a consequence of that lack of consensus around its 
text, the Copenhagen Accord failed to be adopted as a decision by the COP, as per the 
                                                          
http://www.unep.org/newscentre/multimedia/default.asp?ct=photos&gal=seal (Accessed: 12 June 
2016). 
391 IISD (a) (note 389 above; 1). 
392 Yvo de Boer is a former UNFCCC Executive Secretary from 2006 to 2010. Information available at: 
ttp://unfccc.int/secretariat/executive_secretary/items/1200.php. (Accessed: 10 August 2016). 
393 IISD (a) (note 389 above; 27). 
394 Carlarne (note 242; 59). 
395 IISD (a) note 388 above; 26).   
396 Ibid.  
397 Ibid. 




standards of the United Nations Organisation.399 COP 15 only “took note” of the 
Copenhagen Accord, leaving it void of any legal power. Although that had been said, 
the Copenhagen Accord remained however a key referential document for the future of 
the climate change regime.400 It required developing countries to undertake mitigation 
actions and developed countries to commit to targets.401 It was an outline of a future 
framework to address climate change,402 through which signatory parties formally 
expressed their views about what they expected a post Kyoto Accord to be like. Even 
though it was a non-binding universal regime, it reiterated the urgency to reduce current 
emissions in order to achieve the goal of stabilising the global temperature increase to 
less than 2 degrees Celsius at the end of the 21st century.403  
 
This precisely is what matters most for the present research, focused on the developing 
countries’ emission mitigation regime shift. Thanks to the Copenhagen Accord, the 
following rounds of negotiations became more aerated, to the extent that one of the 
delegates to negotiations commented before leaving the Conference centre as follows:  
 
“If it had been adopted, the Accord would have been an important step forward towards 
a better and legally-binding outcome”404 
  
                                                          
399 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties 3 May 1966. Available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication /UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf. 
(Accessed: 6 June 2016); IISD (a) (note 389 above; J. Wilson ‘No deal at Copenhagen’ (2010) 106 (1/2) 
SAJSci 128 3 at 3. Available at: http://sajs.co.za/no-deal-copenhagen/wilson-jessica (Accessed: 8 May 
2016). 
400 Quoting Aldy et al, Brian Spak, argues that the Copenhagen Accord represents another viable approach 
to the international climate Policy unlike the Kyoto Style targets and timetables which so far was the only 
one in town. See B. Spak ‘The success of the Copenhagen accord and the failure of the Copenhagen 
conference’ (Substantial Research Paper). Available at: http://www.american.edu/sis/gep/upload/Brian-
Spak-SRP-Copenhagen-Success-and-Failure.pdf. (Accessed: 1 February 2016) 2010 at 38. 
401 Rajamani (c) (note 398 above; 828).    
402 IISD (a) (note 389 above; 29). 
403 Carlarne (note 242 above; 59). 




3.2.6. COP 16: The Cancun Agreement 
 
3.2.6.1. Objective  
 
The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico, took place from 
29 November to 11 December 2010.405 The focus was on the two-track negotiation 
process aimed at enhancing long term co-operation under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, constituted by the AWG/KP and the AWG/LCA.406 Expectations were that 
Cancun would only produce meaningful progress on some of the key issues including 
mitigation, adaptation, financing, technology, reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in developing countries, conservation, sustainable management 
of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) and on monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV), international consultation and analysis (ICA),407 but 




A text commonly known as the “Cancun Agreement” was adopted, under which 
developing countries agreed to take based on Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
(NAMA) aimed at achieving a deviation in their emissions relative to a business a -usual 
scenario by 2020.408  In other words, developing countries accepted voluntary 
commitments covering the period up to 2020.409 Although some authors have argued 
about the Cancun Agreement’s lack of legally binding character,410 it has produced the 
regime that is currently governing countries parties to the UNFCCC except those already 
committed under the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period.411  
                                                          
405 IISD (b) ‘Summary of the Cancun Climate Change Conference: 29 November -11 December 2010’ 
(2010) 12 (498) Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2 at 1. Available at http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop16/enb 
(Accessed: 15 July 2016). 
406 Ibid. 
407 Ibid.  
408  Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions are hereinafter referred to as “NAMAs”; IISD (b) (note 
404 above; 18).  
409 A. Marcu ‘Doha/COP 18: gateway to a new climate change agreement’ (2012) CEPS Commentary at 
2. Available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/38917/ (Accessed: 30 June 2016). 
410 Liu ‘Legislation and Policy: The Cancun Agreements’ (2011) 13 ENV L REV 43 at 43; L. Rajamani 
(d) ‘The Climate Change Regime in Evolution: The Disagreements that survive the Cancun Agreements’ 
(2011) CCRL 136 at 138-139. 




The Green Climate Fund (GCF)412 is an innovation under the Cancun Agreement. The 
GCF requests developed countries to provide support for preparation and 
implementation of developing countries’ NAMAs.413 It also brought formally under the 
UNFCCC process, the developed countries’ mitigation targets and developing countries’ 
mitigation actions decided earlier under the Copenhagen Accord.414 This recovery of the 
Copenhagen Accord’s outcomes was even praised by some negotiating parties to the 
extent that one member expressed his excitement in these terms: 
 
“We’ve managed to bring the main Copenhagen outcomes formally under the 
UNFCCC—and in some cases, we’ve gone beyond the Copenhagen Accord and added 
some flesh to the bones.”415  
 
Another negotiating party member uttered this comment, in reference to mitigation 
provisions:  
 
“I would not characterise this outcome as ‘strong, especially concerning mitigation, but 
it is clearly a positive one.”416 
 
Developing countries’ position shifted in Cancun as they in majority supported a 
universal legally-binding outcome.417 They further expressed concern about the 2°C 
goal, preferring a 1.5°C goal, proving themselves to be more caring about the global 
climate.418 Even groups of climate activists and organisations such as the Umbrella 
Group,419 opened up in favour of a universal legally binding treaty. Equally for the EU 
                                                          
412 The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC, 
under its Article 11. It was established by parties at the convention at COP 16 to support projects, 
programmes, policies and other activities in developing country Parties. The Fund is governed by the GCF 
Board. Information available at: 
http://www.greenclimate.fund. (Accessed: 16 July 2016); decision 1/CP.16 available at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=17 (Accessed: 16 July 2016). 
413The actions comprise reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation; conserving forest carbon 
stocks; sustainable forest management; and enhancing forest carbon stocks (REDD+). 
414 IISD (b) (note 404 above; 29). 
415 Ibid. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Rajamani (d) (note 410 above; 139). 
418 IISD (b) (note 404 above; 9). 
419 The Umbrella Group is a loose coalition of non-EU developed countries which formed following the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Although there is no formal list, the Group is usually made up of 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the 




that opened up for a universal legally binding document including developing 
countries.420 
 
Although with the Cancun Agreements it became clearer that days were numbered for 
the liberal emissions regime developing countries enjoyed that far,421 the Conference, 
however, moved a very small step forward towards reducing global emissions that 
contribute to climate change.422 
 
3.2.7. COP 17: The Durban platform for enhanced action 
 
3.2.7.1. Objective  
 
From 28 November – 11 December 2011, parties gathered in Durban, South Africa for 
the COP 17 with mixed expectations. Many countries felt that “operationalising” the 
Cancun Agreements was all that the Durban meetings could achieve.423 Some other 
countries however expected a balanced and interdependent package of decisions that 
could resolve the Kyoto Protocol issue, make negotiations move towards a new legally-
binding treaty, and make the GCF operational.424 Korhola425 commented on that saying 
that the COP 17 was one of those meetings from which nothing special was initially 
expected, but surprisingly ended up yielding meaningful results. 
 
                                                          
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/items/2714.php (Accessed: 20 July 
2016). 
420 Speaking on behalf of the Umbrella Group, Australia stressed the need for legally-binding 
commitments by all major economies with differentiation between developed and developing countries 
and called for COP decisions from Cancun outlining a way forward towards a legally-binding outcome. 
It expressed flexibility concerning a single new protocol or a combination that involves the continuation 
of the Kyoto Protocol. It called for a progress on monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) and 
international consultation and analysis (ICA). Japan issued a proposal for a single legally-binding 
instrument in the form of a new protocol. The EU requested clarifying, in Cancun, that the intention is to 
work towards a legally-binding outcome under the AWG-LCA and reiterated its willingness to commit to 
a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol in the context of a comprehensive global outcome. 
More details on opening statements available at: http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12488e.html.  (Accessed: 
20 July 2016). 
421 Rajamani (d) (note 410 above; 138-140). 
422 Ibid.  
423 IISD (c) ‘Summary of the Durban Climate Change Conference: 28 November -11 December 2011’ 
(2011) 12 (534) Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2 at 29. Available at http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop17/enb 
(Accessed: 16 July 2016).  
424 The green climate fund was established under the COP 16. See note 411 above for more details. 






Durban gave birth to a package of some 20 decisions,426 especially the following two 
which most were important in contributing towards global efforts for emissions 
reduction:  
 
o All the countries would start negotiating on a new binding instrument for a global 
reduction of GHG emissions; 
o The EU and some other industrialised countries’ acceptance of the extension of their 
Kyoto Protocol obligations for a second commitment period, spanning from 2013 to 
2020. 427 
 
a. Outcome related to negotiations for a universal binding instrument 
 
The Durban decisions called for all major emitters – including developing countries such 
as China, Brazil, and India to set national emissions reduction targets that would be 
legally binding428 by 2015. Subsequent negotiations were to be conducted under a newly 
established subsidiary body, The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action (ADP).429 This has been a most significant decision, given that the new 
universal binding instrument became a major regime shift for developing countries as 




                                                          
426 Twenty decisions were made at COP17. Information about the COP17 decisions is available at 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/durban_nov_2011/session/6294/php/view/decisions.php. (Accessed: 16 May 
2016).   
427 Korhola (note 21 above; 77); IISD (c) (note 182; 28).  
428 B.B. Subhabrata ‘A Climate for Change? Critical Reflections on the Durban United Nations Climate 
Change Conference’ (2012) 33(12) Organization Studies 1761 at 1765. 
429 ‘The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) is a subsidiary body 
that was established by decision 1/CP.17 in Durban 2011, pursuant to article 17 of the UNFCCC. Its 
mandate is to develop a protocol, or another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force under 
the UNFCCC that will be applicable to all Parties, which was to be completed no later than 2015 in order 
for it to be adopted at COP21 in Paris 2015, and that will come into effect and be implemented from 
2020.’ Information available at: http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6645.php. (Accessed: 20 May 2016). 




b. Outcome r elated to the Kyoto Protocol extension  
 
The EU agreed to commit itself for a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The decision was a proof about the inclusion of all developing countries in a post Kyoto 
emissions reduction binding regime. The inclusion of all major emitters from developing 
countries was a prerequisite imposed by the EU before its acceptance of any new 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.431 The inclusion of developing countries, 
especially China, India and Brazil for a legally binding emission scheme was equally 
meaningful for the USA, for as long as, the country claimed its meaningful participation 
in the global emissions reduction efforts, even if as said above, the USA no longer 
claimed the same position in COP 17.432   
 
EU leaders however described the Durban outcome in many ways. It was described as a 
historic achievement, a watershed, a moment surpassing the success of COP1 in 1995 
and the meeting that led to the creation of the Kyoto Protocol two years later.433 
Environmental civil society actors were, however, critical, qualifying Durban outcomes 
to be a flaw434 because of the lack of binding emissions cuts, in contradiction to the 
statutory mandate of any COP meeting.435 Their overall claim was that the platform did 
not advance the world any further in solving the climate change challenge: 
 
“Disastrous and profoundly distressing, Durban summit was nothing more than smoke 
and mirrors – an illusion of ambition with no real targets or time lines’,436 ‘A 
compromise which saves the climate talks but endangers people living in poverty’,437 
‘Durban Platform can only be described as a major disappointment”, said Charveriat.438 
                                                          
431 See section 3.1.4 above on the Bali conference.  
432 See section 3.1.3.1 above on the USA emissions mitigation position. 
433 D. Keating ‘A climate deal against the odds’ (December 2011) European Voice at 15. Available at: 
www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/a-climate-deal-against-the-odds-/72961.aspx (Accessed: 2 
May 2016). 
434 The green groups especially were the authors of the critics. Green Groups refer to Coalitions of 
environmental organisations for the defence of the Environment. See for example the green group 
organisations in the State of Missouri/USA. Available at:  http://moenvironment.org/get-involved/green-
groups-in-missouri (Accessed: 15 January 2016).  
435 Subhabrata (note 428 above; 1765). 
436 Statement from Mr. Mohamed Adow, a representative of the NGO Christian Aid at that time. See 
Subhabrata (note 428 above; 1770). 
437 Ibid.  
438 Statement from Celine Charveriat, Director of advocacy for Oxfam at that time. See Subhabrata (note 




It is against such a context of diverging opinions about COP17 that countries parties to 
the UNFCCC moved forward to the next round of negotiations which was the COP18. 439 
 
3.2.8. COP 18: The Doha Climate Gate Way 
 
3.2.8.1. Objective  
 
Held from 26 November to 8 December 2012 in Doha, Qatar, the COP 18 was qualified 
as “transitional” by some observers,440 as the forum was mainly about getting parties to 
move forward on a path towards adopting a universal climate agreement by 2015, and 
adopting a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. Other COP18 objectives 
included the issues of dismissing the two Ad Hoc Working Groups (the AWG-KP441 and 
AWG-LCA442) whose missions came to an end,443 and progress on long term funding 
mechanism to support climate action in developing countries (supposed to reach US$100 




Negotiations in Doha focused rather on ensuring the implementation of agreements 
reached at previous UNFCCC forums,445 The “Doha Climate Gateway” decisions were 
adopted as outcomes from the Conference. The “Doha Climate Gateway” included the 
strengthening of governments’ positions in setting out a time frame for the adoption of 
a universal climate agreement by 2015, which would come into effect in 2020. During 
the Conference, the World Bank released a report entitled "Turn down the Heat: Why a 
4°C Warmer World Must Be Avoided". The Report stated that the world was on track 
towards a 4°C temperature rise at the end of the 21st century, should the currently 
                                                          
439 IISD (d) ‘Summary of the Doha Climate Change Conference: 26 November -8 December 2012’ (2012) 
12 (567) Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2 at 1. Available at http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop18/enb (Accessed: 
16 July 2016). 
440 Ibid  
441 See note 377 above. 
442 See note 376 above.  
443 IISD (d) (note 439 above; 26).  
444 Ibid. 




inadequate level of ambition remain.446 The Doha Climate Gateway echoed that 
evidence by reaffirming that all countries needed to increase national ambitions to 
GHGs.447  
 
Doha has been a turning point for developing countries negotiating groups.448 They 
started looking at the future of climate change talks from different perspectives and 
further formed the following sub-coalition within traditional negotiation groups: 
  
o The Association of Independent Latin American and Caribbean states (AILAC) 
group: very supportive to the idea that a strong and robust Convention applicable to 
all was the most effective way to achieve the objective of remaining below 2°C 
temperature increase.449  
o The “like minded group on climate change”450 was more concerned about the 
apparent developed countries’ deviation from the original spirit of the UNFCCC. 
The group gave itself the goal of upholding the Convention’s principles of 
                                                          
446 Report “Turn down the heat: Why a 4°C warmer world must be avoided”. Available at:  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange. (Accessed: 10 July 2016). 
447 Information available at: http://unfccc.int/key_steps/doha_climate_gateway/items/7389.php 
(Accessed: 10 July 2016). 
448 See section 3.1.1.1 of early days of Climate Change awareness. 
449 The Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) is a group of seven 
countries (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and Peru) that share interests and 
positions on climate change. It was established as a formal negotiating group under the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in December 2012, during the Conference of the Parties in Doha, Qatar.  
Its main objective is to generate coordinated, ambitious positions and contribute to the balance in the 
multilateral negotiations on climate change with a coherent vision for sustainable development that is 
responsible to the environment and future generations. Information available at: http://ailac.org/en/sobre/ 
(Accessed: 10 July 2016). 
450 The Like Minded Developing Countries on climate change (LMDCs) is a spontaneous coalition of 24 
countries created at the Bonn Climate Change Conference in May 2012. It is part of G77 + China which 
it aims to strengthen and unify. It comprises several Arab countries, India, China, several emerging Asian 
economies and some active parties from the Caribbean and South America, including Venezuela, Bolivia 
and Cuba. The group, which brings together over half of the world’s population, has no official presidency 
but Malaysia acts as its spokesperson. Their concern is regarding the shifting of the financial burden to 
developing countries and the attempt to expand the list of countries with obligations under the Convention 
(UNFCCC) to provide climate finance, and at the same time shrink the list of countries eligible for 
receiving climate finance. They also called on the developed countries “to provide a clear roadmap for the 
fulfilment of the $100 billion per year by 2020”. Information available at: 
http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/whats-the-use-of-the-country-coalitions/ (Accessed: 30 July 2016); see also 
http://indianexpress.com/article/world/climate-change/after-like-minded-developing-countries-meet-




“CBDR”, as well as the developed countries’ historical accountability for climate 
change.451 
 
3.2.9. COP 19: The Warsaw Outcomes 
 
3.2.9.1. Objective  
 
Convened in a backdrop of urgency,452 COP 19 in Warsaw/Poland took place from 11-
23 November 2013. It was halfway between the Durban COP 17 (which produced the 
ADP) and the 2015 COP 21 in Paris, the deadline for the signing of a universal binding 
climate change agreement. At Warsaw, parties’ progress towards pre-2020 emission 
reduction ambitions seemed shrunken despite the growing evidence about the need for 
drastic emissions cut and repeated calls for urgent action.453 However, debates focused 
on intensifying the work on the content of the 2015 universal climate change agreement, 
and on concrete outcomes on pre-2020 GHG mitigation ambition through Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions that countries had to submit on the course of 
2015.454  
                                                          
451 Information available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/world/climate-change/after-like-minded-
developing-countries-meet-prospects-for-climate-change-negotiations-appear-bleak/. (Accessed: 30 July 
2016). 
452 The following events are the major facts constituting the backdrop against which the Warsaw climate 
change conference was convened. Those factors have been significantly influential on the conference and 
its outcomes:  
1. In 2012, during the Doha Climate Change Conference, Typhoon Bopha ravaged the Philippines.  
2. In 2013, at the opening of the Warsaw Climate Change Conference, Super typhoon Haiyan, the 
strongest storm to ever make landfall, ravaged the Philippines again.  
3. Few weeks before the Conference, the scientific community issued a “clarion call” that climate 
change was unequivocal and its effects were evident in many parts of the world, including 
flooding in the Middle East and Europe, and prolonged droughts in the US and Australia.  
4. Two months before the COP, the IPCC-WGI concluded that human influence on the climate 
system was clear, and limiting climate change would require substantial and sustained reductions 
of GHG emissions.  
5. The World Meteorological Organization confirmed that 2013 was among the top ten warmest 
years on record and that melting ice caps and glaciers brought global sea level to a new record 
high 452.  
6. Many other reports showed how paltry the international response then was.  
7. The UNEP Emissions Gap Report showed an increase in emissions in 2013, noting that the 
opportunities for reaching the 2°C goal are closing and warned against the costs of inaction. See 
IISD (e) ‘Summary of the Warsaw Climate Change Conference: 11 November – 23 November 
2013’ (2013) 12 (594) Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2, at 27. Available at 
http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop18/enb (Accessed: 16 July 2016).  
453 IISD (e) (note 452 above; 30). 
454 ‘In anticipation of the adoption of the Paris Agreement, countries publicly outlined what post-2020 





The two objectives were crucial as they were simultaneously aimed at giving back 
enough confidence towards the UNFCCC process as the relevant forum for climate 




No decision was taken with regard to the issue of a new regime for developing countries. 
Discussions went on about revising the traditional differentiation between developed 
and developing countries.456  A key demand from developed countries for the 2015 
universal climate change agreement was that it may take into consideration fundamental 
changes in the global economy since the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992,457 seeing 
that some developing countries such as the Republic of Korea, China, Brazil and India, 
classified Non-Annex I countries under the UNFCCC, were worldwide economic power 
houses in 2013, with important associated GHG emissions.458 
 
Developing countries were however divided upon the matter.459 The LMDC group460 
was supportive to the reflection of the traditional Annex I/Non-Annex I distinction in 
any future agreement,461 whereas the AILAC group 462 sought instead for the differential 
                                                          
their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). The climate actions communicated in these 
INDCs largely determine whether the world achieves the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, which 
is to hold the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C, and pursue efforts to limit the 
increase to 1.5°C, and to achieve net zero emissions in the second half of this century.’ Information 
available at: http://www.wri.org/indc-definition. (Accessed: 10 October 2016); ‘Further to the 
negotiations under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, the 
Conference of the Parties, by its decision 1/CP.19, invited all Parties to initiate or intensify domestic 
preparations for their INDCs towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2, 
without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions, in the context of adopting a protocol, another 
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.’ 
Information available at: http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php. (Accessed: 8 May 2016);  
Decision 1/CP.19 2014 UNFCCC available 
at:http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf#page=3. (Accessed: 8 May 2016). 
455 IISD (e) (note 213; 30). 
456 Ibid. 
457 IISD (e) (note 213; 29). 
458 Winkler (a) (note 35 above; 469). 
459 Ibid. 
460 See note 449 above for more details on the LMDC group.  
461 IISD (e) (note 213 above; 29). 




treatment to be extended to the group of developing countries, with more national 
diverse circumstances and economic situations.463  
 
It eventually turned out that the 2015 agreement was developing with a purely “bottom-
up” approach, meaning that the responsibility was going to lie on a state to itself 
delineate the extent and nature of its contributions towards the GHG global abatement. 
The bottom-up approach is in contrast to the top down approach, through which legally 
binding emissions reduction targets are statutory commitments provided to parties by 
the treaty as it is the case for the Kyoto Protocol.464  With the bottom up approach under 
the Warsaw outcomes, Global emissions reduction were going to depend on countries’ 
contributions, through the “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC)”.465 
However, after considering the inefficiency of the submitted national pledges, under 
which the aggregated global pledges remained inferior to the cut needed, negotiating 
parties opposed each other upon the term “contributions” (as opposed to 
“commitments”), and ended up leaving unresolved the question of a differential 
treatment between countries under the upcoming Paris regime.466 
 
 As for the ambiguity of the term “contribution” within the phrase “INDC”, Bodansky467 
further understood parties’ fears and explained that they were right, as long as 
“contribution” from a certain country could lawfully take the form of adaptation, 
finance, technology transfer or capacity building contributions, which have nothing to 
do with emissions limitation, and in which case the country would have done nothing in 
cutting its emissions reduction yet as the object of the discussions.  
 
  
                                                          
463 Winkler (a) (note 35 above; 469). 
464 See section 2.3 above on the CBDR. 
465 See section 5.3.8.2 below for details about the INDC. 
466 Also decried by the IPCC and the UNFCCC secretary which has mandate to compile all the INDC; 
IISD (e) (note 213; 29). 
467 D. Bodansky (f) ‘The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?’ Draft (March 2016) at 14-15.  
Available at: https://conferences.asucollegeoflaw.com/workshoponparis/files/2012/08/AJIL-Paris-




3.2.10. COP 20: The Lima Call to Action 
 
3.2.10.1. Objective  
 
The 20th Climate Change Conference was convened from 1-14 December 2014, in Lima, 
Peru, the last COP before the 2015 Paris forum for the adoption of a new universal treaty. 
The objectives included first; the elements of a draft of the future 2015 climate change 
agreement; secondly the definition of the information to be submitted as part of parties’ 
INDC in 2015; thirdly, a concrete plan for the pre-2020 period, comprising compliance 
actions with respect to existing obligations, and steps forward in the implementation of 
policy options that have the greatest mitigation potential.468 However, parties’ 
preoccupations were mainly turned towards the drafting of the future Paris Agreement, 
as this was going to determine the future regime to be applied to them all.469 
 
3.2.10.2. Outcomes  
 
The important thing one captures for developing countries that permeated the 
negotiations in Lima was the issue of how the CBDR principle was going to be reflected 
in the 2015 agreement.470 The Like Minded Group on Climate Change maintained that 
there should be differentiation, both in the 2015 agreement and for the INDCs, in 
accordance with parties’ obligations under the UNFCCC;471 approaching the adoption 
of a universal change agreement, developing countries ultimately attempted to avoid to 
take on any emissions limitation obligations by recalling developed countries’ climate 
change historical accountability, on the light of their legendary interpretation of the 
CDBR and Equity Principle.472  
 
The USA was on its side supportive of a differential approach that takes into account 
various prevailing national circumstances, as many developing countries had radically 
                                                          
468 IISD (e) (note 213; 43).  
469 Ibid. 
470 Ibid.  
471 Ibid. 
472 IISD (f) ‘Summary of the Lima Climate Change Conference: 01 December - 14 December 2014’ 
(2014) 12 (619) Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2 at 37. Available at http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop20/enb 




developed their economies since 1992,473 whereas other developed countries such as 
Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland and Canada squarely opposed recreating 
binary divisions on commitments, based on the distinction between developed and 
developing countries.474 Arguably, the ‘Lima Call for Climate Action’ has ended up 
being the final jump over the fire wall of differentiation between developing and 
developed countries, as it became almost certain that the next climate change regime 
was not going to be based on it.475 
 




As mentioned earlier, the international climate change regime was established by the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol. The prevailing international context at the time the 
UNFCCC was adopted in 1992 has abundantly evolved over the years, pushing countries 
parties to also adjust their positions during negotiations.476 Many factors are behind such 
changes, including the economic development of some of the developing countries,477 
and the call for further actions to limit the global temperature increase to below 20C at 
the end of the current century.478 The Kyoto Protocol had to set up emission limitation 
targets for countries to comply with, whereas its successor the 2015 Paris Agreement 
simply requires them to set up their own mitigation targets. This stark difference marks 
a new era for the international climate change regime. This section will review the 
progression towards the 2015 Paris Agreement, the new regime, and analyses the drivers 
behind the abandonment of the former legal approach, the top down, under the Kyoto 
Protocol, in favour of the new approach, the bottom up, under the 2015 Paris Agreement. 
Advanced Analysis on the regimes will be the subject of chapter five below. 
 
  
                                                          
473 Korhola (note 21 above; 48). 
474 IISD (f) (note 234 above; 37). 
475 IISD (f) (note 234 above; 44). 
476 See sections 2.2 and 3.1 above.  
477 Ibid. 




3.3.2. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol’s legal approaches   
 
The success of any international agreement depends on its domestication and appropriate 
implementation at country level.479 An international agreement therefore has to be as 
flexible as possible to give consideration to negotiating countries’ claims. Depending on 
the object, some international agreements will define and provide for particular policies 
and measures that parties must undertake at country level; they choose a top down 
approach.480 A bottom-up approach is when the Agreement allows each member state to 
freely and unilaterally define its own commitments in order to comply with the 
provisions or objectives of the treaty.481 
 
The UNFCCC, included aspects of both approaches,482 as some scholars argue noting 
that Article 4.1 reflects a bottom-up approach,483 as it requires all parties to develop and 
report on national policies and measures to combat climate change,484 Article 4.2 reflects 
rather a top down architecture,485 setting forth a non-binding target for developed 
countries to abate their emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.486  
 
The Kyoto Protocol rather espoused the top down approach, by establishing legally 
binding emissions, limitation targets for each developed country to reduce national 
emissions comparatively to 1990 levels.487 Although requiring states to adopt particular 
mitigation policies and measures such as efficiency standards, its emissions targets 
nevertheless are to be carried out through emissions mitigation machineries provided 
inside the Protocol itself.488 
 
                                                          
479 I. Plakokefalos ‘Process and rules in international environmental law’ (2012) 10 (297) S CJInt'l L 
297 at 297; Diringer (note 368 above; 292). 
480 Ibid Diringer at 291. 
481 J. Dirix et al ‘Strengthening bottom-up and top-down climate governance’ (2013) 13 (3) Climate Policy 
363 at 365. 
482 Bodansky (b) (note 90 above; 6). 
483 Article 4 of the UNFCCC. 
484 Ibid. 
485 Ibid.  
486 Bodansky (b) (note 90 above; 6). 
487 Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol. 




After the entry into force of the Kyoto protocol, climate change negotiators 
progressively looked at what the after Kyoto Protocol would look like.489 Discussions in 
subsequent conferences were balancing between the two approaches, as groups of 
countries stood in positions often opposing,490 depending on their own national interests.  
 
History recalls that even before the adoption of the UNFCCC,491 countries were already 
divided on which approach to adopt for a possible climate change treaty.492 Western 
European countries proposed and supported an international regime of quantitative 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets and timeframes to curb emissions (the top 
down approach),493 while the US, Japan and the Soviet Union opposed such regime on 
the grounds that states should rather focus on developing national programmes and 
strategies consisting of concrete policy measures (the bottom up approach).494 
 
3.3.3. The evolution towards a new legal approach after the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Under the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the European western 
countries still proved to be supportive of the top down approach.495 They assumed a 
leadership role for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to Article 3.1 of 
the UNFCCC,496 further took necessary steps to comply with Annex I commitments, and 
later accepted to take on its second commitment period. 497 The United States on the 
contrary had proved to be supportive of the bottom up approach, to the extent of its 
withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol’s regime, arguing that it was irrelevant to 
                                                          
489 W.D. Nordhaus ‘After Kyoto: alternative mechanisms to control global warming.’ (2006) 96 (2) The 
American economic review 31 at 31. 
490 Bodansky (b) (note 90 above; 6). 
491 Nordhaus (note 489 above; 31) 
492 Bodansky (b) (note 90 above; 6). 
493 Ibid.  




WIJK+DECLARATION. (Accessed: 12 April 2016); Bodansky (b) (note 90 above; 6). 
495 Dutt (note 381 above; 276). 
496 Article 3.1. of the UNFCCC states: ‘The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties 
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.’ 




effectively deal with the climate change challenge.498 Comparable behaviours are seen 
in Japan and Russia, other supporters of the bottom up approach who complied not with 
the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, and abstained to join its second 
commitment period.499 
 
From the top down approach under the Kyoto Protocol, parties ended up shifting into a 
bottom up approach in the 2015 Paris Agreement. As said above, the Paris Agreement 
was the culmination of a major regime change process that started under the Bali Road 
Map,500 formalised under the Copenhagen Accord,501 and made legal under the Cancun 
Agreement.502 On the course of negotiations leading to the 2015 Paris Agreement, there 
were evidential signs of the rise of a new legal approach, expected to be different from 
the so called unfit approach that was under the Kyoto Protocol.503 During key steps of 
the negotiations, parties were either supportive to, adherent to, or simply tolerant to the 
bottom up approach as the looming legal form of the future climate change regime, 
thanks to which a broader acceptance and compliance could be secured.504 
 
From 1992 to 2015, countries parties had greatly learned about adequate responses to 
administer to climate change.505 They had also learned from some of the mistakes 
committed in the past while implementing the current climate change regime.506 Could 
it be that perhaps, the accumulation of experience is constitutive of the rationale behind 
the climate change regime shift? As mentioned by Kidd507 when analysing the historical 
evolution of environmental law:    
 
“Ten years into the twenty-first century, environmental issues are prominent in people’s 
minds and they dominate political agendas”  
                                                          
498 J. Urpelainen ‘A model of dynamic climate governance: dream big, win small’ (2013) 13 (2) IEA: 
PLE 107 at 125. 
499 Ibid. 
500 R. Clémençon ‘The Bali road map, a first step on the difficult journey to a post-Kyoto protocol 
agreement.’ (2008) 17 (1) The Journ of Env & Dev 70 at 70. 
501 IISD (b) (note 404 above; 29). 
502 Ibid. 
503 Refer to chapter five below for more details. 
504 Refer to sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 below for more details. 
505 See section 2.1 above on the reasons for concern about the climate change.  
506 Refer to notes 654 and 655 below for more details. 




It is therefore understandable that a subject of such a broad concern as the climate change 
may benefit from various inputs of divers stakeholders and could mature over time. The 
global context, also, as exposed above has abundantly evolved compared to what it used 
to be years ago, in the extent that some of the factors that justified parties’ stances in the 
past are no longer at play today. Similarly, other factors have either gained 
meaningfulness, or have squarely erupted as new factors at play in the climate change 
arena.508In this regard, one can admit that the 2015 Paris Agreement may have 
capitalised from the rich experience of a quarter century of climate change dealings, 
compared to the pioneering experience of the UNFCCC in 1992.509 
 
An abundant literature is concordant on the fact that the following factors have 
significantly evolved since the entry into force of the UNFCCC in 1992 and the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997 up to the time of the adoption of the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015: 
 
o Climate change awareness: as the subject of climate change is no longer breaking 
news, but rather a well-known concern in the public opinion, has risen cross 
sectorial concerns. Fear persists with respect to its unpredictable human, 
environmental, and material consequences; 510  
o Certainty about climate change to be a human induced phenomenon: There is at 
present 95 percent of certainty that climate change is a human induced 
phenomenon, from the uncertainty reported by the IPCC in its 1990’s first 
                                                          
508 See section 2.1 above. 
509 Refer to notes 654 and 655 below. 
510 Kidd (note 306 above; 1); ‘Climate change has eventually become a key subject during countries 
political campaigning. A 5 July 2016 American post reads as follows: ‘The race for the White House is 
failing to grapple with the key issues of the day, especially the urgent need to combat climate change 
before atmospheric changes become irreversible’, a slice of the American electorate believes. As the 
primary election season turns toward a head-to-head between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, there is 
increasing anger and frustration over the nature of the contest. A Guardian call-out to online readers in 
the US asking them to reflect on the race so far was met by a barrage of criticism on the tone and substance 
of the world’s most important election – with the two main parties, individual candidates and the media 
all coming under heavy fire. The Guardian asked readers to identify the ‘one issue that affects your life 
you wish the presidential candidates were discussing more’. Resoundingly, the largest group of 
participants pointed to climate change. Of the 1,385 who responded to the call-out – from all 50 states – 
one in five expressed discontent at the relative silence from candidates around a subject that they believed 
to be of supreme and epochal importance.’ Information available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/jul/05/climate-change-voters-2016-election-issues (Accessed: 20 July 2016); an analysis 
conducted by Greenpeace international reveals that the Governing Party ANC in South Africa has 
enshrined climate change concerns in its manifesto and has listed the measures they are proposing. 
Information available at: http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/News/news/Climate-change-renewable-




assessment report.511 It remains to work and advance the understanding and 
reduce or eliminate the remaining uncertainties regarding the causes, effects, 
magnitude and timing, economic, and social consequences of climate change and 
its various alternative response strategies;512  
o The urgency to reduce current GHG emissions, in order to achieve the goal of 
stabilising the global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius at the end of the 
present century;513 
o The increasing trade and economic concerns over climate change: The 
predominance of trade concerns and economic considerations over 
environmental and human repercussions of climate change during climate 
change negotiations;514 
o The application of the CBDR and Equity Principle: The increasing call for an 
interpretation of the CBDR and Equity Principle that takes into account current 
countries’ respective capabilities,515 the call for the inclusion of new major 
polluters from developing countries in a binding emissions reduction regime;516  
o The progressive fall of the traditional cleavage between developed and 
developing countries: applied in the UNFCCC, parties opted for the drop out of 
the traditional differentiation between countries in any future climate change 
regime;517 
o The progressive abandon of countries’ support to the top down approach under 
the Kyoto Protocol518 and the emergence of the bottom up approach through the 
INDC strategy brought by the Bali Road Map and subsequent COP decisions.519  
 
  
                                                          
511 See note 126 above. 
512 Article 4.1 (g) of the UNFCCC. 
513 IPCC 2014 (b) (note 73 above; v). 
514 L. Tamiotti et al ‘Commerce et changement climatique’ (2009) OMC & PNUE at vii-xii. Available at: 
https://www.wto.org/french/res_f/booksp_f/trade_climate_change_f.pdf. (Accessed: 12 October 2016). 
515 Brunnée (a) (note 153 above).  
516 Ibid. 
517 Refer to section 5.3.7 for more details.  
518 Dutt (note 381 above); Diringer (note 368 above; 292). 






The regime instituted by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol will no longer be in power after the 
entry of the 2015 Paris Agreement in 2020 into force. For developing countries, the 
regime under the Paris Agreement represents a major regime shift, as all countries are 
expected to mitigate national emissions. Based on both the CBDR and the historical 
responsibility of developing countries on the aggravation of atmospheric concentration 
of GHG, developing countries went on as free from any binding emission limitation 
scheme while developed countries were bound. Almost a quarter of a century after the 
adoption of the climate change regime represented by both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, countries parties’ national circumstances have significantly evolved. Climate 
change knowledge is relatively satisfying today, with 95 percent of certainty of climate 
change to be a human induced phenomenon. Developing countries are classified today 
among the biggest emitters worldwide, in contrast with what they used to be in 1992. 
The call for further actions to curb GHG emissions was launched by the IPCC in order 
to limit the global temperature increase to a maximum of 2 degrees Celsius at the end of 
this century, hence the justification for the need for a global contribution to the effort to 
tackle climate change. During subsequent rounds of negotiations leading to the 2015 
Paris Agreement, the Kyoto Protocol’s top down legal approach was successfully 
challenged in favour of the bottom up approach, and the fire wall of differentiation 
between developed and developing countries collapsed. Enriched by nearly 25 years of 
climate change negotiations and regimes implementation, this probably is an opportunity 
to deeply analyse both the meaning and the applicability of the Common But 
Differentiated Responsibility Principle, especially in a context of a unique regime that 




CHAPTER IV: THE GREENHOUSE GASES EMISSIONS MITIGATION 







After the adoption of the UNFCCC, the urgency to address the climate change threat 
brought to the fore the issue of which countries had to take, which the responsibility for 
the reduction of the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under the UNFCCC climate 
change regime.520 As previously discussed, developed countries were finger pointed, 
because of their acknowledged historical responsibility for climate change, while 
developing countries had nothing substantial that was required from them.521 
Differential climate change responsibility constitutes the substance of the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol, under which the world's wealthier countries alone assumed binding 
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, whereas developing countries 
collectively enjoyed a regime of emissions limitation exemption, besides the UNFCCC’s 
timid exhortation which addressed them to voluntarily consider ways to abate their 
emissions.522 While proponents of the Kyoto Protocol celebrated it as a breakthrough in 
international climate policy, its opponents saw in it as a flawed treaty, complaining 
especially about its differential approach because of which the protocol set emissions 
limitations to developed countries only, whereas addressing climate change required a 
global participation of all countries, including the developing ones.523 This chapter 
presents a brief analysis of developing countries emission mitigation obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol. In the first stage, the chapter briefly gives a background that helps 
to understand the negotiation dynamics and the context of the adoption of the Protocol, 
                                                          
520 A. M. Halvorssen (a) ‘Common, but differentiated commitments in the future climate change regime-
amending the Kyoto Protocol to include Annex C and the Annex C mitigation fund’ (2007) 18 Colo. J. 
Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 247 at 247. 
521 See the preamble of the UNFCCC. 
522 M. Babiker et al ‘The Kyoto Protocol and developing countries’ (2000) 28 (8) Energy Policy 525 at 
525. 





before discussing in the second stage the key provisions which define the developing 
countries emission mitigation regime. 
 
4.2. Background of the Kyoto Protocol 
 
The first Conference of the parties to the UNFCCC (COP1) was held from the 28th of 
March to the 7th of April 1995 in Berlin, Germany, under the chairmanship of Mrs A. 
Merkel.524 COP 1 produced the Berlin Mandate,525 which in turn gave birth to the Kyoto 
Protocol.526 However, most of the framework conventions are procedural in nature, 
because they only establish the legal and institutional framework that allow further 
adoption of protocols or other more substantive and concrete treaties for the fulfilment 
of their objectives.527 The UNFCCC was no exception to that rule, because it did provide 
for general commitments to countries with respect to emissions mitigation, but failed to 
give further details with that regard as it is under the Kyoto Protocol.528 Korhola529  
thinks that it was so because countries that negotiated the UNFCCC usually pushed aside 
most of the difficult questions, and considered solely the issues which were possible to 
agree upon at that time. This explains why an issue such as the allocation of binding 
emission mitigation targets to country parties was not dealt with under the UNFCCC, 
but rather waited for future COP forums and outcomes for it to be addressed.  
 
However, as soon as country parties started implementing the UNFCCC, and discussing 
about the international climate change regime within the frame of the UNFCCC, they 
                                                          
524 Angela Dorothea Merkel is a German stateswoman and former research scientist. She has been the 
Chancellor of Germany since 2005, and the leader of the Christian Democratic Union since 2000.  At the 
time of the COP 1, she was the German Minister of Environmental Affairs. Information available at:  
http://www.biography.com/people/angela-merkel-9406424. (Accessed: 23 October 2016). 
525 ‘At the COP 1 held in Berlin, in 1995, parties agreed that the commitments in the UNFCCC were 
"inadequate" for meeting the Convention's objective. In a decision known as the  “Berlin 
Mandate”, countries agreed to establish a process to negotiate strengthened commitments for developed 
countries.’ Information available at: http://unfccc.int/documentation/decisions/items/2964.php. 
(Accessed: 23 October 2016). The Berlin Mandate is available at: 
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf. (Accessed: 15 June 2016). 
526 J. Brunnée (b) “Europe, the United States, and the global climate regime: all together now?” (2008) 
24 (1) Journal of LU & Env. Law 1 at 2. 
527 D. Bodansky & L. Rajamani (e) ‘The evolution and governance architecture of the climate change 
regime. International Relations and Global Climate Change: New Perspectives’ (2016) 2nd Ed. 
Forthcoming at 11; Korhola (note 21 above; 47). 
528 See Article 4 of the UNFCCC.  




quickly noticed that its commitments were inadequate to meet its ultimate objective of 
stabilising the concentration of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere at levels that would be 
harmless to the climate system.530 Parties therefore decided to take on more concrete 
mitigation actions in order to supplement the Convention’s vague commitments with 
more specific and quantified obligations, besides coherent time frames for actions.531 
Under the "Berlin Mandate" as mentioned above, countries launched the process of 
strengthening the UNFCCC's commitments through the adoption of a “protocol”, or 
“another legal instrument”, whose aim was going to be the allocation of quantified 
emissions limitation to developed countries, the adoption of objectives to reduce 
emissions during the period post-2000, and the elaboration of policies and measures 
relating to emission reductions.532 
 
Breidenich533 lists three reasons that he thinks were behind the decision of the country 
parties to the UNFCCC to opt for concrete climate change actions: First, the national 
projections of GHG emissions indicated that most developed countries were not on the 
track to meet the Convention's emissions mitigation target which was aimed for the year 
2000.534 Secondly, the UNFCCC said nothing regarding emissions mitigation for the 
period post 2000, putting an operational obligation to parties to deal with that gap.535 
Finally, country parties recognised that even if developed countries’ GHG emissions 
were fully stabilised at 1990 levels, it would still not be sufficient to avoid dangerous 
interference with the climate system. This is because the first commitment period of 
Kyoto covered only a quarter of global emissions (25 percent), whereas the second 
commitment is only covering 15 percent of global emissions.536  
 
As for the binding mitigation of emission from developing countries, the Berlin Mandate 
stated that no new commitments would be allocated to developing countries as part of 
                                                          
530 See section 3.1.2.1 above for details on the objective of the UNFCCC. 
531 Breidenich et al ‘The Kyoto protocol to the United Nations framework convention on climate change’ 
(1998) 92 (2) The Am J’nal of Int. Law 315 at 318; Brunnée (b) (note 526 above; at 2); Korhola (note 21 
above; at 47). 
532 See note 525 above on the Berlin Mandate. See UNFCCC COP1 Decision 1/CP.1, at 4-6 (June 6, 
1995).  
533 Breidenich (note 531 above; 318).  
534 See Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC for details about developed countries ‘commitments up to the year 
2000. 
535 Ibid.  




its process, besides the commitments they already had under Article 4.1 of the 
UNFCCC.537 This provision of the Berlin Mandate was one of the determining elements 
for the shaping of the future emission mitigation regime for developing countries, as 
supported in this study.538 The thing is, at the times towards the adoption of the Berlin 
Mandate, the position of the majority of developing countries was that it behoved the 
developed countries to adopt significant measures to reduce the GHG emissions owing 
to their historical responsibility for climate change. Developing countries often required 
developed countries to assume their climate change historical responsibility first, before 
they could also put their own economic development process at risk by adopting GHG 
mitigation measures in turn.539 However, even though the Berlin Mandate opposed the 
introduction of new additional commitments for developing countries besides those 
under the UNFCCC, it further launched (in the same provision) a call for all the parties 
to "advance the implementation" of their existing commitments under Article 4(1) of the 
UNFCCC,540 proving that the Berlin Mandate was also concerned with the issue of 
developing country’s emissions mitigation. 
 
After the Berlin COP 1, the next COP forum (COP2) took place in Geneva, Switzerland. 
It run from the 8th to the 19th of July 1996. It was attended by representatives of almost 
161 countries, of which 147 of the 158 had already ratified the Convention at that 
time.541 The Geneva Conference was considered an intermediary forum in the process 
of preparing a legally binding document to tackle climate change. The looming 
document was going to use an approach that was different from its mother treaty, the 
UNFCCC.542 The Geneva Conference confirmed the Berlin COP 1 decisions, and further 
considered the requirement of the COP 2 ministerial declaration to have legally binding 
quantitative emission reduction targets for industrial countries,543 although a significant 
                                                          
537 ‘The process will, inter alia: Not introduce any new commitments for parties not included in Annex I, 
but reaffirm existing commitments in Article 4.1 and continue to advance the implementation of these 
commitments in order to achieve sustainable development, taking into account Article 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7.’ 
See Decision II (b) of the Berlin Mandate. Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf. 
(Accessed: 15 June 2016). 
538 Refer to note 525 above. 
539 Cheng Zheng-Kang ‘Equity, Special Considerations, and the Third World’ (1990) 1 COLO. J. INT'L 
ENVTL. POL 57 at 61-63. 
540 See Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC. 
541 Korhola (note 21 above; 48). 
542 Ibid Corona at 47. 




number of countries did not express their views thereby.544 The Geneva Conference 
became an echo to the IPCC’s call for immediate actions to be taken in order to prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic related climatic transformations.545  
 
It was during the above Geneva Conference that some developed countries started 
raising their voices although supporting different trends regarding the issue of emission 
mitigation by country parties to the UNFCCC. The EU for instance, acted as a 
unanimous block of countries in promotion of the UNFCCC, demanding the adoption 
of the strictest measures possible to curb climate change.546 The USA (represented by 
the Clinton’s administration) shifted its legendary position and surprisingly went 
claiming a legally binding Convention, insisting that it was not possible to apply the 
same action packages to all countries, because of their varying circumstances.547 Japan 
echoed the view of the USA in that regard.548  
 
The shift of the position of the US was surprising because, as demonstrated by 
Bodansky,549 the absence of binding emission mitigation targets under the UNFCCC 
was a pure reflection of the US position, as the country opposed any proposition in that 
direction. Furthermore, the country was opposed to parties such as the EU, and the 
AOSIS negotiation group that from the initiation of climate change talks, were in favour 
of a Convention containing legally-binding emission targets.550 That is why, during COP 
1 in Berlin, the EU avoided the repetition of the experience pre-UNFCCC by quickly 
taking the lead in the climate change policing talks, before stating that to return to the 
1990 emissions levels as demanded by the UNFCCC could not be done without binding 
obligations being allocated to parties.551  
 
                                                          
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/15a01.pdf#page=71 (Accessed: 7 May 2016); See Korhola (note 21 
above; 48). 
544 Sixteen countries refrained from expressing themselves in the ministerial decision, amongst which are 
(in alphabetic order): Australia, New Zealand, and Russia, along with a number of oil-producing countries. 
Information available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/15a01.pdf#page=71. (Accessed: 7 May 
2016). 
545 Korhola (note 21 above; 48). 
546 Ibid.  
547 Ibid.   
548 Ibid.   
549 Bodansky (e) (note 527 above; 11). 
550 Ibid.  




4.3. Generalities on the Kyoto Protocol 
 
4.3.1. Adoption, entry into force, and Objective  
 
The Kyoto Protocol is a legally binding treaty that attempts to mitigate the GHG 
emissions under the UNFCCC.552 From a legal point of view, the protocol finds its 
origins in Article 4.2 (d) of the UNFCCC which provides for a review of the adequacy 
of the commitments of the Annex I parties to the UNFCCC at its first COP.553 The 
Protocol was adopted at the COP3 that was held from the 1st to the 11th of December 
1997 in Kyoto, Japan, whereby over 160 states were represented. Ratified by parties, the 
Kyoto Protocol entered into force on the 16th of February 2005,554  about seven years 
after its adoption, because of its double entry into force trigger, as per its Article 25.1.555 
Four years after the adoption of the protocol, country parties came up at the COP 7 in 
Marrakesh, Morocco, in 2001,556 and adopted the rules regarding its implementation, 
which are known as the “Marrakesh Accords”.557  
 
As detailed in section 4.2.3 below, the Protocol has had two commitments periods: the 
first ran from the 1st of January 2008 to the 31st December 2012, whereas the second 
runs from the 1st of January 2013 to end up on the 31st of December 2020.558 The Kyoto 
                                                          
552 Information on the Kyoto Protocol available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
(Accessed: 10 May 2016). 
553 F. Yamin ‘The Kyoto Protocol: Origins, assessment and future challenges’ (1998) 7 (2) RECIEL 113 
at 115. 
554 It is reported that from 1997 until 2003, only 120 countries ratified the UNFCCC. However, they still 
failed to represent the 55% of Annex I country emissions as per the protocol’s requirement under its 
Article 25.1. It was Russia’s ratification towards the end of 2004 which made it cross the threshold of 
entering into force. See Brunnée (b) (note 526 above; 2). The status of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
is available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_Protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php, (Accessed: 04 
August 2016).  
555 Article 25.1 of the Kyoto Protocol provides as follows: ‘The Protocol shall enter into force on the 
ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties 
included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions 
for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession.’ 
556 Information available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (Accessed: 10 May 2016). 
557 The Marrakesh Accords were signed under the UNFCCC. The Accords contain detailed rules regarding 
the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The Accords were adopted at the COP 7 in 2001. Texts of the 
Marrakech Accords are available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf. (Accessed: 26 July 
2016). 
558 Information on the Kyoto Protocol available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 




Protocol does not have any objective of its own,559 because it was adopted in pursuit of 
the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC.560 Article 2 of the UNFCCC states that the 
ultimate objective of the Convention and that of any related legal instruments the COP 
may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, 
the stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at levels that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interferences with the climate system.561  
 
Guided by the CBDR principle, the primary vocation of the Kyoto Protocol was to 
translate into concrete terms the Convention’s general commitments for country parties 
(especially for Annex I) as an attempt to curb the GHG emission and achieve the 
UNFCCC’s goal. Therefore, unlike the UNFCCC which established aspirational 
commitment to parties,562 the Kyoto Protocol established concrete binding emission 
reduction targets for developed country parties, and advanced a clear and mandatory set 
of targets, making countries’ obligations clearer and more precise. This has also 
facilitated the assessment of countries’ compliance with the protocol’s targets, with the 
possibility of legal retaliations for non-compliance behaviours.563 Being that under 
Article 4.2 (g) of the UNFCCC developing countries were free to take on voluntary 
emission reduction commitments, it follows that under the Kyoto Protocol they still keep 
the same liberty, in addition to the general prescriptions of Article 10 of the Kyoto 
Protocol discussed below.564 
 
4.3.2. Guiding principles of the Kyoto Protocol  
 
The preamble of the Kyoto Protocol states that the Protocol is guided by the principles 
of the UNFCCC as enshrined in its Article 3 which is discussed under section 3.1.2.2 
                                                          
559 See Article 2 of the UNFCCC. 
560 See section 3.1.2.1 above for details about the objective of the UNFCCC. 
561 See Article 2 of the UNFCCC. 
562 Breidenich (note 531 above; 327). 
563 See Voigt (note 803 above; 18); see also section 5.3.6 below. 
564 Article 4.2 (g) of the UNFCCC stipulates: ‘Any Party not included in Annex I may, in its instrument 
of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or at any time thereafter, notify the Depositary that it 
intends to be bound by subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. The Depositary shall inform the other signatories 
and Parties of any such notification.’ Subparagraph (a) of Article 4.2 stipulates: ‘Each of these Parties 
shall adopt national1 policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by 
limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas 
sinks and reservoirs.’ Subparagraphs (b) of Article 4.2 refers to the duty of communication of the actions 




above. Whereas there seems to be no need in this section to re-analyse the whole list of 
the UNFCCC principles, yet it appears relevant to closely consider the application of the 
CBDR principle under Kyoto.565 This is because of the particularity the CBDR principle 
represents regarding the allocation of the burden of emission mitigation to the country 
parties, but especially to the group of developing countries, which is the focus of the 
present study. 
 
From a historical perspective, one may assume that developing countries (envisaged in 
the sense of an homogenous group) have dealt differently with their developmental and 
social problems, on one hand, and on the other hand, they have not harvested the same 
economic benefits as did, and is still at present doing, the group of developed countries 
(also envisaged in the sense of an homogenous group) in their process of 
industrialisation.566 Developed countries have become richer over time, while 
developing countries still endeavour to develop economically and socially. That is the 
reason why both groups of countries do not have in today’s context the same capabilities 
to address the climate change threat.567 And also, the two groups of countries have not 
played the same historical role in aggravating the atmospheric concentration of the 
GHG.568  
 
Under international law, countries have sovereign equality as per the UN Charter.569 
They all have equal rights and obligations on the international plane. Addressing the 
threat of climate change required a universal participation through which both developed 
and developing countries had to take on obligations in order to save the planet. Yet, as 
discussed in this study, to secure such universal participation, climate change regime 
had to be equitable enough, in other words it had to be balanced enough while allocating 
responsibilities to countries. As indeed, it would have been unequitable for developing 
countries to share the burden of abating the atmospheric concentration of GHG equally, 
                                                          
565 Under this section, CBDR and CBDR-RC will be used indistinctively. 
566 Halvorssen (a) (note 520 above; 253). 
567 Ibid. 
568 See section 2.1.2 for more details on GHGs.  
569 ‘The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of 
the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945. 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice is an integral part of the Charter.’ Information and text of 




given their lesser historical role with that regard.570 This is why the Kyoto Protocol had 
to give a greater consideration to the CBDR-RC principle in allocating to countries 
different emission mitigation obligations, to reflect the roles they respectively played 
towards the climate change phenomenon at that time.  
 
In application to the CBDR principle, the Kyoto Protocol (as also done by the UNFCCC) 
took consideration of the CBDR’s two prongs: (i) the parties’ climate change differing 
historical responsibilities, and (ii) the parties’ differing capabilities to address the 
climate change threat.571 It is on that basis that the Kyoto Protocol refrained from 
assigning any binding emission limitations to developing countries,572  although it 
recognised that the categorisation of countries might evolve over time, and “graduate” 
from one category of country into another, depending on the evolution of their climate 
change responsibilities and capabilities.573 For instance a country would evolve from 
being a Non-Annex I to becoming an Annex I country.574 The increasing volume of the 
country’s emissions over time might trigger its climate change responsibility, whereas 
the economic development of the country will improve its capability to address the 
climate change threat.  
 
Although from a logical point of view, it appeared relevant and in line with the principle 
of CBDR to impose a greater share of mitigation responsibilities to developed countries 
besides urging them to take the lead in climate change matters, there were nevertheless 
some issues to be careful about, in order to ensure more effectiveness and broader 
support to the protocol’s differential system. One of them is the time frame issue, in 
other words, how long it would take the CBDR principle to be applied under a treaty 
such as the UNFCCC. The next relates to the compatibility of the CBRD with the 
                                                          
570 ‘Once the CO2 is emitted into the atmosphere, it remains there for at least a century, hence, we are 
now seeing the effects of GHGs emitted since the beginning of the industrial revolution. This 
constitutes, for the most part, pollution from developed countries, but not from developing countries.’ 
See for details: UNEP & IPCC Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Summary for 
Policymakers. (2007). Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-
frontmatter.pdf. (Accessed: 25 October 2016). 
571 On differential treatment in the climate change regime, see Rajamani (a) (note 48 above). 
572 Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. 
573 Ibid. Article 4.2(f).  




urgency to the tackle climate change and save the planet. In other words, was the 
application of the CBDR principle compatible with the objective of the UNFCCC?  
 
At first, as recalled by Halvorssen,575 the adoption of the CBDR principle as a climate 
change principle was only meant to last for a limited time period (although imprecise) 
to allow the developing countries to reach satisfying levels of economic growth as the 
industrialised countries did, while simultaneously addressing the climate change threat. 
In that view it is clear that the CBDR principle did not intend to institute a permanent 
and irremovable arrangement of two parallel groups of countries. As also argued by 
Rajamani,576 once the differences between the countries cease to exist, the differential 
treatment should no longer be referred to.  
 
As also argued by Bodansky,577 the CBDR principle was never perfectly reflected by 
the “Annexes” approach as applied under the UNFCCC and Kyoto protocol regime, 
because the approach became disconnected from the reality, as the global economy 
progressively and radically transformed over time.578 At this point a question could be 
asked, ‘how could it be that the approach to differential treatment that was applied in 
1992 to differentiate between countries and allocate them emission mitigation 
responsibilities as discussed above,579 is not referred to afresh in an attempt to readjust 
countries’ responsibilities 25 years later, after some developing countries have achieved 
radical economic transformations, and have become major emitters?’ 
 
After analysing the same issue, Halvorssen580 concluded that treaties that apply the 
CBDR principle should ensure its compatibility with their objective and purpose. Parties 
should also ensure that the domestic implementation of the treaty which applies the 
CBDR principle do not defeat the objective and purpose of the applying treaty as a result. 
This is because it would amount to a conflict, as the application of a principle of law 
cannot go beyond the statutory limits of the treaty under which it is being applied.581 In 
                                                          
575 Halvorssen (a) (note 520 above; 255). 
576 Rajamani (a) (note 48 above; 162). 
577 Bodansky (f) (note 574 above; 14). 
578 Ibid. 
579 Refer to section 2.3 above. 
580 A.M. Halvorssen (b) ‘Equality among unequals in International Environmental Law: Differential 
treatment for developing countries’ Westview Press (1999) at 29. 




the case under scrutiny, i.e. the GHG mitigation regime for developing countries, the 
protocol’s object and purpose of "stabilising the GHG concentrations in the atmosphere 
at harmless levels would be defeated by the continually growing emissions from 
developing countries. This is because of the absence of emission limitations given to 
them. Emissions would end up reaching dangerous anthropogenic interferences with the 
climate system, which situation would be in contradiction with the very purpose of the 
protocol.582  As demonstrated by Lanza,583 if in 2002, developed countries were 
responsible for 64 percent of total emissions,584 and the developing countries for 36 
percent, the situation of 2030 will be the reverse of the position of the main “polluters”, 
according to the projections with 49 percent of the emissions produced by developing 
countries, 51 percent by developed countries.585 
 
However, the application of the CBDR principle under the Kyoto regime has suffered a 
lot of criticism, most of which revolved around the free GHG emission regime being 
granted indistinctively to the heterogeneous group of developing countries, resulting in 
increasing emissions which at the time of this research have exceeded the emissions 
from developed countries, as discussed in following sections. It is also because of an 
“erroneous” application of the CBDR principle, as argued by Korhola586 that although 
effective in many ways, the Kyoto Protocol did not benefit a full international support. 
As also argued by Zhang,587 to reach the goal of the new climate change agreement and 
further save the Earth, the CBDR as applied under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol 
will need further reflection and reinterpretation.588 
 
  
                                                          
582 Halvorssen (a) (note 520 above; 255). 
583 A. Lanza. ‘The Kyoto Protocol and the Statistical Information’ available at: http://old.sis-
statistica.org/files/pdf/atti/CIMe0905p3-12.pdf. (Accessed: 10 October 2016). 
584 64 percent constitutes the sum of 54 percent from the OECD countries, and 10 percent from countries 
in economy in transition under the UNFCCC regime. 
585 51 percent constitutes the sum of 42 percent from the OECD countries, and 9 percent from countries 
in economy in transition under the UNFCCC regime. 
586 Korhola (note 21 above; 280).  
587 H. Zhang ‘Towards a New Global Agreement under the Doha Climate Gateway: A Chinese Way.’ 





4.3.3. The Protocol’s two commitment periods 
 
The Kyoto Protocol have had two consecutive commitment periods.589 The first period 
(Kyoto I) started in 2008 and ended in 2012, whereas the second period (Kyoto II), was 
launched in 2013 and will run until 2020. Kyoto I was decided at the adoption of the 
protocol in 1997, whereas Kyoto II was decided in Doha, Qatar, on the 8th of December 
2012. The deal which produced Kyoto II is known as the "Doha Amendment to the 
Kyoto Protocol".590 Under the Kyoto I, Annex I countries agreed to reduce their 
anthropogenic emissions of GHG by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels.591 Some 37 
industrialised countries and the European Community in total were part of Kyoto I.592 
In addition to the fact that many countries in the conclusion of Kyoto I in 2012 did not 
meet their targets,593 the next commitment period only covers around 15 percent of 
global emissions594 with on top of that a smaller number of country parties.595 This 
means comparatively lesser chances of fulfilling the objective of the Convention.  
 
However, parties that agreed to be bound by Kyoto II committed themselves to increase 
their ambitions by reducing their emissions from 25 to 40 percent below the 1990 level 
by the year 2020.596 This is the case for parties such as the EU, Australia,597 Norway and 
Switzerland, whereas Russia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan refused to be part of the 
Kyoto II scheme. The United States of America still remained outside the treaty, as it 
                                                          
589 Information available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (Accessed: 10 July 2016). 
590 The amendment which constitutes the second commitment period of the Kyoto protocol includes: 
o New commitments for Annex I parties who agreed to be bound by the second commitment 
period; 
o A revised list of greenhouse gases to be reported on by Parties in the second commitment period, 
as an additional gas, the Nitrogen trifluoride (NF3) was added to the list; and 
o Amendments to several articles of the Kyoto Protocol which specifically referenced issues 
pertaining to the first commitment period and which needed to be updated. See for more details 
on the Doha amendment available at: 
https://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kp_doha_amendment_english.pdf. 
(Accessed: 10 May 2016). 
591 See Glemarec (note 18 above); See section 2.1.2 above for the list of greenhouse gases which have 
been targeted during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
592 See note 552 on details on the Kyoto Protocol; See also Bodansky (e) (note 527 above; 24).  
593 Korhola (note 21 above; 78). 
594 Ibid.  
595 Ibid.  
596 M. Davide ‘The Doha Climate Gateway: a first key-point assessment’ (2012) Rev.of Env En&Ec 1 at 
2.  
597 Australia is among the conservative governments that also declined to ratify the Protocol for many 





was the case during Kyoto I, whereas China and India have resisted even talking about 
future binding commitments.598 
 
Parties that do participate in the Kyoto will continue to provide regular reports on their 
GHG emissions as it was the usually the case under Kyoto I. besides, they still have 
access to the flexible mechanisms as it was the case under the previous commitment 
period in order to assist them in meeting their targets.599 In that sense, developing 
countries will continue playing a key role in emissions mitigation during Kyoto II, which 
covers the period leading to 2020. 
 
4.4. The GHG emission mitigation regime for developing countries under 
Kyoto  
 
In application to the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective 
capabilities principle, the Kyoto Protocol retained no quantified emissions limitation and 
reduction commitments (QELRCs) for the group of developing countries. Nevertheless, 
in fulfilling the recommendation of the Berlin Mandate as discussed above, Article 10 
of the Kyoto Protocol included the developing country parties as it called on all the 
parties to strive for the advancement in the implementation of their existing 
commitments under Article 4(1), 4(3), 4(4), 4(5), and 4(7) of the UNFCCC.600 Article 
10.1 of the Kyoto Protocol provides as follows: 
 
“All parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and 
circumstances, without introducing any new commitments for parties not included in 
Annex I, but reaffirming existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the 
                                                          
598 Brunnée (b) (note 526 above; 2). 
599 Backer (note 51 above; 24-25). 
600 See Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC; See note 525 for details about the Berlin Mandate; See Breidenich 
(note 531 above; 325-326); For example, under Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol, parties would be required 
to: ‘formulate, where relevant and to the extent possible, cost-effective national, and where appropriate 
regional programmes to improve the quality of local emission factors, activity data and/or models which 
reflect the socioeconomic conditions of each Party for the preparation and periodic updating of national 
inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the 
Conference of the Parties, and consistent with the guidelines for national communications adopted by the 




Convention, and continuing to advance the implementation of these commitments in 
order to achieve sustainable development, taking into account Article 4, paragraphs 3, 5 
and 7, of the Convention shall…” 
 
This is why under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries’ commitments represented 
no additional duties, but rather did advance their existing commitments under the 
UNFCCC. Article 10 (a) for instance requires parties to the protocol to formulate, where 
relevant and to the extent possible, cost effective national and, where appropriate, 
regional programmes to improve the quality of local emission factors, activity data 
and/or models.601 The said programmes had to reflect the socio-economic conditions of 
each party for the preparation and periodic updating of national inventories of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all GHG not controlled 
by the Montreal Protocol.602 This provision aimed at improving, or even solving the 
multiple problems faced by developing countries in terms of collecting, analysing and 
submitting good quality inventory data in their national communications for a better 
administration of national emission mitigation strategies.603  
 
In the same order of idea, Article 10 (b) includes “soft” commitments to formulate, 
implement, publish and regularly update national or regional programmes containing 
measures to mitigate climate change, and states that these programmes “would” concern 
sectors such as energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, and waste management. 
Sub-paragraph (ii) farther in the same provision enjoins Non-Annex 1 parties to include 
in their national communications, as appropriate as possible information on programmes 
which contain measures that the “party believes contributes to addressing climate 
change” and its adverse impacts, including the abatement of increases in greenhouse gas 
emissions.604  
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According to Yammin,605 the G77 negotiation group deployed considerable efforts to 
delete any legally binding commitment for developing countries, in favour of “soft 
commitments”.606 Still on Yammin’s view, they further endeavoured to make any 
additional financial resources from the protocol’s mechanisms to meet the full cost 
incurred by developing countries, in order to allow them to advance their commitments 
under the protocol.607  
 
The absence of binding emission mitigation for developing countries under Kyoto raised 
concerns in many developed countries, who questioned the effectiveness of the treaty.608 
The following two grounds are the ones that usually feed the questionings: firstly, the 
impossibility to eliminate the threat of global warming based on the developed country 
emission reductions alone.609 Secondly, the fear that costly emission mitigation 
measures reduce developed countries’ international competitiveness in trade. The 
questioning of the effectiveness of Kyoto is based on some economic development data 
projections, which showed that the rates of annual emissions from developing countries 
were going to surpass those of developed countries early in the down of the 21st 
century.610 Projections further showed that the bulk of future emissions growth would 
come from developing countries, whereas the UNFCCC/Kyoto regime has granted them 
the right to freely emit.611 
 
On the issue of loss in international competitiveness, some developed countries thinkers 
analysed the emission reduction obligation issue from an “international trade” view 
point, and feared that forcing to absolutely meet the Kyoto’s obligations could weaken 
developed countries’ economies, and place their local industries at a disadvantaged 
position vis-a-vis the competitors from developing countries, who are not subject to 
similar obligations.612 Developed countries further noticed that, even if fully 
implemented, the protocol's two rounds of commitments would still be unable to achieve 
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the objective of the Convention. Therefore, the necessity of a universal participation in 
the climate change regime. Brunnée613 have discovered that the parties that have 
negotiated the protocol were already alerted of the fact that it was going to be inefficient 
even if fully implemented. However, they ended up overlooking that side of the matter, 
avoiding to further question the differential approach adopted by the Convention in 
allocating emission mitigation commitments to its country parties. 
 
Talking about the Kyoto’s differential approach, Bodansky614 thinks that the Berlin 
Mandate have played a significant role in hardening countries’ differentiation under the 
UNFCCC climate change regime. This is because it explicitly excluded the adoption of 
any new commitments for developing countries, besides their UNFCCC 
commitments.615 The differentiation became further reinforced by the rejection during 
the Kyoto forum of proposals to call for developing countries to assume voluntary 
emissions mitigation commitments.616 It was from that time that some began to suggest 
that the principle of CBDR-RC established a “firewall” between Annex I and Non-
Annex I parties.617 
 
A regime of differential approach caused to the Kyoto Protocol many reproaches, in the 
extent that scholars such as Nordhaus618 made some pessimistic predictions regarding 
the treaty. Nordhaus foresaw that the Kyoto Protocol would have a modest impact on 
the global warming, and that its long-run impact on carbon emissions and global 
temperature will be extremely small.619 So was it for others who saw Kyoto’s failure in 
terms of environmental effectiveness, as a natural consequence of its flawed 
architecture, concluding that the Protocol was an impractical policy document, focused 
on achieving unrealistic and inappropriate goals.620  
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(1999) Energy Journal 2285 at 2288.  
620 W.J. McKibbin & P.J. Wilcoxen 'The Role of Economics in Climate Change Policy' (2002) 16 (2) Jrn 





Both commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol aimed at reducing emissions from 
developed countries only; however, in order to achieve the said commitments, the 
protocol included a number of "flexible mechanisms" which allowed developed 
countries to achieve their QELRCs by undertaking, financing and purchasing emissions 
reductions generated outside their territories.621 The Kyoto’s "flexible mechanisms" 
were introduced at the insistence of developed countries whose argument was that 
parties should have maximum geographical flexibility because from a global 
perspective, the physical source of emission was environmentally irrelevant.622 Under 
the Protocol, "Flexible mechanisms" relates to the International Emissions Trading 
System “ET” (Article 17), the Clean Development Mechanisms “CDM” (Article 12), 
and the Joint Implementation mechanisms (JI) (Article 6).623  
 
The International Emissions Trading System allows countries to trade their 
commitments. Countries that have satisfied their obligations can sell their excess carbon 
allowances to other countries in the form of Assigned Allocation Units (AAU), which 
are the tradable country allowances.624 The CDMs allows the purchase of emission 
credits from projects in Non-Annex 1 parties, or developing countries.  The trading units 
are constituted with the credits arising from CDM projects, also called the “Certified 
Emissions Reduction” (CER). The Joint Implementation mechanisms allows an Annex 
I Party to finance a project in the territory of another Annex I Party and capitalise the 
achievements as if they were done within the party’s own jurisdiction.625 The JI is a 
mechanism that has been designed for the countries with economies in transition.626 
 
The CDM is the only market mechanism which allows developing countries to 
participate in the global mitigation efforts. As mentioned above, through the CDM, an 
Annex I Party finances a project located inside the jurisdiction of a developing country 
                                                          
621 Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
622 Yamin (note 553 above; 121); Halvorssen (a) (note 520 above; 257). 
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party, and in turn receives credit accounting for its own emissions reduction 
commitment.627 Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol specifies that the purpose of the CDM 
is to assist developing countries in achieving their sustainable development while 
contributing to the UNFCCC's ultimate objective. It also aims at assisting at the same 
time developed countries to fulfil their emission reduction commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol.628  
 
Reducing emissions from within the territory of developing countries has proven to be 
a cost effective strategy because it is cheap, in comparison to when it is done within a 
developed countries’ territory, whereby the marginal cost of GHG abatement is 
comparatively high.629  However, even though the CDM implies the participation of 
developing countries through concrete emissions mitigations actions, one still cannot 
capitalise its achievements in favour of developing countries, because, as per Article 12 
of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM credits belong to the developed countries counterpart 




Whenever parties engage in international emission mitigation talks, the question 
regarding the participation of developing countries arises;630 and as discussed in this 
chapter, there is hardly consensus among parties with that respect. The absence of 
emission reduction provisions for the group of developing countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol has been heavily controversial, especially the participation in a mitigation 
regime of developing countries major emitters, also listed as the biggest emitters 
worldwide. Any effort to maintain or justify the regime has made the climate change 
field more suffering than successful. Since its adoption in 1997, dissatisfactions and 
attacks regarding the Kyoto Protocol’s regime for developing countries were flowing to 
the point of almost provoking its collapse. Countries such as the USA used the same 
issue as a ground for abstaining from ratifying the protocol. There is a formal pressing 
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call towards all parties to the UNFCCC to converge local and international efforts to 
contain the global temperature increase within the margin of 2 degrees Celsius compared 
to the averages of the pre-industrial age, to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interferences 
with the climate system. That is therefore the concern about increasing emissions from 
the group of developing countries. The 2015 Paris universal Climate Change Agreement 
which is the focus of the next chapter is an attempt to solve the problem. Based on the 
principle of Equity and Common but differentiated Responsibility and Respective 
Capabilities, it proposes a universal climate change regime which equally applies to all 





CHAPTER V: THE GREENHOUSE GASES EMISSION MITIGATION 







One of the most contentious issues in the climate change debate towards the Paris 
Agreement was the mitigation of emissions from developing countries, especially those 
who had become new major emitters,631 whether they should as well be included in an 
emission reduction scheme.632 The previous regime indeed conceded to them the right 
to freely emit GHG as much as needed in order to fulfil their economic goals.633 
However, a quarter of a century since the adoption of the UNFCCC, the global economic 
context had significantly evolved.634 Some developing countries are among the world’s 
major GHG emitters,635 at a time when there is a more urgent call for a global action to 
limit the current global temperature increase.636 The Paris Agreement is an attempt to 
solve this problem, through a climate change regime that would be applicable to all, with 
the objective of holding the temperature increase to well below 2 degrees Celsius.637 
This chapter will analyse the key features of the Paris Agreement with respect to 
developing countries’ emission reduction. It starts by presenting the COP 21 
negotiations background, and then discusses the elements and the structure of the Paris 
Agreement, before analysing the developing countries emissions reduction regime. The 
chapter ends up with a brief concluding comment. 
 
  
                                                          
631Winkler (a) (note 35 above; 469); Rong (note 254 above; 4583); Zhang (note 254 above; 1753); 
Chandler (note 47 above; ii). 
632 Brunnée (a) (note 153 above; 592). 
633 See the preamble of the UNFCCC. 
634 Werner (note 252 above; 166); Winkler (a) (note 35 above; 2). 
635 J.B. Wiener (b) ‘Think globally, act globally: the limits of local climate policies’ (2007) 155 (6) 
Univ. of PS LR 1961 at 1967; Ibid Werner at 167. 
636 Ibid Wiener (b); see IPCC 2014 (b) (note 73 above; v).  




5.2. Background of the Paris Agreement 
 
The international response to climate change started with the UNFCCC followed by the 
Kyoto Protocol, based on a differential treatment between developed and developing 
countries. The developed countries were loaded with more responsibilities than the 
developing countries. This was because of their acknowledged historical climate change 
responsibility.638 As discussed above, that cleavage between the two groups of countries 
on climate change related issues significantly affected the health of international climate 
negotiations, with negative impact on global emissions.639 
 
The 2009 “Copenhagen Accord” is regarded as a milestone towards the Paris 
Agreement, as it introduced what was necessary for a new universal climate change 
regime. The Bali Road Map adopted the core provisions of the Copenhagen Accord, and 
paved the way to the Paris Agreement,640 while the two Ad Hoc Working Groups (on 
Kyoto Protocol and on Long Term Climate Action) prepared all the parties for a 
universal regime.641 COP17 launched the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, with a 
mandate to develop another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under 
the Convention which would be applicable to all parties.642 The Warsaw Conference 
invited parties to initiate or intensify preparations of Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions,643 whereas the “Lima Call for Climate Action” set in motion the final 
negotiations towards the 2015 Agreement, including the submitting and reviewing of 
INDCs.644   
 
Through the above processes, developing countries in particular were incrementally 
prepared for the upcoming new climate change regime that would be applicable to them 
as well, as the call became urgent for global efforts to close the emission gap towards 
the objective of 2 degrees Celsius increase.  
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As explained by Michel Damian645, the fundamental problem towards the Paris 
Agreement was the situation of the world which is different from 1992, at the adoption 
of the UNFCCC. Developing countries such as China, India and Brazil, which were 
insignificant emitters at that time, are currently among the world’s top emitters.646 
Therefore grew the need of a new emissions mitigation regime that especially extends 
to those new emitters, to prevent further aggravation of the climate system.647 
 
As also in chapter three above, the exemption from emission limitations granted to states 
that were classified as “developing countries” in 1992 was hardly justifiable in 2015.648 
The regime that allowed developing countries to freely emit for their developmental 
purposes became abundantly disputed. For instance, it was not understandable any more 
to put for instance China and Chad in the same basket, and assume that both countries 
are “developing countries” and therefore, be exempted from emissions limitation 
targets.649 As discussed in section 2.2 above, the criteria that is currently referred to, 
which decides whether or not a country is a developing one is questionable.650 Because 
in this case of China and Chad, the only common point between the two is the fact that 
they are both Non-Annex I countries under the UNFCCC; apart from that, they differ in 
almost everything else, especially regarding the GHG emission drivers.651 Therefore, the 
UNFCCC/Kyoto “Berlin wall”652 represented by the separation of the two groups of 
countries had to fall and leave space to a more equitable and updated differential system 
between countries.   
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5.3. The COP 21 forum   
 
5.3.1. Objective  
 
The COP21 was convened from 29 November to 13 December 2015 in Paris, France. 
195 country parties to the UNFCCC were gathered to complete the task they had set for 
themselves under the Durban platform for enhanced action, in 2011, to adopt a “protocol, 
another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention 
which applied to all parties.”653 
 
The Paris forum was the culmination of a quarter century of climate change discussions 
to reach an equitable and universal regime.654 It benefited from the experience of two 
decades of interactions.655 For Bodansky,656 negotiating countries in Paris were more 
prepared than in Rio in 1992, and states knew better which direction to take. As it was 
also the case in 1992 at the adoption of the UNFCCC, attendance by the heads of states 
and governments was important in Paris.657 Such involvement of heads of states, along 
with a broad range of other stakeholders658 is an indication that the message about the 
urgency to take measures to curb climate change is being heard.659  
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Countries in Paris were already familiar with the 2009 Copenhagen climate change 
architecture which was introducing a new regime that would be applicable to all, adopted 
thereafter by the Cancun Agreements, as discussed above.660 Besides this, the 
Copenhagen approach was largely reflected in all the COP decisions leading up to Paris 
Agreement. Therefore, the view of what the Paris Agreement was going to look like was 
already clear for countries, to the extent that they already foresaw the outline of what 
they were going to get after adopting the Paris Agreement.661 
 
5.3.2. Outcomes  
 
The Paris Agreement produced two outcomes: the decision 1/CP.21 that adopted the 
Paris Agreement, and the Paris Agreement itself.662 The current research focuses on the 
Paris Agreement, and specifically on the GHG emissions reduction regime it institutes 
for developing countries.663  
 
However, even in Paris, parties were not unanimous on the legal bindingness of the new 
regime to be adopted. Parties such as the EU and some developing countries were known 
to be favourable to a universal legally binding outcome, whereas the USA, China and 
India were not.664 China and India especially, rejected any binding outcome that would 
be equally applicable to developing countries.665 After the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, analysts now diversely look at the treaty: for some, it is a success, an 
evolution in the climate change governance, and a revolution in the UNFCCC COP 
process.666 For others, it is a good compromise with huge achievement, yet an imperfect 
solution to the global problem of climate change.667 More of them see the treaty only as 
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a text that provides a political direction for climate change matters.668 However, it 
remains that with the Paris Agreement, the world have had its first global climate treaty 
under which developed and developing countries alike are bound.669 The adoption of a 
universal regime was exciting to such an extent that Francois Holland, 670 the French 
president whose country hosted the event qualified the Paris Agreement as “the most 
beautiful and peaceful revolution that have ever occurred in his country”.  
 
However, the Paris Agreement provides a strong framework for the present and future 
climate change response. It also provides the necessary mandate for domestic 
policymakers to undertake its implementation, and sets a universal framework of climate 
change co-operation and solidarity among countries to which it addresses positive 
signals towards a decarbonised world in a near future.671 However, on the view of some, 
one of the most telling failures of the Paris Agreement is that it lacks ambition with 
respect to the scientific requirements for effectively dealing with the urgency of the 
climate change challenge.672  
 
Having failed to produce a universal legally-binding agreement accounting for a new 
climate change regime in Copenhagen in 2009, parties in Paris in 2015 could not afford 
to fail as well.673 Therefore, parties not only redoubted the worst pessimistic scenario of 
a failure, they were now concerned about the probability of adopting a meaningless 
outcome.674 In the end, however, the outcome of the COP 21 exceeded expectations.675 
Negotiations ended up producing an Agreement that, while perhaps not a revolution as 
such, as praised by the French President Francois Holland, was undoubtedly an 
important step in the evolution of climate change governance and a reaffirmation of the 
environmental multilateralism.676 
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5.4. The Paris Agreement: Adoption, Entry into force, Elements and Structure 
 
5.4.1. Adoption and entry into force 
 
The COP21 adopted the Paris Agreement on the 12th of December 2015 by all the 196 
country parties to the UNFCCC, as exposed in section 5.2.1 above.677 The Paris 
Agreement was to enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date on which at least 55 
parties to the Agreement, accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 percent of the 
total global greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession.678 On 5 October 2016, both thresholds for the entry 
into force were achieved, making the Paris Agreement to enter into force on the 4th of 
November 2016,679 in confirmation of an earlier prediction of the UN secretary General 
Ban Ki Moon that he was confident to see it entering into force before the end of 2016.680 
The first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties 
to the Paris Agreement took place from the 7th to the 18th of November 2016, in 
Marrakech, Morocco in conjunction with COP22.  
 
Nevertheless, with the entry into force of the Paris Agreement being an historical event, 
it is worth mentioning this important step which led thereto. The first of the two 
thresholds was achieved on the 22nd of September 2016, as 60 parties representing 47.76 
percent of emissions ratified the treaty.681 The ratification of India on the 2nd of October 
2016 brought up higher, the number of country parties to have joined the treaty, 
accounting for a total of 51.89 percent of global emissions.682 On the 4th of October 
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2016, the EU Parliament made public its favourable decision by a vote to ratify the 
Agreement before the COP22.683 The EU accounts for about 12 percent of global 
emissions.684  
 
It also worth signalling the following, concerning the adopted formula for the entry into 
force of the Paris Agreement, which is similar to the formula applied by the Kyoto 
protocol.685 The Paris Agreement took about more than a year to enter into force since 
its adoption in December 2015, whereas it took eight years to the Kyoto Protocol with a 
similar formula.686 This can be interpreted as a further success won by Paris in 
comparison to Kyoto. Notwithstanding the fact that until October 2016, observers feared 
a delayed entry into force because of China and the USA, the two major emitters 
worldwide, holding about 40 percent of global emissions.687 The two are historically 
known not to be in a hurry when it comes to taking up international engagements for 
emissions limitations.688 This time however, it was not the case, because both countries 
ratified the Agreement on the 3rd of September 2016, thus closing the controversy.   
 
5.4.2. Objective of the Paris Agreement  
 
The Paris Agreement aims at enhancing the implementation of the UNFCCC by 
strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, as stated in its Article 
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2.689 To that extent, Paris has set a target of limiting the global temperature increase to 
"well below 2° degrees Celsius", while pursuing efforts to stay below 1.5 degrees 
Celsius. By urging country parties to endeavour to stay below a 1.5 degrees Celsius 
increase, the Paris Agreement keeps in mind the situation of the most vulnerable island 
nations, to whom a 2°C increase will bear disastrous consequences and irreversible 
damages.690 The UNFCCC puts a special emphasis on the particular climate change 
vulnerability of this group of countries.691 
 
According to Bodle,692 the drafting style of the objective of the Paris Agreement is the 
result of a careful compromise between the positions of the AOSIS and the LDCs, who 
demanded a 1.5 degrees Celsius increase as a limit, and some other countries who argued 
that the temperature goal to be set in the Agreement needed to be credible. While “well 
below 2 degrees Celsius” represents the operational goal of the Agreement, the 1.5 
degrees Celsius constitutes an aspiration which is also established, and therefore needs 
to be addressed. To that extent, the COP has invited the IPCC to provide a special report 
on the impacts that will be represented by a 1.5 degrees Celsius increase. 693 
 
Countries’ INDCs submitted prior to COP21 and updated in 2016 have fallen short of 
the Agreement’s ambition,694 as they do not match the objective of limiting the global 
                                                          
689 Article 2 of the Paris Agreement states: ‘This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the 
Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, 
in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by: 
(a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-
industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate 
change;  
(b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate 
resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten 
food production;  
(c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate-resilient development.’ 
690 L.A. Nurse et al “Small islands” In V.R. Barros et al Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’ (2014) 1613 at 1614 - 1654. 
691 Ibid.   
692 R. Bodle et al (b) ‘The Paris Agreement: Analysis, Assessment and Outlook’ Ecologic Institute at 8. 
Available at: 
http://ecologic.eu/sites/files/event/2016/ecologic_institute_2016_paris_agreement_assessment.pdf. 
(Accessed: 12 October 2016). 
693 Ibid. 
694 The UNFCCC secretariat latest synthesis report on the INDC entitled “Aggregate effect of the Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions: an update Synthesis report by the secretariat” based on 162 INDC 




warming below 2 degrees Celsius, even if fully implemented.695 With the current level 
of ambitions of the INDCs, the global mean temperature is most likely to increase as 
high as between 2.7 degrees Celsius, and 3.5 degrees Celsius.696 Therefore, there’s a 
need to scale up and accelerate national efforts to raise up the INDCs ambitions.697 
Obergassel698 suggests that such scaling up may start with the large emitters, being the 
most important contributors to the problem, and having enough resources to address this 
challenge faster than the smaller emitters which are mostly developing countries. 
 
Two observations are commonly made at this particular point: firstly, there seems to be 
a lack of adequacy between the long term objective of the Paris Agreement and the 
strategies adopted to fulfil the said objective.699 Secondly the urgency and ambition 
required from global mitigation actions for the world to stay under the 2 degrees Celsius 
temperature increase seems not to match with the lack of a binding character towards 
the substantial provisions regarding emission mitigations actions.700 To the two 
                                                          
Agreement requirement. Report available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cop22/eng/02.pdf. 
(Accessed: 20 September 2016); See Obergassel (note 13 above; 1).  
695 Ibid Obergassel; J. Rogelj et al ‘2020 emissions levels required to limit warming to below 2 degrees 
Celsius’ (2013) 3 (4) NCC 405 at 406. 
696 Obergassel (note 13 above; 1). 
697 UNFCCC (2016) ‘Aggregate effect of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: an update 
Synthesis report by the secretariat’ at 15. 
698 Obergassel (note 13 above; 1). 
699 ‘First, the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) team analysed 159 INDCs that had been submitted by 8 
December 2015. The analysis shows that the global temperature rise by 2100 would be 3.6°C compared 
to preindustrial levels, if current policies are maintained. However, if the mitigation ambition of the 
submitted INDCs are fully implemented, and if climate policies of similar ambition are implemented after 
2030, the median global warming would be reduced to around 2.7°C by 2100 (and a full range of 2.2–
3.4°C). This is still higher than the goal of the Paris Agreement of holding global average warming well 
below 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. The CAT analysis also calculated the adequacy of 
individual INDCs based on historical emissions, projected emissions, and policy projections. Accordingly, 
Bhutan’s contribution seems the most ambitious (sufficient: fully consistent with below 2°C limit). 
China’s ambition seems “medium” (not consistent with limiting warming below 2°C, as it would require 
many other countries to make a comparably greater effort and deeper reductions). The EU’s ambition is 
also considered “medium” (less ambitious than China), as are India (less ambitious than the EU) and the 
United States (less ambitious than the EU and India). Russia and South Africa are considered “inadequate” 
(contribute to warming likely to exceed 3–4°C).’ Information retrieved from Mbeva (note 19 above; 14).   
700 ‘The conclusion is that the current set of INDC’s will be compatible with the 2°C target only if steep, 
global emission reductions are undertaken in the post-2030 period. An annual reduction rate of 5% from 
the developed countries and 1% from the least developed, with other countries between these, starting 
from year 2030 will be needed. Reaching the 2°C might require stronger contribution from developing 
countries than what is assumed in some of the current analysis. Further, even this scenario would remain 
below 2°C only with 50% probability.   
It appears critical to parties to increase their level of ambitions for the 2030 targets in order to ensure a 
more robust possibility to remain below 2°C.’ Analysis retrieved from: T. Ekholm & T.J. Lindroos ‘An 
analysis of countries’ climate change mitigation contributions towards the Paris Agreement’ (2015) VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd at 22. Available at: http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-38-8378-




difficulties above, it adds the weak side of the bottom up approach in an agreement 
requiring urgency and stringency of action as it is for the Paris Agreement.701 This is 
because the approach on which the NDC strategy sits does not give insurance that the 
Paris objective will not be met. Asselt702 fears that the objective of the Paris Agreement 
will fall through the cracks in a system of nationally determined inadequate offers. Along 
with others, Asselt justifies his fear by the fact that even the last update in 2016 of the 
Aggregation of countries’ INDCs did not match the objective of limiting global warming 
below 2 degrees Celsius.703 In fact, had it not been for the complexity of the dynamics 
surrounding the climate change international negotiations, the emission gap above 
would have arguably necessitated a top down allocation of the volume of emissions to 
be reduced, as it was the case under the Kyoto Protocol , but this time extended to all the 
country parties.704   
 
5.4.3. Guiding principles of the Paris Agreement 
 
Any of the principles under the UNFCCC equally applies under the Paris Agreement.705 
Nevertheless, comparatively to the UNFCCC, Paris has made some readjustments. In 
some cases, it has added new dimensions to some of the traditional UNFCCC principles, 
in order to broaden their meaning.706 In other cases Paris has merely introduced new 
principles. We have for instance the case of the Equity and CBDR, in the light of 
different national circumstances, and the case of the inter-generational equity principle. 
Although both principles are already present in the UNFCCC, they are given broader 
meanings under the Paris Agreement, owing to its universal character.707  
 
                                                          
701 Damian (note 645 above; 4). 
702 V. Asselt et al ‘Assessment and Review under a 2015 Climate Change Agreement.’ (2015) Nordic 
Council of Ministers at 20. Available at: http://www.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:797336/FULLTEXT01.pdf (Accessed: 20 September 2016). 
703 Ibid Asselt; Obergassel (note 13 above; 1); Rogelj (note 695 above; 405). 
704 Damian (note 645 above; 4). 
705 Preamble of the Paris Agreement proclaims: ‘In pursuit of the objective of the Convention, and being 
guided by its principles, including the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.’  
706 The CBDR principle for instance has developed over time as an answer to developing country 
parties’ calls for fairer rules and procedures in international environmental cooperation. Pauw (note 153 
above; 4-7).    




Besides, a principle such as “the adoption of the highest possible ambition in defining 
goals in climate change matters” constitutes an innovation introduced by the Paris 
Agreement to serve the purpose of its long-term objective.708 Similar observations can 
be made for concepts such as climate justice, human rights, and the right to health, all 
enshrined in the Paris Agreement as new climate change concerns, unknown under the 
UNFCCC.709 
 
The next section will discuss the CBDR principle under the Paris Agreement, and further 
explore the inter-generational equity principle. The principles that Paris shares with the 
UNFCCC were already discussed under section 3.1.2.2 above. The principle regarding 
the “adoption of the highest possible ambition in defining goals in climate change 
matters” will be discussed a bit further.  
 
(i) The Equity and CBDR-RC Principle, in the light of different national 
circumstances. 
 
The Equity and CBDR principle is the pivotal principle of both the UNFCCC and the 
Paris Agreement. The preamble of the Paris Agreement states that:  
 
“Parties to this Agreement, in pursuit of the objective of the Convention, and being 
guided by its principles, including the principle of Equity and Common But 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities, in the light of different 
national circumstances.” 
 
Echoing the preamble, Articles 2.2 of the Agreement provides:  
 
“This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different 
national circumstances.”710 
 
                                                          
708 See section 5.3.8.2.2 below for more details  
709 See the preamble of the Paris Agreement  




Under these two provisions of the Agreement, country parties are urged to address 
climate change on the basis of “equity” and “CBDR-RC principle,” and “in the light of 
different national circumstances”. The adding of “in the light of different national 
circumstances” is an innovation of the Paris Agreement. Under the UNFCCC, the 
formulation of the CBDR principles was slightly different:  
 
“The parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the 
developed country parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof.”711 
 
Under the above provision, country parties are exhorted to protect the climate system on 
the basis of “equity” and “in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities”. And, the wording “Accordingly…” means 
“as a consequence to what has just been said”. Subjecting therefore the sentence that 
follows to the one that has just been said. Making the provision means that the developed 
country parties are exhorted to take the lead in combating climate change as a result of 
the application of the CBDR principle. The wording that forms the CBDR principle in 
the Paris Agreement does not constitute an identical repetition of the wording of the 
CBDR principle under the UNFCCC. Therefore, there is a variability in the 
understanding one may have on the CBDR principle under both treaties. Similar 
observation is made if one compares the CBDR principle under the UNFCCC and its 
original enunciation under the 1992 Rio Declaration on sustainable development.712  
 
Here is a summary of the changes that has occurred between the two treaties: some 
constituting elements have been removed whilst others have been added from either. 
 
  
                                                          
711 Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. 




Table 2: CBDR wording changes between the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement 
 
Element UNFCCC Paris Ag.713 
Equity  Present Present 
Common Responsibilities  Present Present 
Differentiated Responsibilities  Present Present 
Climate change Respective Capabilities of 
countries  
Present Present 
Developed countries duty of leading climate 
change response 
Present Removed  




Present   
Source: Our own comparison of information from the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC.  
 
The first change comes from the removal of the recognition of the historical 
responsibility of developed countries regarding climate change.714 Under the UNFCCC, 
the duty to lead in combating climate change was remitted to developed countries parties 
as a direct consequence of their climate change historical responsibility.715 This is not 
the case in the Paris Agreement, where the historical responsibility element has been 
removed.716 The second change comes from the introduction of the conditional element: 
“in the light of different national circumstances” to make the CBDR principle mean: 
country parties will apply the CBDR principle in the light of their different national 
circumstances. 
 
Section 5.4.7 below focuses on the differential treatment under the Paris Agreement. It 
will therefore deconstruct the CBDR principle as it reads under the Agreement, and 
analyse its constituting elements (refer to table 2 above), in order to understand the 
essence of the changes that have occurred in the new climate change regime, as far as 
developing countries are concerned.  
                                                          
713 “Paris Ag.” In the table refers to the “Paris Agreement” 
714 C. Bultheel et al ‘COP21: success at “the end of the beginning”’ (December 2015) I4CE Clim Brief 
n°38 at 2. Available at: http://www.i4ce.org/wp-core/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/15-12-18-I4CE-
Climate-Brief-38-COP211.pdf. (Accessed: 12 August 2016). 
715 See the Preamble of the UNFCCC. 




(ii) The inter-generational Equity principle 
 
The inter-generational Equity principle is the second principle to be present in both texts, 
even though it is more stressed in the Paris Agreement in comparison to the UNFCCC. 
The principle proclaims that the human race holds the natural environment of the planet 
in common with other species, people, and with the past, present and future 
generations.717 The principle comprises two dimensions: the inter-generational 
dimension, and the Equity dimension.718 That is why Weiss 719 once said that humans 
who live in the present generation are both trustees and beneficiaries of the planet, with 
the right to use and benefit from it, and the duty to safeguard its robustness and integrity 
in order to transmit it to the next generation.720 Issues related to the depletion, the access, 
the use of natural resources, the degradation of the quality of the environment, are the 
ones that are more of concern with regard to the inter-generational Equity principle, as 
far as future generations are concerned.721 
 
The inter-generational equity is already present in the international law for a long period. 
It is mentioned as far as in 1946 in the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling, which recognised the interest of the world to safeguard ‘for future generations 
the great natural resources represented by the whale stocks.’722 Even the World 
Commission on Environment and Development has recognised that the ultimate 
objective of sustainable development was the ability of future generations to reach their 
own goals.723 The Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development, also 
mentions the inter-generational equity principle.724 The inter-generational equity has 
further been enshrined into the preamble (or into body texts) of many international 
treaties such as the CBD, the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
                                                          
717 E.B. Weiss ‘In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Development.’ (1992) 8 (1) AUILR 19 
at 20. 
718 Ibid.  
719 Ibid.  
720 Ibid at 21. 
721 Ibid. 
722 See the Preamble of the international convention for the regulation of whaling, of 1946. Available at: 
http://library.arcticportal.org/1863/1/1946%20IC%20for%20the%20Regulation%20of%20Whaling-
pdf.pdf. (Accessed: 20 September 2016). 
723 World Commission on Environment and Development: ‘Our Common Future Report’ (1987); 
Available at: http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm. (Accessed: 20 August 2016). 




Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,725 as 
well as the UNFCCC.726 The inclusion of the inter-generational equity principle in all 
these multilateral instruments and at last in the Paris Agreement proves sufficiently to 
its audience in the international environmental law.  
 
The preamble of the Paris Agreement exhorts parties to respect, promote and consider 
the inter-generational equity dimension as an obligation when they are taking action to 
address the climate change.727 The Agreement does so in acknowledgement that climate 
change is a common concern for humankind.728 The UNFCCC on its side, exhorted its 
country parties to protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind based on equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.729  
 
In environmental related matters, Weiss argues that two dimensions are to be kept in 
mind in order to understand the principle of inter-generational equity, this is because one 
needs to remember the complex and intertwined relationship that exists within humans 
themselves on the one hand, and between humans and other constituents of the nature 
on the other hand: firstly, the relationship humans have with the natural system (of which 
they are a part), and secondly, the relationship humans have with the past and future 
generations of the living on the planet.730  
 
5.4.4. Legal form of the Paris Agreement  
 
The legal form of the Paris Agreement is an innovation in the history of the international 
climate change law.731  It has been the subject of several discussions that started prior to 
its adoption.732 As observed by Obergassel, the ‘natural’ legal form of the Paris 
Agreement should have been shaped as per Article 17 of the UNFCCC, as it was the 
                                                          
725 See Preamble of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information. Available at: 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf (accessed: 20 July 2016). 
726 Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. 
727 See preamble of the Paris Agreement.  
728 Ibid.  
729 Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. 
730 Weiss (note 717 above; 21).  





case for Kyoto. However, it would have forced the US Government to submit the new 
protocol to the Senate for ratification.733 Which could amount to a new blockade of the 
US participation to the Paris Agreement, as it was the case for the Kyoto Protocol. 734 
Therefore to avoid this situation, the parties in Paris had to opt for a legal form that was 
not even provided for in the UNFCCC.735 However, even in its innovative form, the 
Paris’ legal approach immediately trigged discussions in the US on whether the 
Agreement was a treaty by itself, in order to be submitted to the Senate for ratification.736  
 
However, two things are now admitted: Firstly, the Paris Agreement is not an 
amendment to the UNFCCC, nor a self-standing treaty. This for two reasons: i. Paris 
derives from the UNFCCC under which it was negotiated and adopted.737 In addition, 
the institutional mechanisms and administrative body of the UNFCCC will be shared 
with the Paris Agreement;738 ii. The objective of the Paris Agreement to enhance the 
implementation of the UNFCCC recalls its dependency towards its mother treaty.739 
Secondly, the Paris Agreement is not a Protocol (as per Article 17.1 of the 1992 
UNFCCC) because, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, it does not constitute an addition, or a 
clarification for the application of the UNFCCC. Paris is instead a platform that furthers 
the objective of the UNFCCC, by way of introducing many innovations as discussed 
below.  
 
The Paris Agreement responds to the criteria of a treaty, as provided for under Article 2 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.740 A treaty is defined as an 
international agreement that is concluded between states in written form and governed 
                                                          
733 Ibid at 4. 
734 Ibid. 
735 Ibid.  
736 Ibid.  
737 See the preamble of the Paris Agreement. 
738 As discussed in section 3.1.7.2 above, the decision 1/CP.17 of the COP 17 instituted the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action, which in turn negotiated the Paris Agreement. It was the decision 1/CP.21 
at the COP 21 which adopted the Paris Agreement; therefore, the Paris Agreement can be nothing but an 
emanation of the UNFCCC. 
739 Article 2.1 of the Paris Agreement provides: ‘This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the 
Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, 
in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.’; See Bodle (b) (note 692 
above; 22); See also Bodansky (f) (note 574 above; 3). 




by international law,741 whereas a protocol is defined as an addition, or a clarification to 
a mother treaty.742  In practice, countries often refer to treaties by using different terms, 
including Agreements, Conventions, Protocols, Charters, Accords, and Amendments,743 
that is what made Aust744 to declare that what constitutes a treaty is not the title given to 
an instrument, but rather the intention of its parties to be governed by international law.  
 
5.4.5. Legal Architecture of the Paris Agreement  
 
The Paris Agreement is a multilateral instrument with a hybrid legal approach.745 It 
combines binding and voluntary elements in a top down rules-based system mixed with 
a bottom-up approach.746 The Agreement takes its top down rules-based model from the 
Kyoto Protocol, and its bottom-up approach from the Copenhagen Accord.747 The 
Assessment and review processes under Article 14.2 and Article 13 of the Agreement as 
discussed below embody the “top down” part of the system,748 whereas the NDC system 
embodies the top down approach.749 As exposed in section 3.2.3 above, the Paris 
Agreement has to be viewed as the culmination of a process of a regime change that 
abandons a burden sharing system to adopt a new one that leaves up to country parties 
the initiative of deciding themselves on their emission limitation targets.750 As said by 
David Roberts, 751 the Paris Agreement sought for a balanced solution that is neither too 
                                                          
741 Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 1966 defines treaty as ‘An 
international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation.’ See note 399 above; D. Bodansky (g) ‘Legally Binding versus Non-Legally Binding 
Instruments’ in S. Barrett et al Towards a Workable and Effective Climate Regime (2015) 155 at 155. 
Available at: http://voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/bodansky.pdf. (Accessed: 22 October 2016). 
742 ‘A protocol has similar legal characteristics as a treaty or a convention, but of a less formal nature. 
Generally, a protocol amends, supplements or clarifies a multilateral treaty. A protocol may be on any 
topic relevant to the original treaty and is used either to further address something in the original or parent 
treaty, or to address a new concern; it is also used to add a procedure for the operation and enforcement 
of the treaty. A protocol is ‘optional’ because it is not automatically binding on States that have already 
ratified the original treaty and in order to be binding, the states must independently ratify it.’ Information 
available at: http://definitions.uslegal.com/p/protocol/ (Accessed: 19 September 2016). 
743 Bodansky (note 741 above; 155).  
744 A. Aust Modern treaty law and practice. Cambridge University Press (2013) 17-18. 
745 IISD (g) (note 662 above; 43); Ivanova (note 41 above; 414); Bailey (note 667 above; 3). 
746  See details in section 3.2.3 above. 
747 IISD (g) (note 662 above; 43); Ivanova (note 41 above; 414). 
748 Asselt (note 702 above; 20). 
749 Ibid. 
750 See section 3.2.3 above. 
751 David Roberts “The Conceptual Breakthrough behind the Paris Climate Treaty” (December 2015) 
vox.com available at: http://www.vox.com/2015/12/15/10172238/paris-climate-treaty-conceptual-




strong, nor too weak. Because if the Agreement was an overly strong solution, it could 
be unacceptable to key emitting states, and if it was too weak, it would have been 
ineffective. Therefore, to safeguard national sovereignties, the Agreement adopted a 
bottom-up approach, which “reflects rather than drive national policy”752 complemented 
by international norms that ensure transparency and accountability and to stimulate 
states to progressively ratchet up their efforts, through stronger actions under the NDC 
system.753 
 
5.4.6. The Legally binding character of the Paris Agreement   
 
Paris is a juxtaposition of both legally binding and legally non-binding provisions.754 
Legal bindingness reflects a state of mind, mainly that of officials who apply and 
interpret the law (executive branch officials, judges, and anthers), but also to some 
degree the state of the mind of the broad community that the law aims to rule.755 Legal 
bindingness depends on their ‘internal point of view’,756 which is a sense that a rule 
constitutes a legal obligation, and that compliance is consequently required by law, 
rather than being merely an optional question.757  The concept of ‘legally binding’ is 
distinct from several other dimensions of ‘bindingness’. For instance, it differs from the 
notion of “justiciability”, meaning whether an instrument is justiciable – in other words, 
whether the instrument can be applied by courts or other tribunals.758 Second, the 
concept has also to be distinguished from that of enforcement.759 Third, the legal form 
of an agreement has to be distinguished from its precision. This is because a legally 
                                                          
752 Ibid. 
753 Full implementation of the INDCs submitted as of December 15, 2015, would put the world on a 
pathway to 2.4-2.7° C. See ‘Climate Action Tracker, Effect of Current Pledges and Policies on Global 
Temperature’ Information available at: http://climateactiontracker.org/global.html. (Accessed: 10 
November 2016). 
754 Bodansky (g) (note 741 above; 5).  
755 Ibid at 2. 
756 Statement from the British philosopher HLA Hart, reported by Bodansky (g) (note 741 above; 5). 
757 Ibid Bodansky (g). 
758 ‘In general, courts will only apply legal instruments, so “justiciability” depends on the legal form of 
an instrument, not on its bindingness. Because the legally binding character of an instrument does not 
depend on whether there is any court or tribunal with jurisdiction to apply it.’ See Bodansky (g) (note 741 
above; 5). 
759 ‘The enforcement involves the application of sanctions to induce compliance. It is not a necessary 
condition for an instrument to be legally binding. If an instrument is created through a recognised law-
making process, it is then legally binding, whether there are any provisions that are specific to sanctions 
for its violation. Enforcement of a treaty does not depend on legal form, since non-legal norms can also 




binding instrument can be very vague, while a non-legal instrument is quite precise 
comparatively. This is ascertained, despite unsuccessful efforts to determine the 
significance of what constitutes the “bindingness” of a legal provision under the 
international law.760 As discussed in section 5.2.3.1 above, treaties are always “legally 
binding” instruments under the International law, provided they are created through a 
recognised law-making process.761 Besides, under the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda762 treaties are binding on the parties that are part to them, and must be 
implemented by them in good faith.763 In other words, parties are urged to comply with 
all good faith with their obligations as enshrined under treaties they are part of.  
 
The non-legally binding character of an instrument is not synonymous of a non-
existence of any binding character attached to the said instrument.764 States have a rooted 
belief that the legal binding character of an agreement matters, 765 because the non-
legally binding character of an instrument can significantly affect parties’ behaviours.766 
States also believe that formulating an agreement in legally binding terms signals a 
stronger commitment, both to states that are part of the agreement, and to the wider body 
of politics, particularly in a context where domestic acceptance of the treaty requires 
legislative approval.767  However, this is not always the case, because it is proven that 
some political agreements, such as the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, or 1975 Helsinki 
Accords,768 have had a greater influence on states’ behaviour than their legal 
counterparts.769 The effectiveness of a treaty is without regard of its drafting style, 
                                                          
760 R. Stavins et al ‘International Cooperation: Agreements and Instruments’ In O.R. Edenhofer et al 
Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) 1001 at 1020. 
761 Bodansky (g) (note 741 above; 2). 
762“pacta sunt servanda” is a latin expression which means: “the agreements and stipulations of the parties 
to a contract must be observed”. See Collins Dictionary of Law. (2006). Available at: http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/pacta+sunt+servanda (Accessed: 17 September 2016). 
763 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. 
764 Bodansky (g) (note 741 above; 2).  
765 Ibid. 
766 D. Shelton ‘Commitment and compliance: The role of non-binding norms in the international legal 
system’ (2003) 2013-50 GW LSRP 1 at 13-15. 
767 Bodansky (g) (note 741 above; 2). 
768 ‘The Helsinki Final Act was an agreement signed by 35 nations that concluded the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki, Finland. The multifaceted Act addressed a range of 
prominent global issues and in so doing had a far-reaching effect on the Cold War and U.S.-Soviet 
relations.’ Information available at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/helsinki. (Accessed: 
19 September 2016). 




whether or not it is written in a legally binding form, although a legally binding style 
will comparatively have greater effect on domestic politics.770 On the view of Barret,771 
the effectiveness of an international regime (defined by a treaty) is rather a function of 
three factors that are the ambition of its provisions, the level of participation by states, 
and the degree to which states are compliant. 
 
Besides, the legally binding character of an instrument does not imply that every 
provision in the said instrument creates a legally binding obligation, as noticed by 
Bodansky.772 Treaties are often a mix of legally binding and legally non-binding 
provisions.773 The binding character of a provision within a treaty depends on the 
vocabulary that particular provision uses; for instance, the verbal forms ‘shall’ and 
‘should’ used in provisions indicate different scopes of the legal bindingness of a 
provision, which is often already established in the mind of law makers.774  
 
Whilst analysing the Paris Agreement, Bodansky775 noticed that in various matters, 
appropriate “formulas”, were carefully referred to by the Agreement to create the 
expected legal outcomes from country parties: Here after follows their summary:  
 
  
                                                          
770 Ibid at 8. 
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disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DEnvironment_and_statecraft.pdf. (Accessed: May 2016). 
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Table 3: Verbal forms and corresponding legal outcomes for country parties to the 
Paris Agreement in determination of parties’ obligations 
 
The word ‘shall’ was used wherever there was a consensus to create a legally binding 
obligation, whilst ‘should’ or ‘encourage’ were used to create different levels of 
recommendations. Other expressions such as ‘will’ or “are to” were used to express 
expectations, whereas “may” was used to reflect permission.776 Some styles and verbs 
were consensually removed or replaced, especially those that were going to create 
further legally binding obligations, in addition to the ones country parties already agreed 
to.777 
 
As also reported by the Earth bulletin of negotiations on the Paris forum, many further 
adjustments were done on the final draft of the Agreement that was submitted for 
adoption in order to insure that the balanced approach be kept throughout the treaty.778 
As a consequence, the Paris Agreement had more legally non-binding obligations in 
comparison to the legally bindings.779 Some analysts argued that the minimisation of the 
                                                          
776 Ibid.  
777 ‘There was a high risk of non-ratification of the Paris Agreement by some major emitters, such as the 
US, given the prescripts of that country’s national legislation in the subject of ratification of international 
treaties.’ Information available at: https://newclimate.org/2015/12/14/what-the-paris-agreement-means-
for-global-climate-change-mitigation/ (Accessed: 21 August 2016); IISD (g)  (note 662 above; 43); 
‘Arguably, if a provision said “shall” and hence created a legal obligation, Senate or Congressional 
approval might have been required first for U.S. participation to the treaty, whereas if “should” was used, 
the Paris Agreement could be accepted by the President as a presidential-executive agreement, given the 
lack of legal obligation attached thereto’. See Bodansky (f) (note 574 above; 13); The Details on the debate 
on whether or not in the views of the USA the Paris Agreement constitutes a treaty under international 
law, is available at: http://beforeitsnews.com/environment/2015/12/is-the-paris-climate-agreement-a-
treaty-2543856.html. (Accessed: 19 August 2016). 
778 IISD (g) (note 662 above; 43). 
779 Analysis available at: https://newclimate.org. (Accessed: 21 August 2016); See note 777 above. 
Verbal forms Corresponding legal outcomes for country parties 
‘Shall’ Used to create a legally binding obligation 
‘Should’ Used to create recommendations that are not legally binding 
‘Encourage’ Used to create recommendations that are not legally binding 
‘Will’ Used to express expectations that are not legally binding  
“Are to” Used to express expectations that are not legally binding 




binding character would impact the seriousness of the Paris Agreement, and further 
impact the ambitious character of the climate change actions at national levels.780 
 
For instance, Article 3 states that all parties “are to undertake and communicate 
ambitious efforts with the view of achieving the purpose of the Agreement”.781 The 
formula “are to undertake” used in this provision makes the “ambitious character of 
national mitigation targets that countries have to submit as NDCs” to be a non-legally 
binding obligation. Also, the use of the phrase “countries are to undertake” in the final 
form of the Paris Agreement has made the whole provision more of an expectation than 
a legal obligation on countries, comparatively to the legally binding formula “countries 
shall undertake”, that was proposed in the amended original draft of the Agreement.782  
 
The same observation applies to Article 4.4 which exhorts developed countries to 
continue taking the lead in the fight against climate change by undertaking economy 
wide absolute emission reduction targets.783 In the case of this Article, the word "shall" 
was originally used for developed countries, whereas "should" was used for developing 
countries, but the United States refused this differentiation, and further argued that by 
keeping “shall” in that provision, the ratification of the Paris Agreement by the USA 
would have required the approval of the congress.784 Therefore, negotiators replaced 
“shall” by “should” just before the adoption of the final version of the Agreement. These 
are some of the many examples that illustrates the way countries avoided a legally 
binding obligation, in favour of a legally non-binding because of their national 
interests.785 
 
Indeed, it is surprising to see that parties did not agree about writing in a legally binding 
form, many substantive provisions of the Agreement, such as the parties’ emission 
mitigation contributions,786 this despite the fact that they themselves acknowledged that 
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781 See Article 3 of the Paris Agreement at note 40 above.  
782 IISD (g) (note 662 above; 43). 
783 Article 4.4 of the Paris Agreement. 
784 IISD (g) (note 662 above; 43). 
785 Ibid. 




climate change was a more serious current global and urgent threat.787 This constitutes 
one of the biggest shortcoming of the Agreement on the views of many scholars.788 The 
thing being, if a country produces its NDC with no convincing mitigation targets, 
comparatively to its real potential, there is nothing concrete the Agreement can do with 
that regard. Besides, if a country does not comply with its mitigation obligations under 
the Agreement, there is no provision for retaliation.789 Therefore, the concerns about the 
adequacy of the objective of the Agreement and the means aligned to reach them.790 
 
However, the selected vocabularies ultimately make the Paris Agreement faithfully 
reflect what the political consensus between the countries was,791 and explain its great 
flexibility, offering considerable margins of manoeuvre to country parties. This is 
because the priority in Paris was put on a universal participation.792 Although for some 
such flexibility represents a “good drafting strategy” that has allowed a universal 
adherence, for others it is a “source of weaknesses”, with the potential of diminishing 
the Agreement’s “strength”.793 Falkner794 rather finds a justification to the Paris’ 
flexibility in the context of its adoption which was a post Kyoto and Copenhagen, 
dominated by regular deadlocks in climate change negotiations.795  Therefore, in such 
conditions, states could not afford to adopt a new climate change instrument that offered 
no enough flexibility, as did Paris.796 
 
For Bodansky and Sterk,797 the Paris Agreement reflects a careful balancing of various 
potential forces, a trade-off between the diverging positions of major emitting countries. 
Sterk’s opinion is that the Agreement was designed to carefully avoid barriers to 
                                                          
787 IISD (g) (note 662 above; 43). 
788 Bodansky (f) (note 574 above; 13); Bodle (b) (note 692 above; 22).   
789 Bettina LAVILLE ‘« Contraindre les États et les éléments ? » : le pari de... l’Accord de Paris’ 
(February 2016) EEIRMLJ 15 at 20. 
790 Ibid.   
791 Bodansky (f) (note 574 above; 13). 
792 Information available at: http://www.climatelawandpolicy.com/en/blog/29-blog-climate-change/102-
analysis-paris.html (Accessed: 20 August 2016). 
793 See note 777 above for the analysis. 
794 R. Falkner ‘The Crisis of Environmental Multilateralism: A Liberal Response’ in D. Brack et al The 
Green Book: New Directions for Liberals in Government (2013) at 354. Available at: 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/538a0f32e4b0e9ab915750a1/t/538db535e4b0f4bbdccb7062/14017
95893518/Falkner_2013_Environmental_Multilateralism.pdf. (Accessed: 17 September 2016). 
795 R. Falkner (note 794 above; 358). 
796 Ibid Falkner at 354. 




countries’ effective participation to the new regime.798 Ivanova made a similar 
observation,799 thinking that the special form of the Paris Agreement, which combines 
binding and voluntary elements was designed to enable the USA to adopt the Agreement 
through executive action rather than formal US Senate approval.800  However, at this 
particular point, Bodansky801 is of a slightly different opinion, because he thinks that the 
hybrid architecture of Paris was rather a quest from states themselves, following the 
Copenhagen failure. He says states urged negotiators to develop a hybrid architecture 
which would combine a bottom-up approach in order to promote flexibility and 
participation by parties, and a top down approach in order to promote national and 
international ambitions.802  
 
Returning to the legal binding character of the Paris Agreement, most of its legally 
binding provisions establish obligations of result that are subject to review.803 The 
requirement from parties to submit certain types of information at certain periods of 
time, and report or account on climate change related issues is a binding obligation.804 
Provisions that refer to the procedural elements are the ones that form the bulk of the 
Agreement’s legally-binding obligations,805 whereas provisions that refer to substantive 
elements are the legally non-binding.806 Countries contents of the NDCs for instance are 
not legally binding.807  
 
5.4.7. Differential treatment between countries under the Paris Agreement 
 
It is said that the Paris Agreement constitutes a turning point in the history of climate 
change, mainly because of the way in which it dealt with the former UNFCCC 
                                                          
798 Information available at: http://www.climatelawandpolicy.com/en/blog/29-blog-climate-change/102-
analysis-paris.html (Accessed: 20 August 2016).  
799 Ivanova (note 41 above; 413).  
800 Explanation on the USA executive action and Senate approval available at: 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/legislative_home.htm. (Accessed: 15 September 2016); see also 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/09/obamas-plan-to-avoid-senate-review-of-the-paris-
protocol. (Accessed: 17 August 2016); see also: http://www.senate.gov/legislative/legislative_home.htm. 
(Accessed: 15 September 2016). 
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805 IISD (g) (note 662 above; 43). 
806 Ibid. 




differential treatment.808 Paris abandoned the notion of Annexes which is the corner 
stone of the UNFCCC and Kyoto regime,809 in favour of a flexible and calibrated 
approach that takes into account changes in a country’s circumstances and capacities 
over time. 810  Bodle and Damian Michel811 evoke rather the abandonment of the 
traditional two-speed approach of the climate change regime which differentiates 
developed countries from developing countries,812  whereas Mbeva813 argued that Paris 
managed to adjust the same UNFCCC approach by moving beyond the limits that were 
imposed by the cleavage the Convention instituted, applying a “subtle 
differentiation”.814 On the view Bultheel,815 the differentiation between developed and 
developing countries is still present in the Paris Agreement, but in a much more 
attenuated form, compare to the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC.  
 
The approach to differentiation which is applied in the Paris Agreement amounts to a 
self-differentiation system whereby a country which is willing to take on more ambitions 
than its actual status requires is welcome to do so.816 That is why Bultheel came to the 
conclusion that, the evolution of the differential regime in the Paris Agreement was a 
proof of how international law can adapt to the realities of the global economy, and 
accommodate the rise of emerging countries.  
 
Despite the fact that the above scholars have all differently commented on the Paris 
Agreement because of the different angles from which they based their judgements, they 
all have one constant thing in their reasoning, which is the fact that they have all noticed 
that with respect to the implementation of its new regime, the Paris Agreement had 
various differential provisions regarding the various domains that constitute the climate 
change response (mitigation, adaptation, finances, and capacity building).817  
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Even though the Paris Agreement does not give any definition of what constitutes a 
“developed country” or a “developing country”, there is little chance for confusion with 
that regard.818 In the present study, it is presumed that any mention of “developing 
country” by the Agreement refers to countries that are “Non-Annex I” under the 
UNFCCC, whilst references to “developed countries” refers those countries that are 
“Annex I” and “Annex II”. The fact is the Paris Agreement avoided to undertake at 
present a pre-classification of countries parties as did the UNFCCC.819 This was because 
of two reasons: firstly, it left up to countries the option of a self-assessment in order to 
find out in which group their respective national circumstances would fit better;820 
secondly, the economic situation of a country may evolve over time, and make it move 
from one group to another.821 For instance, a country that is currently a “developing” 
country may evolve and become a “developed” country over time, in which case, it 
would assume new responsibilities according to its new status.822 Mbeva nevertheless 
complains about the fact that countries’ responsibilities had become less clear,823 and 
that for many countries, it had become unclear whether they are considered developed 
or developing countries.824  
 
However, scholars such as Backer and Mc. Kenzie825 express their satisfaction about the 
sensitive character of the “softer differential approach” brought by Paris. For them, that 
approach is more apt to capture changes that have occurred and that might occur in future 
in the socio-economic situation of developing countries'. The approach further 
reinforces the chances of the Agreement to live longer than its predecessor, the Kyoto 
                                                          
818 See section 2.2 above. 
819 See Articles 4.2 (f) and 4.2 (g) of the UNFCCC. 
820 Backer (note 51 above; 7); See also Mbeva (note 19 above; 8-9).  
821 Ibid Backer; see also section 5.3.7.1 below. 
822 See Mbeva (note 19 above; 9-10). In this regard, the curiosity of the author goes to the possibility of 
an opposite question: what will be the case for a former developed country that has becomes economically 
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be formally degraded from its rank of a developed country to become a developing country? Will it 
therefore have reduced its load of climate change to fit its new status? 
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(World Bank, 2015), but it claims to be a developing country in its INDC. Chile, South Korea and Mexico 
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Protocol,826  as it makes the Agreement bring more equity and justice into the climate 
change regime.    
 
Many aspects of the Paris differential regime can be seen throughout its provisions: 
Article 3 for instance calls for a “support” in favour of developing countries to allow 
them to effectively implement the Agreement, because parties are all invited to 
undertake and communicate ambitious and progressive climate change efforts over 
time.827 Article 4.1 creates a differentiation between developing and developed countries 
for the peaking of greenhouse gas emissions, recognising that the peaking would take 
longer to be reached by developing country parties than by the developed ones.828 In 
other words, there would be a certain degree of tolerance in favour of developing 
countries’ emissions augmentation after the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, 
comparatively to emissions from developed countries that do not benefit of such.  
 
The universality of the Paris Agreement that reinforces its differential approach brings 
a new dimension to the interpretation of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities in the climate change field.829 As also argued by Zhang830 a year before 
the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the world needs further reflections and 
reinterpretation of the CBDR principle in order to save the planet, in the sense of a new 
global agreement that will be legally binding for all, as also claimed by the Doha Climate 
Gateway. Besides, the Paris Agreement emphasises that country parties may take full 
account of the Equity principle, and the respective capabilities of parties in the 
implementation of the treaty, in the light of different national circumstances.831 The issue 
of emission mitigation or limitation, as well as the peaking of GHG emission are all the 
subject of its new differential treatment between countries.832   
 
                                                          
826 Ibid.  
827 See Article 3 of the Paris Agreement at note 40 above.  
828 Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement states: ‘in order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out 
in Article 2, parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, 
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830 Zhang (note 587 above; 443). 
831 Article 2.2 of the Paris Agreement states: ‘This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of 
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5.4.7.1. The “Equity and Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and 
Respective capabilities principle, in light of different national 
circumstances” under the Paris Agreement 
 
The CBDR principle is a pivotal principle in the climate change international regime.833 
It can be viewed as one way of integrating the environment and development at 
international level, as well as outlining the proportional commitments countries make in 
comparison to others; 834 it also refers to the “justness” of these commitments.835 Article 
2.2 of the Paris Agreement urges parties to implement the Agreement in reflection of 
Equity and the principle of CBDR-RC, in the light of different national circumstances.836 
The preamble of the Agreement makes the same call as Article 2.2.837 This shows that 
the Equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective capabilities 
principle occupy the centre of the Paris Agreement.838  
 
The basic formulation of the CBDR principle referred to in the climate change regime 
is found in the UNFCCC. It focuses on the “CBDR” radical elements, to which it 
alternatively adds the following elements depending on the contexts: i. the ‘respective 
capabilities and country parties’ social and economic conditions’, ii. the ‘respective 
capabilities’ element, and iii. the ‘parties’ specific national and regional development 
priorities, objectives and circumstances.’839 The UNFCCC also once associated the 
CBDR element with equity,840 whilst exhorting country parties to protect the climate 
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind in Article 3.1.841 
 
Compared to the UNFCCC formulation, one may say that the Paris Agreement chooses 
a formulation that is significantly different. It adds, and then intimately links to the basic 
                                                          
833 See section 2.3 above for more details on the CBDR principle. 
834 Pauw (note 153 above; 20). 
835 Ibid. 
836 Article 2.2 of the Paris Agreement; see also note 829 above. 
837 Preamble of the Paris Agreement. 
838 Refer to note 836 above.  
839 The preamble of the UNFCCC uses the formula: “CBDR and respective capabilities and their social 
and economic conditions.” Article 3.1 uses the formula: “CBDR and respective capabilities. Accordingly, 
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thereof.” Article 4.1 uses the formula: “CBDR and their specific national and regional development 
priorities, objectives and circumstances.” See section 2.3 above for more details.  
840 Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC; See also note 202 above. 




formulation of the CBDR two more elements that are the “Equity” and the “respective 
capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances”. The Agreement does so in 
order to render the interpretation of the CBDR principle more adequately towards the 
objective of the Agreement and thus avoid any future misuse of it by parties.842 A further 
aspect that shows the importance of the two added elements for the new regime is the 
frequency under which they are utilised under the Paris Agreement. Paris refers to the 
“respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances” element up to 
four times, and to the Equity element up to five times, whilst in the UNFCCC both 
elements are referred to only once, and not a single time in the Kyoto Protocol.843  
 
At the opening session of the COP 21, the UN General Assembly President Mogens 
Lykketoft addressed the negotiating parties to recall them that the Paris meeting needed 
to deliver a political agreement with equity and ambition at its core.844 Such insistence 
reinforced the importance of the Equity principle. Therefore, it is not surprising to notice 
that the Agreement has put it in the centre of its preoccupations, as claimed by some 
scholars prior to the adoption of the Paris Agreement.845 The thing is, over the years, 
there arose several concerns on whether the Equity principle was observed in the climate 
change regime.846 This question often led to deadlocks in negotiations, because some 
countries, based on the interpretation of the CBDR principle of 1992,847 seemed to act 
as if they were granted a conventional unrestricted liberty to emit, whilst others were the 
object of emissions bans.848  
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responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.  
843 Mentioned five times in the Paris Agreement, once in the UNFCCC, and not mentioned at all in the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
844 IISD (g) (note 662 above; 3). 
845 See for instance Werner (note 252 above; 166); See also Voigt (note 195 above; 50). 
846 Obergassel (note 13 above; 14).  





Prior to the COP21, there was already a controversy on whether to explicitly reference 
the Convention’s principle of CBDR-RC. 849 The USA opposed, including any 
references thereto in the Durban Platform’s decision, reading it as a code for continuing 
the UNFCCC Annex system.850 However, in 2014, the Chinese and US governments 
released a joint statement on climate change, in which both countries announced to be 
committed to reaching an ambitious 2015 universal climate change agreement that 
reflects the principle of CBDR and respective capabilities, “in light of different 
national circumstances”.851 It was evident that both main emitter countries agreed to 
add to the basic formulation of the CBDR the phrase “in light of different national 
circumstances”. The US demanded for a long time a “dynamic” interpretation of the 
CBDR, or even its ban from the climate change regime.852  
 
This addition from the US and China’s joint statement was almost automatically 
included in the Lima Call for Climate Action which was adopted a few weeks later. An 
attempt to also include it automatically in the Paris Agreement met resistance because 
of the pressure from developing countries, before they finally accepted it.853 Although 
developing countries won the battle of the re-iteration of the CBDR principle in the Paris 
Agreement, they lost on its new meaning. The addition of “in light of different national 
circumstances” to the CBDR’s basic formulation meant the end of the UNFCCC 
differential system, and the move beyond the static and rigid binary cleavage.854  
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good. 2. To this end, President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping reaffirmed the importance of 
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2015 agreement that reflects the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
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As also discussed by Lee,855 this evolution of the USA position suggested that the 
country became willing to adopt emissions mitigation targets in future, on the condition 
that the CBDR principle was formulated in a way to include binding responsibilities for 
both developing and developed countries. Similarly for China, although zealously 
advocating for the continuation of the Kyoto differential regime until a recent past, the 
joint statement proved the country’s will to move towards a revision of its interpretation 
of the CBDR principle in order to be able to take on emissions limitations targets.856 In 
the period leading to the COP 2015, calls towards a reinterpretation of the CBDR 
principle multiplied, in prospection for a more relevant new climate change regime. 
Scholars such as Werner857 and others made noticeable suggestions to that end.  
 
Developed countries historical responsibility  
 
Regarding the historical responsibility developed countries have towards the climate 
change, the Paris Agreement stays silent on the matter. It has removed any reference to 
the climate change historical responsibility that previously laid on the developed 
countries.  That is the reason why Foran858  argued that the Paris Agreement was an 
obscene regression on the founding principles of the UNFCCC which promised to deal 
forthrightly with the scale of the climate change crisis, and to ensure that the responsible 
for global warming pay the fair share of the costs associated with the effort to solve the 
problem. The preamble of the UNFCCC which states: “Noting that the largest share of 
historical and current global emissions of GHG has originated in developed countries 
…”859  had no equivalent in the Paris Agreement. This being, some scholars concluded 
that the acknowledgement of the climate change historical responsibility of developed 
countries was finally removed from the new treaty, and therefore banned from further 
considerations in future climate negotiations.860  
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This has pushed Bodansky to declare that the “firewall”861 represented by the traditional 
separation between countries was overturned at Paris.862 However, despite the 
aforementioned remark, the Paris Agreement still recognises that the “national 
circumstances” of developed countries were better in comparison with those of 
developing countries.863 That is why it maintains its request to see developed countries 
playing a leading role in the fight against climate change. Article 4.4 of the Paris 
Agreement is eloquent with that regard. It exhorts developed country parties to continue 
taking the lead through undertaking economy wide absolute emission reduction targets, 
whilst exhorting developing countries to continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and 
move towards economy wide emission reduction targets in the light of their national 
circumstances over time.864 Still, regarding this chapter of historical responsibility, 
Article 4.5 of the Agreement enjoins states to provide support to developing country 
parties for the implementation of their obligations under Article 4, recognising that only 
an enhanced support will allow them adopt higher climate ambitions.865  
 
We will conclude this section by considering the remark of Dubois866 about the pursuit 
of equality between country parties in the climate change regime: Dubois draws 
attention to the fact that, in the same manner as it was difficult to maintain the traditional 
differential treatment between developing and developed countries, it will also be 
difficult, if not a mistake, to seek for a formal equality between country parties of the 
new regime.867 The issue of differentiation between countries in the modern context of 
international climate change law has been reckoned as a matter of both fairness and 
effectiveness.868 To that extent, the Paris Agreement represents an evolution to the way 
country parties address the issue of differentiation.869 It has managed to avoid the trap 
that caught up the UNFCCC in 1992.870 Under the Paris Agreement, country parties are 
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still differentiated, but not like under the UNFCCC. The Agreement insures a balance 
between the necessity of climate change burden sharing and the urgency to interiorise 
principles such as fairness and equity, to preserve undiluted the effectiveness of the 
Agreement itself.   
 
5.4.8. The Greenhouse Gases emission mitigation by developing countries under 
the Paris Agreement  
 
5.4.8.1. Context of the application of the obligation to emission mitigation  
 
The international climate change response is organised around two strategies that are the 
mitigation of GHG emissions, and the adaptation to the effects of climate change.871 
Mitigation refers to any human intervention aiming at reducing the emissions of GHG 
in the atmosphere either by acting at their sources level or by enhancing their removal 
by “sinks”.872  In the last 200 years, the levels of CO2 have risen by over 30 percent, 
resulting in global temperature rise of about 0.6 – 0.8 degree Celsius.873   The Paris 
Agreement urges countries to work in order to limit the global temperature rise at well 
below two Celsius degrees. To reach that level of ambition, there is need for a global 
action on emission mitigation, especially from all the emitters, including those among 
developing countries.874 Because recent findings by Wei’s875 have attributed to 
developing countries 63-65 percent of current global emissions,876  and 39 –47 percent 
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of contribution to the global warming during the period from 1850 to 2005. Besides that, 
their emissions are most likely to continue increasing because some of them are planning 
to build large coal-fired power plants in the next years.877 It is against such a context that 
the Paris Agreement have introduced universal emissions mitigation obligation, on the 
base of which developing countries will make their contributions to the ongoing global 
effort to curb climate change. Regarding the said mitigation obligation, three features of 
the Paris Agreement seem important to be outlined:  
 
Firstly, from a country parties’ perspective, the Paris Agreement has two sorts of 
provisions: Provisions that apply to all country parties,878 and provisions that apply to 
specific groups of countries that present particular climate change vulnerabilities, as it 
is the case for the LDC, along with the small islands developing states.879 An illustration 
to this can be taken from Article 3 of the Paris Agreement which applies to all the 
countries, whereas Article 4.6 applies only to the LDC.    
 
Secondly, from a conditional perspective, the realisation of some obligations that parties 
have are conditional, whilst others are unconditional. For instance, the realisation of the 
obligations of developing countries as per Article 4 is conditioned to the support to be 
provided to them under the Agreement. Article 9.1 contains a similar exigency.880  
 
                                                          
Information available at: https://judithcurry.com/2016/08/16/cop21-developing-countries. (Accessed: 10 
September 2016); See also http://www.cgdev.org/media/developing-countries-are-responsible-63-
percent-current-carbon-emissions. (Accessed: 10 September 2016). 
877 ‘In an unusually stark warning, the World Bank president, Jim Yong Kim, noted that countries in south 
and south-east Asia were on track to build hundreds more coal-fired power plants in the next 20 years – 
despite promises made at Paris to cut greenhouse gas emissions and pivot to a clean energy future.’ 
Information available at: http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/05/06/world-bank-asia-coal-power-
plant-plans-are-disaster-for-climate.  (Accessed: 10 September 2016). 
878 See for instance Articles 3 and 4.6 of the Paris Agreement. 
879 Article 4.6 of the Paris Agreement provides ‘The least developed countries and small island developing 
States may prepare and communicate strategies, plans and actions for low greenhouse gas emissions 
development reflecting their special circumstances. See also Articles 9.4, 9.9, 11.1, 13.3 of the Paris 
Agreement; Dubois (note 32 above; 158). 
880Article 4.5 of the Paris Agreement states: ‘Support shall be provided to developing country Parties for 
the implementation of this Article, in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11, recognizing that enhanced 
support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions.’ ; Article 9.1 of the 
Paris Agreement: ‘Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing 
country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations 




Thirdly, from a legal nature perspective, some of the obligations of the Agreement are 
of a substantial nature, whereas others are of a procedural nature.881 The substantial 
obligations relate to quantifiable objects (for instance the volume of emissions 
mitigation targets), they are not legally binding. 882 This means a country does not have 
any obligation regarding the amount of emissions it intends to reduce, accounting as its 
national contribution.883 Obligations of a procedural nature set the rules for certain 
process to take place.884 They relate to issues such as the preparation, communication 
and maintenance of successive NDCs. Obligations of a procedural nature are the ones 
that are legally binding in the Paris Agreement.885 Which means that countries are under 
obligation to observe the standards of conduct as well as the procedures instituted by the 
Agreement. For instance, countries are under obligation to prepare and submit to the 
UNFCCC secretariat their NDC every 5 years, irrespectively of the content or the 
adequacy of the pledges therein.886 Developing countries mitigation obligations are 
drawn from the above types of provisions.887 
 
However, the current study will analyse the mitigation obligation of developing 
countries from a substantial and procedural angle, because it contains the first two sorts 
of obligations. Articles 3 and 4 of the Agreement contain the key provisions regarding 
developing countries’ emissions mitigation obligations. Nevertheless, the two articles 
are not to be approached in an isolated manner. One must envisage them in conjunction 
with other related dispositions dispersed throughout the 27 other articles of the 
Agreement. The following comprises obligations under the Paris Agreement, and can be 
regarded as an outline of the main features of the new emission mitigation regime for 
the developing countries:   
 
o The obligation to prepare, communicate, and most importantly to maintain 
developing country parties’ NDCs that represent a progression over time, and 
                                                          
881 See for instance paragraph 4 of Article 4 has a substantial nature, whereas paragraph 2 has a procedural 
nature.  
882 See for instance Article 4.4 of the Paris Agreement.  
883 Ibid.   
884  See Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. 
885 Ibid.  
886  See Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement. 




reflect countries’ highest possible ambition, as per Article 3.1 and 3.2, Article 
4.2. 
o The obligation to pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of 
achieving the objectives contained in the NDCs, as per Article 4.2 and Article 
4.3. 
o The obligation to undertake environmental integrity, economy wide emission 
reduction or limitation targets, as per Article 4.13. 
o The obligation to cap GHG emissions in a long term run, as per Article 4.1.  
o The obligation towards the Agreement’s transparency mechanism as per 
Article 4.8.   
 
5.4.8.2. The obligation to prepare, communicate and maintain successive 
ambitious National Determined Contributions  
 
Article 3 of the Paris Agreement provides as follows:  
 
“As NDC to the global response to climate change, all parties are to undertake and 
communicate ambitious efforts as defined in Articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 with the view 
of achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2. The efforts of all 
parties will represent a progression over time, while recognising the need to support 
developing country parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement.”888  
 
Article 3 of the Paris Agreement urges all the parties to undertake and communicate 
ambitious efforts regarding the fight against climate change, with the view of achieving 
the purpose of the Agreement as set out in its Article 2, as discussed above. It also 
requires that the efforts of countries may represent a progression over time, and reflect 
each time a country’s highest possible ambition. The preparation and submission of the 
INDCs by a country are legally binding obligations. This is because of the use of the 
verbal form “shall” in Article 4.2 which also enjoins to each party to prepare, 
communicate and maintain successive NDC that it intends to achieve. Article 4.2 of the 
Paris Agreement provides as follows: 
 
                                                          




“Each party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDC that it intends to 
achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving 
the objectives of such contributions.” 889 
 
The NDC or INDC are “bottom-up” based climate change actions that countries intend 
to undertake at the period post 2020.890 National Determined Contributions (NDCs) are 
equivalent to INDC. Countries are currently submitting to the UNFCCC secretariat their 
INDC. Once a government of a country party has ratified the Agreement, its INDCs turn 
to become an NDC.891 Which means that the intention the considered government 
expressed under its INDC has been now confirmed as a national contribution. The INDC 
practice was adopted in the climate change regime by decision 1/CP.19 at the COP 19 
in Warsaw, in preparation of the COP21.892 The literature sometimes refers to INDC as 
national pledges. The approach of the INDC is praised by scholars such as Bodle893 who 
thinks that it is thanks to the INDC system that the adoption of the Paris Agreement was 
made possible. Because countries would not feel legally bound to meet the pledges they 
make under NDC. Although many others are of an opposing view, especially regarding 
the disputable potential of the INDC to fill the current emission gap, and solve the 
climate problem.894  
 
Choosing the NDC approach has also earned to the Paris Agreement itself some 
reproaches: Firstly, the submission of an NDC every five years is a legally binding 
obligation under the Agreement, whereas the content of the NDC are legally non-
binding. Meaning countries are under obligation to prepare and submit NDC, but what 
countries pledges in is not covered by the law. Besides this aspect of the problem, the 
Agreement also fails to indicate whether the subsequent NDCs will cover which period 
of time; meaning that countries are urged to prepare and submit their NDCs every five 
                                                          
889 Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement. 
890 See note 3.2.3 above for details about the bottom up approach; See also Section 3.1.9.2 above for more 
details about the INDC. 
891 F. Röser et al ‘After Paris: What is next for Intended Nationally Determined Contributions?’ (2015) 
New Climate Institute briefing papers at 2. Available at: https://mitigationpartnership.net/indcs-after-
paris, (Accessed: 12 August 2016). 
892 The INDC from the beginning were not an obligation imposed to countries. See Decision 1/CP.19 2014 
of the UNFCCC, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf. (Accessed: 11 
August 2016); see also section 31.9 above. 
893 Bodle (b) (note 692 above; 2). 




years, while they are not told about the period of time a single NDC will cover; Secondly, 
the Agreement does not institute any assessment mechanism to refer to in judging the 
adequacy of NDCs’ ambition; Thirdly, to realise its highly constraining and ambitious 
objective, the Paris scheme entirely relies on country parties’ national pledges, whilst 
the adequacy of countries’ national pledge to meet the Paris’ objective is being 
disputed.895 The Agreement does so based on the assumption that complementary 
mechanisms such as persuasive impact of the publicity of the INDC, the consultation 
mechanism, as well as the global stocktake operation will put sufficient public pressures 
on states to push them to comply with their obligations through effective contributions 
to the implementation of their respective NDCs.896 Lastly, with many aspects the 
Agreement also lacks clarity on the mechanisms of implementation of countries’ 
obligations.897  
 
Ambitious efforts that are referred to in Article 3 are for instance the radical greening of 
developing country parties’ economies over time, which have to result in a total phase 
out of carbon dioxide net emissions in the course of the current century.898 But still the 
question remains regarding what level of ambition in a country’s national pledge can be 
judged as acceptable at the international level? Since the Agreement provided for no 
standard which is supposed to guide the assessments. Not only that, but the Agreement 
remains silent regarding the substantial content of the NDCs, besides the absence of 
emission mitigation targets. As discussed above, negotiators in Paris were convinced 
that there were no opportunities to prescribe specific emission reductions targets, 
because this could compromise countries’ participation, especially the major emitters. 
The underlying idea is that countries will eventually choose their own emission 
reductions targets under the NDCs.899   
 
                                                          
895 Bodle (b) (note 692 above; 2). 
896  Ibid. 
897 Many technical works regarding the implementation of the Agreement were left to be fine-tuned during 
the COP 22 in Marrakesh, Egypt, November 2016. 
898 The UNEP’s Working Definition of a Green Economy is: ‘A system of economic activities related to 
the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services that result in improved human 
wellbeing over the long term, while not exposing future generations to significant environmental risks and 
ecological scarcities. More details on green economy available at: 
https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/im/wscbteeb-mena-01/other/wscbteeb-mena-01-unep-green-economy-
arab-en.pdf. (Accessed: 17 September 2016). 




Nonetheless, the lack of legally binding character from a treaty does not open ways for 
non-compliant behaviours from its parties.900 In fact, the thought behind the lack of a 
legally binding character attached to the issue of emissions reduction in the Paris 
Agreement was to give to its country parties the latitude to determine themselves as to 
what extent they are willing to go in reducing their national emissions, as a contribution 
to the global effort to curb climate change; so that once countries have themselves 
adopted their own national emission limitations or mitigation targets, they may better 
comply with, because the INDCs are done in the light of countries respective 
capabilities. Besides, if one considers the application to the Paris Agreement of the 
international law principle of “pacta sunt servanda”901 it follows that parties must 
indeed honour in good faith each one of the obligations enshrined in the Agreement they 
are part of, regardless of the binding character of its wordings.  
 
NDCs are of a pivotal importance for the Paris’ climate change regime, because it is 
from the compilation of country parties’ INDCs that it becomes possible to pre-
determine whether or not the world is on the track to achieve the long term goals of the 
Paris Agreement. This actually is what took place during the period between COP20 up 
to the end of COP21, when 187 countries representing approximately 95 percent of 
global GHG emissions submitted their INDCs. 902 In this case unfortunately, the NDCs’ 
compilation proven to be insufficient to meet the needed level of ambitions to fulfil the 
goal of the Paris Agreement.  The aggregate level of national pledges revolved around 
55Gt CO2eq in 2030, provided all the INDCs are fully implemented, whilst global 
emissions needed to go down to around 42 GtCO2eq,
903 based on a least-cost 2°C 
scenario.904 The emission gap therefore was about 13 Gt. This gap meant that the global 
temperature will increase by about 2.7°C by the end of the current century, and will 
continue rising thereafter.905  Although the INDC approach does not solve the climate 
                                                          
900 Bodansky (g) (note 741 above; 4). 
901 See note 762 above for the meaning of “pacta sunt servanda”. 
902 Bodle (b) (note 692 above; 2). 
903 Ibid 
904 ‘A least cost scenario is a scenario based on a type of pricing where a business sets a comparatively 
low price in order to enhance the demand for its product among consumers, as well as its competitive 
position in the market.’ Information and more available at: 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/low-cost.html. (Accessed: 12 October 2016). 
905 The possibility for the 2.7°C to be met is only a 50% chance. See note 700 above. See also Röser 




problem so far,906 scholars such as Röser907 praised it, arguing that a climate scenario 
with the INDC strategy was better than a climate scenario without.  
 
Besides the NDC’s main obligation as discussed above, there are some other underlying 
obligations attached to the NDCs’ strategy, namely the obligation to formulate and 
submit the NDC to the UNFCCC secretariat every five years,908 and the obligation for 
each country’s NDCs to represent an improvement in comparison to its predecessor, and 
reflect the highest possible contribution that the country was able to deliver.909 
 
5.4.8.2.1. The NDC five years’ submissions cyclic process 
 
Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement institutes a five years cycle process for the submission 
of countries’ NDCs.910 Through these five years cycles, parties are to “ratchet up” their 
efforts to keep the global temperature rise “well below 2°C, and further pursue efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”911 The Agreement 
seeks to ensure that each release of NDCs by countries are accurately informed by the 
outcomes of the global stocktake referred to in Article 14, in order to further the climate 
change actions that will take place during the next NDC turns. The five years’ process 
gives also gives enough time to countries to improve their ambitions if required.  
 
After the submission of their initial INDCs, developing countries are required to update 
and communicate their next NDCs at least every 5 years, starting by 2020, in order to 
allow the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement to undertake 
its first global stocktake based on country parties’ NDC in 2023.912 The stocktaking will 
                                                          
906 Ibid Röser.  
907 Ibid.  
908 Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement. 
909 Article 4.3 of the Paris Agreement states: ‘Each Party’s successive Nationally Determined Contribution 
will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current Nationally Determined Contribution and 
reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.’ 
910 Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement states: ‘Each Party shall communicate a Nationally Determined 
Contribution every five years in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and be informed by 
the outcomes of the global stocktake referred to in Article 14.’ 
911 IISD (g) (note 662 above; 43).  
912 Article 14.2 of the Paris Agreement states: ‘The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall undertake its first global stocktake in 2023 and every five years 




be occurring midway through the NDC cycle, every five years after 2023,913 which 
implicitly suggests that the NDC will have to cover at minimum a period of 5 years from 
one stocktaking to the next, in order to be reviewed if indicated.914 Because, as stated in 
Article 14.3 above, the outcome of a global stocktake will inform parties whether to 
update or enhance the next round of NDCs.915 
 
Article 13.7 puts developing countries parties under legally binding obligation to 
regularly release the information regarding their national inventory report of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHG.916 There is a further 
legally binding obligation on developing countries to provide any information necessary 
to track the progress made in implementing and achieving a country’s previous (or 
current) NDC.917 Moreover, as per the prescription of Article 4.13, developing countries 
parties are expected to improve their national environmental accuracy, integrity, 
completeness, transparency, comparability and consistency, and ensure to have avoided 
double counting.918 The concerned improvements will transpire through a country’s 
NDC.  
 
As it was the case for similar treaties such as the CBD,919 the implementation of the 
above provisions will require the utilisation of considerable information and resources, 
at national and local levels, and will therefore necessitate the development of country 
wide climate change plans and programmes that foster low GHG emissions 
                                                          
outcome of the global stocktake shall inform Parties on updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined 
manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well 
as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action.’ 
913 IISD (g) (note 662 above; 43). 
914 Article 14.2 of the Paris Agreement. 
915 Ibid Article 14.3. 
916 Article 13.7 of the Paris Agreement states: ‘Each Party shall regularly provide the following 
information:  
(a) A national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases, prepared using good practice methodologies accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to the Paris Agreement; (b) Information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving 
its Nationally Determined Contribution under Article 4.’ See section 2.1 for more details on GHG sinks 
and emission. 
917 Article 13.7 (b) of the Paris Agreement. 
918 Ibid the Paris Agreement; Article 4.13 
919 The Convention for Biological Diversity, Available at http://www.cbd.int/gbo1/chap-02.shtml 
(Accessed: 




developments.920 The stocktaking report on countries’ NDCs will oblige countries to 
decide whether to develop new plans, or review plans that are already being 
implemented. In either option, a considerable work of technical capacity building, legal 
and institutional preparedness and implementation, as well as financial capacity building 
will need to take place in developing country parties.921 However, one will have to bear 
in mind the complexity of the task, because of the varying national circumstances of 
developing countries, as they do not all face similar climate change challenges. It follows 
that some of them may find it profoundly challenging and therefore not possible to 
undertake the necessary changes in the absence of any financial and technical assistance, 
whereas others may have little to do with that respect.922  
 
5.4.8.2.2. Obligation for subsequent NDCs to reflect the highest possible level of 
ambitions compared to its predecessors  
 
Article 4.3 put developing countries under obligation to produce successive NDCs that 
reflect progressive higher ambitions on emissions reduction and climate actions over 
time. Article 4.3 states:  
 
“Each party’s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression 
beyond the party’s then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest 
possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.”923 
 
It also remains silent regarding the content, standards, or targets of the emissions to be 
reduced.924 This in other words means that countries are under obligation to produce the 
highest possible level of ambition of NDCs based on their own national targets and 
standards, because no statutory standards have been provided under the Agreement, in 
which case countries are themselves, judge and party. Not only that, but the obligation 
under Article 4.2 has a legally non-binding character, because of the use of the word 
“will” in the provision, in order to produce the obligation.925  
                                                          
920 X.V. Tilburg et al ‘Paving the way for low-carbon development strategies.’ (2011) ECN at i-vi.  
921 Ibid. 
922 Brunnée (note 153 above; 595).  
923 Article 4.3 of the Paris Agreement. 
924 Bodle (b) (note 692 above; 2). 




Article 4.3 above read in conjunction with Article 4.4 gives more clarity about the 
requirement of the ‘highest possible ambition’ that is asked from parties.926 Article 4.4 
exhorts developing country parties to continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and 
further encourages them to move over time towards economy wide emission reduction 
or limitation targets, in the light of their different national circumstances.927 The 
obligation under Article 4.3 might arguably constitute a bridge between the climate 
change domestic measures and the NDCs countries are to submit. This is because, in 
order for each NDC to reflect the highest possible level of ambition over time, there 
must be progressive domestic mitigation efforts that countries undertake, as also 
required by Article 3 of the Paris Agreement. Any progress then that is realised by a 
country pursuing Articles 3 and 4.3 will be reflected in its subsequent submitted NDCs. 
 
However, what else seems captivating in Article 4.3 above is that the obligation it creates 
might constitute the shadow of a future emission reduction legally binding scheme that 
country parties will have to negotiate and adopt under the Agreement. This arguably 
seems to be true for developing countries in particular, given their fast growing 
participation rate in the global emissions,928 whilst there is a claim that the zero carbon 
emission point has to be reached rapidly in order to meet the Agreement’s goal.929 
Scientists are even expecting the bulk of greenhouse emissions to be mainly coming 
from developing countries in the next decades.930  
 
The above fear is tempered by the principle that countries adopt the highest possible 
ambition in climate change related affairs. It sets out the standard of care that is now to 
be exercised by every country party to the Paris Agreement.931 It implies a “due diligence 
standard”932 by virtue of which governments are to act in proportion to the risk at stake 
                                                          
926 Dubois (note 32 above; 158). 
927 See section 5.3.8.4 for details on Article 4.4 of the Paris Agreement. 
928 Refer to note 631 above. 
929 See section 5.3.2 above for the objective of the Paris Agreement. 
930 Refer to note 36, 333 and 339 above. 
931 Voigt (note 803 above; 28). 
932 ‘The concept of due diligence in international law is a means to identify the duty of care to be exercised 
in international affairs. In order to demonstrate to have acted diligently, a State is expected to prevent 
foreseeable, significant damage, or at least minimize the risk of such harm. The concept has been defined 
as requiring ‘Such a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and 
ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent [person, enterprise, State] under the particular 
circumstances; not measured by any absolute standard, but depending on the relative facts of the special 




and to the means at their disposal.933 Developing countries therefore are committed to 
taking all appropriate and adequate climate change measures in line with their best 
capabilities and responsibilities in order to effectively contribute to the progressive 
achievement of the long term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.934 
 
5.4.8.3. Obligation to pursue domestic mitigation measures by developing 
countries 
 
Unlike the UNFCCC,935 the Paris Agreement does not provide for any specific 
mitigation obligation to be applied on developing countries as a separated group.936 The 
Paris Regime is rather universal,937 and as a central rule, it equally applies to all 
countries, which are equally urged to contribute to the achievement of its objective. 
However, country parties bring their contributions based on the CBDR principle,938 as 
per the preamble, and Article 2.2 of the Paris Agreement which proclaims that parties to 
the Agreement are guided by the principles of Equity and Common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national 
circumstances.939 However, based on Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement, developing 
country parties are put under legally binding obligation to pursue domestic mitigation 
measures that are consistent to each countries’ NDCs.940 Article 4.2 states:  
 
“Each party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDC that it intends to 
achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving 
the objectives of such contributions.” 
  
Domestic mitigation measures referred to in Article 4.2 above are measures addressing 
the GHG emissions drivers at national and local levels, as analysed under section 2.1 
                                                          
In some areas of international law, it has even become the prevailing legal standard for assessing the 
adequacy of government action.’ Information available at: http://www.qil-qdi.org/paris-agreement-
standard-conduct-parties/. (Accessed: 12 September 2016). 
933 Voigt (note 803 above; 28). 
934 Ibid.  
935 Article 4 of the UNFCCC defines developed and developing countries commitments separately. See 
section 3.1.2 above for more details on the UNFCCC. 
936 Bodle (note 692 above; 22). 
937 Röser (note 891 above; 2).   
938 Ibid.  
939 Preamble and Article 2.2 of the Paris Agreement. 




above.941 Emissions drivers are the factors that originate either directly or either 
indirectly the GHG emissions. They may be immediate, or underlying, or even be among 
the policy measures.942 As said in the previous section, the obligation to pursue domestic 
mitigation measures by developing countries is arguably interlinked with the obligation 
that countries’ successive NDC must represent a progression over time, ever reflecting 
the country’s highest possible ambition.943 Because it is only through improved and 
progressive domestic measures that a country might be able to produce each time higher 
ambitious NDCs, in satisfaction of its statutory obligation.  
 
Although developing countries are thus obliged under Article 4.2, Article 4.5 recognises 
that they will be able to satisfy the content of the obligation only if they receive enhanced 
assistance in order to enable them do so. Article 4.2 provides as follows:  
 
“Support shall be provided to developing country parties for the implementation of this 
Article, in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11, recognising that enhanced support for 
developing country parties will allow for higher ambitions in their actions.”944 
 
However, some observers from developing countries have started complaining about 
their countries’ participation in the Paris Agreement.945 The issue is in the uncertainty 
of the Paris’ mechanism of climate change financial assistance towards developing 
countries. The above observers are asking developing countries governments not to 
ratify the Agreement quickly, because, on their view, developing countries were flawed 
under the Paris Agreement. 946 Their claim is that developing countries should first seek 
to secure solid guarantees for the financial support towards the implementation of the 
                                                          
941 See section 2.1 for more details on drivers of GHG emission.  
942 Ibid.  
943 Article 4.1, Article 4.2 and Article 4.3 of the Paris Agreement. 
944 Ibid Article 4.5. 
945 ‘There is an increasing feeling that developing countries have been flowed under the Paris Agreement, 
as shown in a key recommendation in a five-page briefing from Sir Meena Raman, on behalf of an 
influential Malaysia-based think tank (the third World Network) that was sent to members of the Arab 
Group of nations in March 2016. It will be more advantageous to developing countries to wait for 2016 
and not rush into ratifying the Paris Agreement. Otherwise, we lose the political leverage that is critical 
to secure the necessary conditions that will enable developing countries to meet their obligations.’ 
Information available at: http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/03/29/developing-nations-urged-to-
boycott-paris-agreement-signing/. (Accessed: 18 September 2016). 




Agreement, as per Article 4.5 above, in the absence of which they will be the big losers 
of the Paris deal. 947 
 
It might be that such stance from developing countries analysts is being fuelled by 
reasoning regarding the removal of developed countries’ climate change historical 
responsibility from the Paris Agreement. The thing is that in the absence of the climate 
change historical responsibility, there is no reason for the application of the polluter pays 
principle in climate change related matters as far as developed countries early emissions 
are concerned.948 The polluter pays principle is the environmental law principle upon 
which builds the rational that finances for fighting climate change had to come from 
those who have caused it.949 This in turn justified the mobilisation for a support for 
developing countries from the developed ones. The support thus provided to developing 
countries was kind of a compensation for the adverse effects of a climate change 
provoked by the developed countries.  
 
Section 2.1 above gives a summary of the GHG emission mitigation divers that are 
concerned by any domestic mitigation measures, especially the ones to be undertaken 
by developing country parties.  
 
Although being of a universal application, the provision under Articles 6.4 - 6.9 of the 
Paris Agreement seems relevant to be mentioned here, as it may be referred to by 
developing countries pursuant to their emission mitigation plans. Article 6.4 – 6.9 
establishes a new mechanism which aims to facilitate the realisation of country parties’ 
emission mitigation obligations as it was the case for the CDM under the Kyoto 
Protocol,950 but this time with a broader scope, compare to the CDM under the Kyoto 
Protocol. This is because all the parties that will be using the Mechanism of Articles 6.4 
                                                          
947 Ibid.  
948 Principle 16 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment And Development proclaims: ‘National 
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of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and 
investment.’ See note 20 above. 
949 For more details about the Polluter Pays Principle in Environmental Law, see Kidd (note 306 above; 
7). 





– 6.9 above will be expected to firstly have some form of mitigation commitments that 
they are being compliant with.951 This was not the case for the Kyoto Protocol under 
which developed countries alone being the initiators and funders of CDM had mitigation 
obligations, whereas developing countries whose role were limited at hosting projects, 
were not subjected to any commitment supposed to be met first. The Paris mechanism 
aims at delivering an overall mitigation outcome in contribution to lowering the global 
emissions of GHG,952 and further seeks to secure net mitigation impacts being not 
focused on carbon offsetting alone, as it was the case for the CDM under the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
 
5.4.8.4. The obligation to undertake economy wide emission reduction or 
limitation targets over time  
 
Article 4.4 of the Paris Agreement exhorts developing countries parties as follows: 
 
“Developing country parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are 
encouraged to move over time towards economy wide emission reduction or limitation 
targets in the light of different national circumstances.”953 
 
Despite the temporal imprecision regarding this obligation that has to be realised in an 
imprecise future, developing countries are indeed urged to undertake economy wide 
emission reduction or limitation targets as soon as they are able to. Although this will 
be effective only over time, this provision embodies one of the categorical shifts that are 
brought by the Paris Agreement comparatively to the UNFCCC, because it prescribes 
future substantial mitigation efforts to be undertaken by developing countries.954  
 
The obligation under Article 4.4 is to be envisaged in conjunction with the prescriptions 
of Article 4.1 above,955 along with the provision of Article 4.5, because they all abound 
                                                          
951 Lawyers Responding to Climate Change (LRI) ‘Commitments by developing country parties under the 
Paris Agreement’ (February 2016) Briefing paper at 3. Available at: http://legalresponseinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Commitments-by-Developing-Country-Parties-under-the-PA.pdf. (Accessed: 
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952 Article 6.4 (d)) of the Paris Agreement. 
953 Ibid Article 4.4. 
954 Dubois (note 32 above; 158). 
955 Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement states: “In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out 




in the sense of encouraging developing countries to continue enhancing their mitigation 
efforts, and move over time towards economy wide emission reduction or limitation 
targets in the light of countries’ national circumstances.956 The same observation 
concerns Article 4.19 which also commits to developing countries the formulation and 
communication of long term greenhouse gas emission development strategies on the 
basis of the CBDR-RC principle, in the light of their different national circumstances.957  
 
The emission mitigation that developing countries are to undertake represent 
considerable efforts to be deployed towards a low emission carbon development.958 
However, as observed by Kidd,959 it appears today more recommendable that developing 
countries may undertake national assessments to find out whether the official 
pronouncements on the contribution of countries to the global effort to curb climate 
change are being backed up by appropriate mitigation actions for instance, as it is the 
focus of the present study. This exercise once done will be informative for the 
implementation of developing countries obligations under the Paris Agreement, because 
of the real dangers that exists on some developing countries not to be able to comply 
with their obligations under the Paris Agreement due to diverse factors.  
 
As also observed by Paul Collier,960 to address climate change, carbon emissions need 
to be curtailed in developing countries as well, whereas the poorest countries have a 
strong interest in economic growth in order to address the mass poverty challenge which 
is their current experience.961 But this can be done only through massive GHG emissions 
due to the use of cheap energy affordable to the poorest countries. 962 Therefore, the 
objective of quickly reaching a zero emission scenario and the need for the economic 
development of poor countries seems to potentially be in conflict. Global restrictions on 
                                                          
recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions 
thereafter in accordance with the best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic 
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956 Article 4.4 and Article 4.5 of the Paris Agreement.  
957 Ibid Article 4.19. 
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Effective Climate Regime’ (2015) 423 at 423-424.  
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carbon energy could impede the development of poor countries by denying them cheap 
energy, and also directly threaten the income of those poor countries which export 
carbon fuels.963  
 
The obligation to move towards economy wide emission reductions and limitation 
targets by developing countries will therefore be among the main challenges that they 
will face under the Paris Regime. This is because the economies of developing countries 
are weak so far and are still growing in the sense of their developmental objectives. 
Therefore, any adopted strategy for the transition towards a wide emission reductions 
regime may amount to a slowing down of national economies, in the event of improper 
considerations, planning or implementation, as also suggested by an abundant 
literature.964 Therefore, to help alleviate these challenges, the Agreement begs for a 
support to be provided to developing country parties for the implementation of Article 
4, recognising that an enhanced support will allow them to deploy higher ambitions in 
their actions.965 
 
Considering the required urgency of action to curb climate change, what remains unclear 
is whether the emission reduction of Article 4 will be successfully achieved on the basis 
of the current bottom up approach of the Agreement; or if probably, future negotiations 
will be engaged under the UNFCCC to bring back (to a certain extent) a top down 
approach in order to equitably and bindingly share the efforts of GHG mitigation 
between countries for more consistency with the objective of the Convention.966 This is 
because of the growing fear that the compilation of countries’ NDCs continue failing to 
meet the scientific requirement for the objective of 2 degrees Celsius under the 
Agreement. In addition, the long term goal of the Paris Agreement constitutes a strong 
signal towards various stakeholders’ gradual turn to the direction of a total 
decarbonisation of the economy in a closer future.  
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Global emissions are continually growing, thereby deepening the global emission gap. 
Meanwhile, the Paris Agreement is relying on trusting that countries will act with 
fairness and make their NDCs ambitions higher in order to meet the indicated scientific 
requirement for a temperature increase limited at 2 degrees Celsius compared to the pre-
industrial era, at the end of the current century. Countries will act accordingly on the 
basis of their respective capabilities, yet it is broadly acknowledged that any reference 
to countries’ respective capabilities is vague, broad and imprecise, as recalled in an 
Advisory Opinion of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, released in 
2011.967 The same opinion is being shared by some scholars’ that are also expressing 
their concerns regarding the uncertainties around the possibilities to reach the objective 
of the Paris Agreement.968 
 
5.4.8.5. The obligation to “cap” GHG emissions in a long term run  
 
Article 4.1 urges parties to aim at reaching global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions 
as soon as possible, in order to achieve the long term temperature goal of the 
Agreement.969 The obligation to cap GHG emissions in a long term run is non-binding 
regarding the wording used by the provision for its set up. The Agreement further 
recognises that the peaking will take longer for developing country parties than for 
developed countries, and that the emissions trajectory will be determined ‘on the basis 
of equity’.970 Following the wordings of Article 4.1, the long term objective to reduce 
global emissions is planned to take place in three phases: firstly, the reduction of the 
current increase, secondly the peaking of the emissions as soon as possible until the 
reaching of a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by 
                                                          
967 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 1 February 2011, Responsibilities and Obligations of 
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http://www.vox.com/2016/4/5/11361390/coal-plant-pipeline-china-india. (Accessed: 10 October 2016). 
969 Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement; See also note 314 above. 




sinks, in the second half of this century, and ultimately the declining of emissions, with 
the final goal of balancing all anthropogenic emissions with removal by "carbon 
sinks".971  
 
Developing countries therefore are exhorted to follow the Paris’ global emission 
mitigation pathway, as the Agreement ascertains that the peaking of emissions will take 
longer for them.  However, the Agreement does not specify the years on when global 
emissions are supposed to reach the peak, or even to equal a net zero. And furthermore, 
in Article 4.1 the wording “balance between emissions and removals” is ambiguous and 
is not necessarily synonymous to a “net zero”.972 Therefore, the same worries expressed 
by the scholars in previous sections may as well be considered in the current section, 
regarding the adequacy of the strategies and the objective of the Agreement. 
 
5.4.8.6. Obligations towards the transparency mechanism of the Agreement  
 
The Paris Agreement establishes a common transparency and accountability mechanism 
under Article 13.1 as follows: 
  
“In order to build mutual trust and confidence and to promote effective implementation, 
an enhanced transparency framework for action and support, with built-in flexibility 
which takes into account parties’ different capacities and builds upon collective 
experience is hereby established.” 
 
Besides, in order to give more effectiveness to the above transparency mechanism, 
Article 4.8 introduces a new obligation for developing countries, which did not exist 
under the previous regime, to provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency 
and understanding while communicating their NDCs. Article 4.8 of the Paris Agreement 
Provides as follows:   
“In communicating their NDC, all parties shall provide the information necessary for 
clarity, transparency and understanding in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any 
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relevant decisions of the COP serving as the meeting of the parties to the Paris 
Agreement.”973 
 
To understand the ambition of countries’ NDCs and further track the progress regarding 
the implementation of the Agreement, the quality of information provided in NDCs is 
crucial.974 That is the reason why the Paris Agreement put all the countries (including 
the developing countries) under legally binding obligation with that regard.975 The role 
of the transparency mechanism is relevant at both country level and at global level. At a 
country level, the very accurate information that serves the transparency mechanism 
offers to countries themselves a good base for comparison between successive NDCs’ 
ambitions, as per their obligations under the Agreement. At the global scale, 
understanding what parties intend to do in their NDCs is important, because it enables 
multilateral stakeholders to compare the fairness and Equity of each contribution.976 Still 
from a global perspective, transparent information is helpful as a basis for aggregating 
data and assessing progress towards the collective ambition.977  
 
The Paris Agreements’ compliance mechanism is only “facilitative”, and lacks a legally 
binding character.978 Although the Agreement has legal force over ratifying parties, it 
does not provide for any enforcement mechanisms or legal sanctions to address parties’ 
non-compliance behaviours.979 Therefore, in order to solve this gap, and ensure that 
countries comply with their statutory obligations, the Agreement has established such a 
transparency and accountability mechanism that promotes a due diligence of conduct 
from country parties regarding their NDCs.980 The transparency mechanism comprises 
the transparency of actions (Article 13.5) and the transparency for supports (Article 
13.6). 
 
The global climate is an international public good. With the terrestrial atmosphere being 
an internationally shared good, it follows that there is always a potential for a free-riding 
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behaviour, cheating, or even disputes over climate change burden sharing issues, 
because of the international character of the responsibilities towards its protection.981 
Not only that, but the ultimate goal of the Paris Agreement itself tells more about the 
necessity of an established process that insures the international community that the 
global effort to curb the climate change as supported by countries’ pledges is effective 
and is based on rational plans and relevant figures, and is able to phase out any GHG 
within the definite timeframes.982  
 
The transparency mechanism can further serve to publicise the actions of states, allow 
timely detections of countries’ deviation from expected paths, and formulate corrective 
measures.983 However, the “transparency framework” announced under the Agreement 
has not yet been fleshed out. Analysts on climate change related matters predict that to 
be the most relevant field of work in the coming years in order to guarantee an effective 
implementation of the Paris Agreement.984 
 
The transparency mechanism is one of the key features of the new universal climate 
change regime the Paris Agreement has instituted. Although some analysts emit 
criticism towards it, arguing that it is “merely” facilitative in nature because it lacks an 
enforcement mechanism, the truth is that the transparency mechanism occupies the heart 
of the obligations in the Paris Agreement. On the view of Busby985 every other obligation 
under the Paris Agreement revolve around country parties’ compliance with the 
transparency mechanism, which serves as a safeguard for the NDCs.  Justice Brandeis986 
once admonished: “sunlight is the “best disinfectant”. The ambition of the transparency 
mechanism is to contribute to putting states under obligation to carry out their NDCs, 
and that by so doing, the Agreement hope to have greater chances to reach its objective, 
because if a country party does not honour its obligation under the Agreement, thanks 
to the transparency mechanism, other parties will be aware of it, which will subject them 
to a peer and public pressure.987  
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5.4.8.7. The Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation of 
forests  
 
Article 5.1 of the Paris Agreement establishes an aspirational commitment towards the 
reduction of emissions that come from the deforestation and the degradation of forests 
in developing countries. In other words, it refers to the REDD+ initiative as discussed 
in section 3.1.4 above.988 Article 5.1 provides as follow:  
 
“1. Parties should take action to conserve and enhance, as appropriate, sinks and 
reservoirs of GHG as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1(d), of the Convention, 
including forests. 2. Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, 
including through results-based payments, the existing framework as set out in related 
guidance and decisions already agreed under the Convention for: policy approaches and 
positive incentives for activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries; and alternative policy 
approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and 
sustainable management of forests, while reaffirming the importance of incentivising, 
as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches.” 
 
The conservation and management of emission sinks and reservoirs were already part of 
parties’ commitments under the UNFCCC,989 but not under the Kyoto Protocol. Using 
the formula: “parties should take action to conserve and enhance…” the Paris 
Agreement puts countries’ obligation to conserve and manage emission sinks and 
reservoirs (the REDD+ initiative) under a rather aspirational than mandatory mandate. 
Even though the existing REDD+ framework within developing countries was 
established in observance of the differential regime of the UNFCCC, Article 5(2) of the 
Paris Agreement encourages parties in general terms to also reduce emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing country parties, and further allows 
parties to cooperate in the implementation of their NDCs, including through the 
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voluntarily use of “internationally transferred mitigation outcomes” as per Articles 6(2) 
and 6.3 of the Paris Agreement.990  
 
Although the rules and regulations for this international co-operation will normally be 
developed over the coming years, the Agreement states that, if engaging in such 
transfers, parties are required to avoid ‘double counting’ in accordance with guidance 




The Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 institutes a new climate change regime which 
applies to both developed and developing countries that are parties to the UNFCCC. The 
Paris new climate change regime has abandoned the binary differential approach of the 
UNFCCC in favour of a subtler differential approach based on equity, and Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective capabilities principle, in light of different 
national circumstances. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol which bound only developed 
countries with emission mitigation obligations, the Paris Agreement has set up a series 
of GHG emission mitigation obligations for developing countries as well. Developing 
countries are therefore put under an unforeseen obligation to mitigate their GHG 
emissions in all equity, and in light of their respective national circumstances in 
contribution to the global effort to tame the climate change. The next chapter will 
undertake an analysis of the differences and the similarities of the emission mitigation 
regimes instituted for developing countries under both international legal instruments. 
  
                                                          
990 LRI ‘Commitments by developing country parties under the Paris Agreement’ (February 2016) briefing 
paper at 3. Available at: http://legalresponseinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Commitments-by-
Developing-Country-Parties-under-the-PA.pdf. (Accessed: 10 October 2016). 




CHAPTER VI: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE GREENHOUSE GASE 
MITIGATION REGIME FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES UNDER THE 






From previous discussions, it has been noticed that the binary differential approach 
which was the cornerstone of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol’s regime was replaced by a 
universal regime under the Paris Agreement.992 While under the Kyoto Protocol, 
developing countries enjoyed preferential treatment, which left them free from any 
binding emission mitigation obligation, the situation has radically changed in the Paris 
Agreement, under which developing and developed countries are equally urged to 
undertake mitigation actions in contribution to the global effort to curb climate 
change.993 Under the Paris Agreement, developing and developed countries will be 
treated on an equal basis, in the application of the Principle of Equity and Common But 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities.994 All these are evidence of 
the important regime shift that has occurred from Kyoto to Paris. However, the 
discussions in the previous chapters, especially in Chapter four and Chapter five, have 
revealed that there are some similarities and differences between the regimes set up by 
both treaties regarding the mitigation of greenhouse emissions by the group of 
developing countries. Chapter four which examined the emission mitigation regime of 
developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol has shown that they did not have any 
emission mitigation obligation,995 whereas chapter five brought forward the bulk of 
emissions mitigation obligations that applied to developing countries under the Paris 
Agreement. This current chapter sets out to attempt to identify and analyse the 
differences and similarities between the two regimes under both treaties, before 
succinctly commenting on the implications of the identified shifts for developing 
countries.  
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6.2. Comparison of emission mitigation regimes for developing countries under 
the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement  
 
6.2.1. General considerations 
 
The first and most glaring difference between the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris 
Agreement is the universal participation of all parties to the UNFCCC in the global effort 
to curb the emission of GHG under the Paris Agreement. Under the Paris’ universal 
regime, countries are equally considered, while expected to contribute to the global 
effort based on the principle of Equity and CBDR-RC. As for the regime of emission 
mitigation for developing countries, it follows from the information retrieved in 
Chapters four and five above that, there are very few similarities between Kyoto and 
Paris, yet multiple differences arise when comparing both regimes. This is because 
developing countries were not much concerned by the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, 
whereas they are fully taken into consideration by the Paris Agreement on climate 
change.996  
 
Therefore, the regimes comparison of developing countries’ emission mitigation which 
follows will not only be undertaken based on few comparable parameters between the 
two treaties but those parameters that allow such a regime comparison will mainly be 
furnished by the Paris Agreement. This is because the Paris Agreement has offered 
concrete and substantial mitigation obligations features for developing countries that 
could be referred to, whereas the Kyoto Protocol remained silent, hence offering nothing 
substantial for a regime comparison.  In other words, the enumeration and analysis of 
the differences and similarities between the two regimes will almost be limited to 
enumerating and analysing the innovations which are brought in by the Paris’ universal 
regime in contrast to the regime of exemption that was in application under the Kyoto 
Protocol for developing countries.  
 
Although in broad terms, the nuance between the two regimes may seem obvious at first 
glance because developing countries have come from a situation of no obligation under 
                                                          




the Kyoto Protocol, to a situation of concrete specific obligations under the Paris 
Agreement, the analysis of the regime transition between the two treaties remains 
relevant. In fact, a closer approach towards the legal situations of developing countries 
in both regimes exacerbates the necessity to scrutinise the subtleties of the differences 
and similarities represented by the regime transition under study. This is particularly 
relevant if one seeks to catch the significance of the new mitigation obligations for 
developing countries, consequential to the universality of the Paris Agreement.  As 
announced at the introduction of this study,997 the research was not just a mere attempt 
to catch the differences and similarities between the regimes of both treaties, but also an 
effort to understand for the group of developing countries the implications of the 
transition from the regime of Kyoto to the new regime of Paris. Table 4 below 
summarises the similarities and differences between the two regimes under the two 
treaties, and it is followed by a corresponding analysis. 
 
Although the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement were both adopted, “in pursuit of 
the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC”, they have not approached the climate change 
fight on the same basis.998 This is evidenced by their objectives and legal approaches 
which are dissimilar from each other, thus offering the first major sources of differences 
between the two treaties. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in pursuit of the objective of 
the UNFCCC to stabilise the greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at levels 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,999 
whereas the Paris Agreement has opted for a special objective of limiting the global 
temperature increase above the pre-industrial levels to well below two or even 1.5 
degrees Celsius.1000 It is acknowledged that the Paris Agreement has taken on more 
responsibilities towards curbing the GHG emissions by fixing a precisely targeted limit 
to the global temperature increase, allowing its objective to be more precise, compared 
to the Kyoto Protocol, whose objective remained as vague as the objective of the 
UNFCCC itself.  
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Regarding the legal approach of the two treaties, the Paris Agreement as discussed 
above, has adopted a bottom-up approach which is represented by the strategy of 
National Determined Contributions (NDCs), thanks to which countries self-determine 
their contributions towards the global GHG mitigation objective;1001 whereas the Kyoto 
Protocol is based on a top-down approach,1002 represented by the Quantified Emission 
Limitation and Reduction Commitments (QELRCs) strategy, under which the required 
global emission mitigation burden is statutorily shared between the parties.  
 
6.2.2. Particular considerations  
 
As explained in the previous section, the differences between the two regimes will be 
almost limited to the innovations brought by the Paris Agreement, because of the silence 
of the Kyoto Protocol regime regarding emission mitigation obligation by developing 
countries. Table 4 below summarises the similarities and differences between the two 
regimes of the two treaties. 
 
Table 4: Comparison of the emission mitigation regime for developing countries 
under the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement  
 
Parameter of comparison  The Kyoto  Protocol The Paris Agreement 
Obligation relating to the NDC 
strategy (preparation, 
implementation and report 
representing higher ambition 
compared to previous NDCs).  
No Reference to NDC 
is made under the 
Protocol  
NDC constitutes its 
core strategy and an 
obligation for 
developing countries. 
Articles 3, 4(2) and 
4(3). 
Obligation to pursue domestic 
mitigation measures with the aim 
of achieving the NDCs’ 
objectives. 
Does not exist Constitutes an 
obligation for 
Developing countries 
(Article 4.2).  
Obligation to undertake economy-
wide emission reduction or 
limitation targets over time. 
Does not exist Constitutes a non-
binding obligation for 
Developing countries 
(Article 4.4) 
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Parameter of comparison  The Kyoto  Protocol The Paris Agreement 
Obligation to “cap” GHG 
emissions in the long term.  




Obligation towards a transparency 
mechanism.  
Does not exist  Constitutes an 
obligation for 
Developing countries. 
(Articles 4.8 and 13). 
Reduction of Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest 
Degradation.  
Does not exist  Constitutes an 
obligation for 
Developing countries. 
(Articles 5.1 and 5.2). 
 
Source: Own compilation of information from previous chapters.  
 
6.3. Analysis of the differences and the similarities of the emission mitigation 
regimes of the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement for developing 
countries 
 
6.3.1. Differences  
 
The first difference between the two regimes relates to the obligation that developing 
countries have under the Paris Agreement which is to undertake mitigation activities on 
an equal basis with their counterparts in the developed countries. This obligation is 
opposed to the situation of developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol, whereby they 
had no mitigation obligation. However, it seems to be a consequence of the universal 
character of the Paris’ regime which equally applies to all, on the basis of the CBDR-
RC Principle. This is materialised by the obligation developing countries have to 
prepare, implement and report countries’ NDCs, which is urged to each time represent 
higher ambitions, as also required from the developed countries.1003  
 
At this stage, one preoccupation bounces in our spirits, that of which country is 
“developed” and which one is “developing”, regarding the obligation countries have 
henceforth to contribute to the objective of the Paris Agreement with respect to their 
respective capabilities. The above Section 2.3 of the present study discussed the notions 
                                                          




of “developing countries” and “developed countries” and raised the fact that neither the 
Kyoto Protocol (and the UNFCCC) nor the Paris Agreement provided for a clear 
definition for both notions. However, a precision towards the matters seems relevant, 
owing to its legal significance regarding the implementation of the Paris Agreement, 
which will be done based not only on the CBDR-RC principle but also on countries’ 
self-classification as developed or developing. This is because depending on whether a 
country will classify itself as pertaining to either group, the country will accordingly 
plan for its contribution to the global mitigation effort, as developing countries have 
been granted special treatment with respect to the emission mitigation, despite the 
universal character of the new regime.1004  
 
Although the assumption of the present study that any reference to “developing” or 
“developed” country by the Paris Agreement is to be envisaged in the sense of countries 
that are either “Non-Annex I” or “Annex I” and “Annex II” under the UNFCCC, the 
issue of countries’ classification at this point deserves to be discussed afresh. While a 
self-classification of some countries as “developing countries” under the Paris 
Agreement may be easily digestible and hardly disputable by their peers and by the 
observers, it may not be the case for some other countries, especially the key emitters 
from developing countries, such as the BASIC countries,1005 from which more important 
mitigation efforts are expected owing to the importance of their current participation in 
global emission. The thing is, developing countries do not have the same economical or 
environmental potentialities and neither do they face similar challenges relating to 
climate change.  
 
The historical development of the climate change discussions as exposed in chapter three 
above outlined the progressive and growing concern regarding the necessity of a 
significant participation of developing countries in the global effort to curb climate 
change. Now that their participation has been secured, the discussion will arguably move 
towards the effectiveness of such participation, on the basis of their respective 
capabilities. This is roughly for two reasons, first, as discussed in Chapter five of this 
study, chances to secure the required amount of emissions cut for the global temperature 
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increase to stay well below two degrees Celsius will be hampered if major emitters from 
developing countries only take up symbolic mitigation responsibilities; secondly, as 
discussed in chapter three and five above, the current heterogeneity of the group of 
developing countries dictates a reconsideration of the trend of putting them together as 
if they were a unified homogeneous group, with comparable capabilities regarding the 
mitigation of emissions.  
 
The current emission figures show that developing countries do not similarly emit the 
GHG, and did not do so in the past.1006 Therefore, they should not be required to equally 
contribute to the global mitigation effort.1007  The reasoning which applies to this matter 
is slightly similar to the one that was applied under the Kyoto Protocol, based on 
principles such as the CBDR and the polluter pays principle and that obliged developed 
countries to take on more climate change responsibilities owing to their greater historical 
contribution to the phenomenon.1008 Even from an economical point of view, developing 
countries are currently diversely equipped, with some paradoxically among the richest 
countries in the world, even far richer than some developed countries, whereas some 
countries are very poor, with comparably insignificant GHG emissions.  
 
For instance, countries that are members of the BASIC group have far more contributed 
to the problem of global emissions and have far more financial capabilities compared to 
countries that are members of the AOSIS group, or even those that are part of the LDC. 
The BASIC countries should therefore, be expected to take on more emission mitigation 
responsibilities under the new universal regime, in application of the CBDR-RC 
principle. Similarly, the Oil Producing Countries (OPEC), which from the start 
questioned the science of climate change because of their fear for the backwash of 
climate change measures on oil trade, should take on more emission mitigation 
responsibilities and even more financial burdens regarding emission mitigation, in 
comparison with the other G77 countries that are not OPEC members. 
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While some developing countries are paying the price of climate change, others are 
contributing to it at levels similar to developed countries. Therefore, the efforts expected 
from both categories of developing countries would not and should not be the same. The 
mitigation efforts expected from the current major emitters that were classified, 
“developing countries” in 1992 and under the Kyoto Protocol will be almost similar to 
the efforts required from developed countries.1009  That is the reason why if countries 
that are in this category self-classify themselves as “developing countries” in order to 
contribute less than they could or should under normal circumstances, there may be 
contestations from their peers given their greater capabilities to contribute. This may 
also become a further point of disputes during climate change future negotiations, as the 
fate of the planet would be at stake.  
 
Even among the developing countries themselves, a call was already launched for a 
differentiation between them because of the noticed heterogeneous character of the 
group with respect to emission mitigation.1010 The call was made by the coalition for 
rainforest nations, which became the first group of climate change negotiating countries 
to advocate for a staged approach that differentiates between developing countries.1011 
However, as an attempt to answer the above concern, the Paris Agreement has adopted 
the strategy of NDCs in the view of getting all the countries to contribute to the global 
response to the climate change threat in accordance with their respective capabilities. 
Nevertheless, unlike the Kyoto’s strategy of QELRCs, which provided to parties clear 
and definite statutory allocations of emission reduction targets, the strategy of NDCs in 
the Paris Agreement puts the emphasis not on the volume of GHG emission to be 
reduced by parties, but rather on the obligation to prepare, implement and report the 
NDCs. 
 
According to Bodansky, the difference between the Paris Agreement’s NDCs and the 
Kyoto Protocol’s QELRCs strategies can be seen from four angles: First, the NDCs are 
nationally determined rather than collectively negotiated as it was the case with the 
QELRCs’ targets. Second, the substantial element of the NDCs is not legally binding, 
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as the Paris Agreement does not provide for any obligation to achieve them, unlike the 
QELRCs of Kyoto. Third, NDCs are to be recorded in a public registry to be established 
by the secretariat of the UNFCCC rather than in an Annex to the treaty, as it was the 
case for the QELRCs under Kyoto.1012 Fourth, NDCs are required from all parties that 
are part of the Agreement, contrarily to the QELRCs that concerned only the developed 
country parties.1013 
 
However, still on the subject of the obligation to undertake mitigation activities, one 
more interesting differentiating feature of both regimes is the lack of legal sanctions 
attached to the breach of parties’ obligations under the Paris Agreement compared to the 
Kyoto Protocol.1014 As discussed in section 5.4.8.2 above, there is a breach of a Party’s 
statutory obligation each time a country fails to produce its NDC. However, the new 
regime remains silent regarding the possibility that a country may submit its NDC but 
decide thereafter not to honour its pledges, or otherwise, regularly produces it, but 
decides not to submit it to the UNFCCC secretariat. Therefore, such absence of legal 
sanctions attached to this kind of behaviours, which by passing are challenging to the 
objective of the Paris Agreement, constitute arguably a regression of the Paris 
Agreement in comparison to the Kyoto Protocol which had its compliance mechanism 
assorted with sanctions towards parties’ contravening behaviours.1015 
 
The second characteristic which differentiates both regimes, relates to the obligation 
developing countries have under the Paris Agreement which is to pursue domestic 
mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the objectives they set up in their NDCs. 
1016 This is radically different from the Kyoto Protocol’s regime, under which developing 
countries had rather the option of voluntarily undertaking mitigation measures, in the 
application of Articles 4.2 (g) and 4.2 (a) of the UNFCCC.1017 As it was the case for the 
previous point, the current differing characteristic also seems to be consequential to the 
universal character of the Paris’ regime.  
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The analysis that follows will lean on the CDM and on the strategy of the Reduction of 
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD), 
because they are both emission mitigation strategic measures that applied to developing 
countries under the UNFCCC/Kyoto regime and that will continue under the Paris 
Regime, subject to some adjustments as exposed below.1018 The use of the CDM by 
developing countries parties aimed inter alia at securing their contribution to the global 
mitigation efforts while achieving countries’ sustainable developmental goals in the 
cleanest way.1019 Through the adoption of the CDM strategy, developing countries 
became part of the global GHG abatement coalition under the Kyoto’s regime, with 
substantial participation in terms of emission reductions, although they had no binding 
obligations. Even though the Paris Agreement has made no expressed reference to the, 
“Clean Development Mechanism” , it has, however, taken it into consideration, as 
suggests the interpretation of its Articles 6.4 - 6.9, which provide for a new mechanism 
that will be implemented on behalf of the CDM strategy of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The Paris Agreement’s new mechanism aims at first, facilitating the realisation of 
country parties’ emission mitigation obligations as it was the case for the CDM under 
the Kyoto Protocol,1020 and second, delivering an overall mitigation outcomes in 
contribution to lowering the global emission of GHG, with net mitigation impacts.1021 
Unlike the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris’ new mechanism is not focused on 
carbon offsetting alone, its scope is rather broader because all the parties that will be 
voluntarily using the mechanism will be expected to first have some form of mitigation 
commitments which they are being compliant with.1022  
 
The third characteristic which constitutes a contrast between the two regimes is the 
obligation that developing countries have under the Paris Agreement of undertaking 
economy wide emission reduction or limitation targets over time, which also did not 
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exist under the Kyoto Protocol. Although the exclusion of developing countries from the 
Kyoto’s scheme raised serious questions about the overall effectiveness of the treaty, 
some parties were on the contrary in favour of the exclusion, and argued that it would 
not be viable to require developing countries to undertake and meet binding emission 
mitigation targets, because of their weaker economies at that time. 1023  A quarter of a 
century later, the questions parties to the UNFCCC should ask themselves are, ‘has the 
economic situation of the group of developing countries improved, worsened or has it 
remained static over time?’, ‘Are the probable evolutions evenly observable in every 
one of the developing countries identified in 1992, or is it that some developing countries 
have improved their economies and national circumstances while others are in the worst 
economic situation a quarter of a century later?’ However, as discussed in section 5.4.8.4 
above, negotiating countries in Paris adopted such obligations towards developing 
countries mainly because they were pressed by the urgency of the call towards a global 
participation in the effort to limit the global temperature increase under 2 degrees Celsius 
by the end of the current century. Arguably, negotiating parties did not thoroughly 
consider the feasibility of such obligations regarding developing countries’ capability to 
comply with it. 
 
Although developing countries constitutes a heterogeneous group, comprising of some 
rich and well-equipped countries such as the members of the BASIC group, the oil 
producing developing countries, and some poorer such as the LDC countries, it is 
important to note that it is the majority of them that lacked and may still lack the financial 
means to implement adequate climate change policies, besides they acknowledged under 
equipment regarding climate change. The majority of developing countries still uses 
older, dirtier and polluting technologies in sustaining their economies and lack the 
necessary infrastructure and policies that can allow them to develop alternatives that are 
environmentally-friendly. 1024   
 
Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement urges developed countries to provide financial 
resources to assist developing country parties with respect to their mitigation and 
                                                          






adaptation plans, in continuation of their existing obligations under the UNFCCC.1025 
Article 9.2 provides for a scaling-up of the climate change financial assistance which 
should take into account country-driven strategies and the priorities, as well as the needs 
of developing country parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the 
LDC and the small island developing states.  
 
However, despite the above disposition of the new regime, which offers some guarantees 
of financial assistance towards developing countries in meeting their new obligations, 
the absence of an effective working financial mechanism under the Paris Agreement will 
defeat its very objective if not channelled to help developing countries, especially the 
most vulnerable to ensure a transition towards a green economy.1026 The reason is that 
those vulnerable countries may continue to rely on older, inefficient and highly emitting 
technologies for their developmental goals, as they lack the necessary financial means 
to acquire the modern low-emitting technologies and other equipment in order to comply 
with their new obligations under the universal climate change regime.1027 Furthermore, 
with the current demographic expansion and the need for economic development that 
developing countries are experimenting, emissions might likely continue to grow, 
despite that their national goal will to be compliant with their new mitigation obligations. 
Therefore, from a global perspective, the climate change fight will be the loser and will 
put in danger the objective of the Paris’ Agreement, because any gain obtained from the 
emissions abatement realised through the contribution of developed countries would be 
offset by the growth of the emissions originating from those developing countries, to 
whom no other choice would be left beside the use of their cheaper but highly polluting 
technologies to build and sustain their national economies.  
 
The fourth differentiating characteristic refers to the obligation to cap GHG emissions 
in the long term run. It can as well be subject to an analysis similar to the one made 
above. As it was the case for the three previous parameters in comparison, the obligation 
that developing countries should cap their GHG emissions did not exist under the Kyoto 
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Protocol. Therefore, it constitutes an innovation brought into the climate change regime 
by the Paris Agreement. However, even though in the future, the capping of greenhouse 
gas emissions as required under the Paris Agreement will be beneficial to developing 
countries (and the global environment) once achieved, the immediate associated costs to 
achieving that will be one of the greatest challenges for the group of developing 
countries.  
 
It is broadly admitted that countries feel more encouraged, or even pressed to initiate 
institutional and policy actions and reforms on a ground level once confronted by top-
down emission reduction target.1028 Therefore, because of the exemption regime they 
enjoyed under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, most developing countries were 
not motivated in adopting adequate national mitigation policies. Because of that, there 
are at present legitimate concerns regarding whether or not developing countries are able 
to successfully adopt and implement measures to cap their GHG emissions in the long 
run, as required by the new regime. This is because the mitigation governance 
frameworks which is currently in place in developing countries are those set up in 
response to the previous UNFCCC/Kyoto exemption regime.1029 However, in the event 
the assessment of the governance frameworks which are currently in place will reveal 
that they require to be upgraded, the concern will turn to be whether the richer parties to 
the Agreement would make available the needed financial and material support in order 
to realise the necessary adjustments? This ultimately brings us back to the concern 
regarding the financial mechanism of the Paris Agreement, which we have succinctly 
discussed above, due to the limitations of the current study which unfortunately did not 
give much space to such debate.  
 
From the current context, the mitigation measures that the Paris Agreement expect 
developing countries to take seems hardly affordable for most of them, because of the 
related direct costs, the loss of jobs and other associated long-term costs as discussed 
above.1030 The economic implications are of such a magnitude that many experts think 
that the exigencies regarding climate change will not be prioritised by developing 
                                                          
1028 S. Rayner ‘How to eat an elephant: a bottom-up approach to climate policy’ (2010) 10 (6) Cl. Pol at 
620. 
1029 See note Chapter 4 above on the regime of the Kyoto Protocol for more details. 




countries, as there will still be many more important and immediate domestic priorities 
that they will need to consider and try to solve first, before taking on climate change 
consideration.1031  
 
The fifth differentiating characteristic concerns the obligation developing countries have 
towards the transparency mechanism established under Article 13.1 of the Paris 
Agreement. The transparency mechanism is a common framework and an accountability 
mechanism in order to build mutual trust and confidence among parties and to promote 
an effective implementation of the Agreement.1032 To that end, Article 4.8 of the Paris 
Agreement introduces a new obligation which did not exist under the Kyoto regime, 
which urges all the parties to the Agreement to provide all the information which is 
necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding while communicating their NDCs. 
As for developing countries, they are in addition expected to provide information on the 
support needed and received from third parties, including information on the use of any 
received support, as well as the impacts and results secured, thanks to it.  
 
6.3.2. Similarities  
 
As a result of the emptiness of the Kyoto Protocol regarding developing countries’ 
mitigation obligations, similarities between its regime and the regime of the Paris 
Agreement are scarce. Nevertheless, the study has noted some few features of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s regime regarding the mitigation obligation that are also found in the Paris 
Agreement and will be applied to developing countries as well. They are the object of 
the focus of the study here below. 
 
The first point of similarity is the reliance on domestic policies for the realisation of the 
objective of the treaty, as the NDCs of the Paris Agreement are based on domestic 
policies on climate change that countries need to adopt and implement, in contribution 
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to the global effort to mitigation as per the Agreement’s Article 4.2.1033 Under Article 10 
(b) (ii) of the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries were also expected to voluntarily 
undertake emission mitigation activities,1034 because they were expected to include in 
their national communication information on programmes which contain climate change 
measures, including the abatement of increases in greenhouse gas emissions. 
  
“Parties included in Annex I shall submit information on action under this Protocol, 
including national programmes, in accordance with Article 7; and other Parties shall 
seek to include in their national communications, as appropriate, information on 
programmes which contain measures that the Party believes contribute to addressing 
climate change and its adverse impacts, including the abatement of increases in 
greenhouse gas emissions, and enhancement of and removals by sinks, capacity building 
and adaptation measures”1035 
 
This disposition of the Kyoto Protocol provided for voluntary mitigation actions by 
developing countries, in contribution to the global effort to curb climate change. Similar 
provisions are found under Articles 2.1(a), 2.1(a) (vi), and 2.1(b) of the Kyoto Protocol 
whereby country parties are urged to adopt and elaborate policies and measures in 
accordance with their national circumstances and undertake appropriate reforms in 
relevant sectors aimed at promoting policies and measures which limit or reduce 
emissions of GHG. Although the elaboration and implementation of NDCs by parties 
constitute a legally binding obligation under the Paris Agreement, their content is not 
legally binding and rather depends on parties themselves, who will decide on their 
national mitigation goals and on which activities to bring forth as a national contribution 
to the climate change response, as it is the case for developing countries under Article 
10 (b) (ii) of the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
The next point of similarity between the two regimes is found under Article 15.1 of the 
Paris Agreement and Article 15.1 of the Kyoto Protocol. Article 15.1 of the Paris 
Agreement has established a statutory mechanism which aims at facilitating the 
implementation of the treaty by country parties and promote compliance with its 
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provisions, whereas Article 15.1 of the Kyoto Protocol has established a subsidiary body 
for the implementation of the Protocol, with the mandate of facilitating the 
implementation and promoting compliance with the provisions of the Protocol among 
the country parties. A closer analysis of both provisions has shown that the facilitative 
mechanisms of both treaties were roughly comparable. A further comparable element 
can be the review mechanism attached to the NDCs strategy under the Paris Agreement, 
which is planned to be held every five years. Such approach looks similar to the review 
Mechanism provided for in Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the Kyoto Protocol, as far as the 
voluntary mitigation activities undertaken by developing countries are concerned. 
 
6.4. Conclusion  
 
The present chapter was an attempt to identify and analyse the differences and 
similarities between the emission mitigation regimes established by the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Paris Agreement for developing countries. Due to the silence of the Kyoto 
Protocol regarding the obligation to emission mitigation by developing countries, the 
comparative analysis between the two regimes could hardly be established upon 
anything substantial taken from the Kyoto Protocol in comparison to the Paris 
Agreement. The differences between the two regimes were eventually limited to an 
attempt to contrast the five major innovations brought by the Paris Agreement against 
some of the features of Kyoto Protocol that could be extended to the mitigation of 
emissions by developing countries. Although unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris 
Agreement covers all the country parties to the UNFCCC, there are growing concerns 
about whether developing countries have in place, or will be able to have in place the 
adequate framework to guarantee the success of their obligations under the new regime. 










7.1. Overview of the thesis  
 
The present thesis is an attempt to capture the contribution of developing countries to 
the current global effort to tackle climate change. It has specifically endeavoured to draw 
a comparative analysis between two legally adopted regimes in order to govern the GHG 
emission abatement by country parties to the UNFCCC. The first regime was the one 
under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (which has had two commitment periods) and the second 
regime was the one under the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. It is to this end 
that the study has been limited and focused on the core provisions of both treaties that 
were concerned with the mitigation of GHG emissions by developing countries.  
 
Investigations accounting for the study were conducted around the key question: “To 
what extent has the GHG emission reduction regime of developing countries parties to 
the UNFCCC shifted from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 2015 Paris Agreement on 
climate change?” There were two broader sub-questions that guided the research, the 
first was: “What were the differences and the similarities between the GHG emissions 
mitigation regimes for developing countries under both treaties?” whereas the second 
was, “If there were any differences or similarities resulting from the regime shift from 
Kyoto to Paris, what were the implications of those differences or similarities for the 
group of developing countries?”  
 
What justified the research was the importance of considering well before the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement, the bulk of legal obligations relating to GHG 
mitigation as it was put on the shoulders of the developing country parties, being that 
the obligations under the Paris Agreement are in contrast with the exemptions 
developing countries enjoyed under the Kyoto Protocol. That is the reason why the study 
was limited to the GHG mitigation provisions of both treaties, in order to provide a 
broader view on their legal characteristics for developing countries, and further outline 





The dissertation began by sketching the overall research as an introduction and then it 
gave an overview on the key notions of the study. Notions regarding climate change 
science, or the controversial concepts of developed versus developing countries, as well 
as some insightful analysis regarding the Principle of Equity and CBDR-RC, were 
exposed and discussed. Through climate change science, the research was mostly 
focused on the area of GHG emissions and also considered the drivers of the emissions 
that are occurring currently and also the global figures of global emissions, before 
discussing the reasons for concern for the mitigation of global emissions.  
 
The criteria that are referred to while deciding whether a country is a “developed 
country” or a “developing country” were analysed and discussed in chapter two. This 
was done because it is on that classification that rested the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol 
climate change regime, which did create a controversial bifurcation of climate change 
responsibilities between the two groups of countries, particularly in the field of 
emissions mitigations. The UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol’s regime has allocated the burden 
of emissions mitigation to developed countries that were listed in Annex I, owing to the 
interpretation and the application of the CBDR principle based on the climate change 
context and knowledge that prevailed in 1992.  
 
The study then considered the birth and the historical moves made by the 
UNFCCC/Kyoto international emission mitigation regime for developing countries over 
time. It has analysed the evolution of the discussions under the Conference of the Parties 
to the UNFCCC (COP) forums and has put to light the fact that the differential treatment 
between developed and developing countries was being increasingly attacked and ended 
up defeated and replaced by the Paris’ universal regime which is applicable to all. This 
occurred for two reasons: first, from a situation where, at the adoption of the UNFCCC 
in 1992, the global context was dominated by the emissions from OECD countries 
(developed countries) as main emitters at the time, developing countries’ emissions has 
swollen to the extent that they are at present among the main emitters worldwide. This 
radical evolution eventually brought into question the meaning and usefulness of the 
regime of exemption to emission mitigation developing countries were granted under 




universal participation of all countries, whether developed or developing to undertake 
emissions mitigation activities to save the planet. 
 
In chapter four, the dissertation analysed the Kyoto Protocol’s regime regarding the 
emission mitigation by developing countries, which it has noticed to be substantially 
void of any legally binding mitigation obligation for developing countries, before 
putting under scrutiny, in chapter five, the Paris Agreement’s universal regime, which 
applies binding mitigation obligation to developing countries as well. The analyses 
undertaken in chapters four and five were done in order to identify the key features of 
the regimes in both treaties regarding the emissions mitigation by developing countries, 
with the aim of obtaining a platform for a regime comparison based on the identified 
parameters. Chapter six undertook the comparison between the regimes of the two 
treaties has exposed and discussed the key features that constitute the regime shift for 
the mitigation of GHG emission by developing countries. This present chapter concludes 
with an overview of the thesis and a summary of the key findings from the analysis 
conducted on the regimes of both treaties, assorted with the possible ways forward. 
 
7.2. Summary of findings  
 
Broadly speaking, the nuance between the two regimes will look obvious at first glance, 
this is because in one hand there is the regime of the Kyoto Protocol, under which 
nothing substantial was required from developing countries apart from an expectation 
that they would undertake voluntary mitigation actions; and on the other hand the regime 
of the Paris Agreement, under which developing countries have specific substantial 
mitigation obligations. However, although these contrasting characteristics seem to offer 
at first glance the difference that exists between the two regimes of the two treaties, a 
closer consideration of both texts has revealed more regime subtleties which has allowed 
the drawing of the differences and the similarities of both treaties regarding the emission 
mitigation regime by developing countries. Chapter six above identified and analysed 
those subtleties. The following section will be an attempt to summarise them as they 
consist of differences and similarities between the two regimes, in order to catch the 
significance of the new mitigation obligations that are on the shoulders of developing 





7.2.1. The abandonment of the differential treatment applied under the regimes 
of UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol between developing and developed 
countries 
 
In response to the first sub-question that was raised in this study, chapter four established 
that there was hardly consensus among parties regarding the absence of emission 
mitigation obligations for the group of developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Given the background of the pressing call towards all the parties to the UNFCCC to 
converge their efforts to contain the global temperature increase within the margin of 2 
degrees Celsius compared to the pre-industrial era and thus avoid dangerous 
anthropogenic interferences with the climate system, concerns arose about the increasing 
emissions from the group of developing countries, to the extent of becoming one of the 
major controversial points during the climate change talks, as demonstrated by chapter 
three. After the Chinese emissions surpassed those of the United States of America in 
2007, it became evident that something had to change regarding the UNFCCC/Kyoto 
differential treatment which was in favour of developing countries.1036 The new major 
emitters among developing countries were especially finger pointed to be included as 
well in an emission mitigation scheme. After 2007, efforts to maintain the 
UNFCCC/Kyoto’s differential regime were not only in vain, but they also provoked 
increased dissatisfactions and attacks from the majority of developed countries to the 
point of almost bringing the collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the blockage of climate 
change negotiations.  
 
Chapter three established that prior to 2015, the inclusion of developing countries in an 
emission mitigation scheme became a key point during the COP negotiations towards a 
new climate change regime. Chapter five, in turn  established that the 2015 Paris 
Agreement brought the solution to the above matter by instituting a universal climate 
change regime which applies to both developed and developing country parties to the 
UNFCCC. The Paris Agreement has abandoned the binary differential approach of the 
UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol in favour of a subtle differential approach which is based on 
                                                          




equity, and Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities 
principle, in light of different national circumstances. Therefore, unlike the Kyoto 
Protocol which only regulated developed countries’ emissions, the Paris Agreement has 
set a series of innovative provisions towards emission mitigation by developing 
countries as well. These provisions urge developing countries to undertake emission 
mitigation actions, in contribution to the global effort to tame climate change, hoping 
that by increasing the amount of emissions covered by binding mitigation measures, one 
also increased chances of staying well below the 2 degrees Celsius of temperature 
increase required. Chapter four has shown that the Kyoto Protocol’s regime refrained 
from allocating emission mitigation targets to developing countries, whereas chapter 
five has identified five key features of the Paris Agreement’s regime regarding the 
obligations of emission mitigation by developing countries. The five key features are as 
follows: 
 
o The obligation to prepare, communicate and maintain successive ambitious NDC;  
o The obligation to pursue domestic mitigation measures; 
o The obligation to undertake economy wide emission reduction or limitation targets over 
time;  
o The obligation to “cap” GHG emissions in a long term run;  
o The obligations towards the transparency mechanism of the Agreement.  
 
In chapter 5, developing countries have been found to be a heterogeneous group, which 
deserves to be taken into consideration in implementing the Paris Agreement, to avoid 
a misuse of the CBDR-RC principle. 
 
7.2.2. Differences and similarities between the regimes of the Kyoto Protocol and 
the Paris Agreement regarding the mitigation of emission by developing 
countries  
 
In response to the two sub-questions of the study, chapter six has identified, analysed, 
and discussed the implications of the differences and similarities between the emission 
mitigation regimes established by both treaties for the group of developing countries. 




by developing countries, nothing significant could be referred to for a comparison to the 
above features of the Paris Agreement’s regime. Therefore, the comparative analysis of 
the differences and similarities of the two regimes turned to become an effort to contrast 
the Paris’ above five key features against the Kyoto’s regime of no mitigation obligation 
for developing countries.  
 
From an environmental perspective, the inclusion of developing countries in the global 
effort by the Paris Agreement to as well mitigate their GHG emission constitutes a 
success which is harvested by the climate change international diplomacy. However, 
there are growing concerns about the chances of a successful implementation of the 
above obligations by the majority of developing countries, because the implementation 
by developing countries of their new statutory obligations constitutes the next step for 
the new climate change regime. It is also and the logical implication of the regime shift 
that has occurred from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement. Whether or not 
developing countries will be able to put in place the adequate frameworks that guarantee 
a successful implementation of their obligations under the new regime is among the 
things that matter next. Especially because of the identified inadequacy of the NDCs 
pledges with what is required in terms of emission cuts in order to stay within a safe 
margin of temperature increase at the end of the present century, as discussed in section 
5.4.8.2 above. 
 
To prepare and maintain the successive NDCs, more ambitious each time in comparison 
to the previous ones, and to undertake economy wide emission reduction with the aim 
of curbing the emissions in a long term run will need a huge support to developing 
countries from developed countries, as also acknowledged by the Paris Agreement’s 
provisions with that respect. Further works will, therefore be needed, namely through 
the COP processes, in order to identify and to solve the gaps towards such achievements. 
It will also be useful to identify any potential source of hindrance for the success of the 
new regime and endeavour to deal with upstream. This is because the fate of the future 





7.2.3. Recommendations  
 
The recommendation which emanates from the current research concern the possibility 
of  a success or a failure regarding the expectations that arose because of the inclusion 
of developing countries in a universal climate change regime. This is done because of 
the benefits that inclusion can bring regarding the climate change problem, given that 
henceforth, developing and developed countries are both put under obligation to mitigate 
their GHG emissions.  
 
After the adoption of the Paris Agreement, which was followed by its faster than 
expected entry into force, the next step towards its success becomes its effective 
implementation by country parties, especially the developing countries. in other words, 
to reach its goal, the Paris Agreement will need full involvement of all categories of 
developing countries, whether major or insignificant emitters, this is because from 2020 
onwards, the Paris Agreement will be the principal global instrument under which will 
be organised the international, and further the domestic response to climate change for 
country parties, whereas developing countries are expected to be the main emitters of 
the GHG from 2030 onwards. Therefore, a successful implementation of the Paris 
Agreement by developing countries might determine its success, as well as the fulfilment 
of its ultimate objective.  
 
However, subject to the heterogeneity of the group of developing countries, which 
comprise both rich and poor countries, with varying financial and material climate 
change capabilities, the above hope to a successful Paris Agreement which is put on a 
full and significant participation of the group of developing countries may be threatened 
by the poverty and poor national circumstances of the majority of them. Especially 
because most of developing country parties are currently recognised not to have the 
necessary means to implement the Agreement and comply with their new mitigation 
obligations, hence the concern about their effective participation to the new regime in 
the absence of a mechanism of assistance as said above.1037 
 
                                                          




After months of considering, analysing and writing about the regime shift regarding the 
emission mitigation obligation that the Paris Agreement has introduced for developing 
countries, it is humbling to only realise that the journey towards the effectiveness of its 
new regime has not yet even started. This is because the adoption of a treaty is one thing 
and its success is another, especially in the field of climate change where the failure of 
the Kyoto Protocol to reach its targets is pedagogical. The urgency of actions to slow 
climate change and limit the global temperature increase to well below two degrees at 
the end of the current century as required by the Paris Agreement will necessitate that 
country parties ensure that everything needed to that extent is put in place.  
 
The fact that developing countries have been eventually included into a universal regime 
of binding emission mitigation does not in itself constitute the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the global emission gap to be filled, although above any other 
consideration, it seems to be the most important outcome the climate change diplomacy 
may have to date.1038 One has to ensure, thereafter that countries have the necessary 
means to successfully implement the treaty after it has been ratified. This will especially 
be the case for developing countries as they need to undertake innovative emission 
mitigation efforts and acquire sober carbon technologies, as well as deploy other forms 
of efforts towards a decarbonised economy, in order to be able to deliver the expected 
national mitigation outcomes in contribution to the fulfilment of the objective of the new 
treaty. For such enterprises to be undertaken by poor and underequipped countries will 
unavoidably need assistance from those who have the needed means. Therefore, 
developed countries will have to assume more effectively their statutory role of leading 
the fight against climate change and pursue their assistance towards the developing 
country parties to the new regime to allow them to optimise their contribution to the 
fight against the global threat of climate change. 
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